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ABSTRACT 
 Verification of data-plane software is limited to verifying point properties such as 
bounded packet processing time or not misinterpreting malformed packet headers, which 
usually are chosen to illustrate the merits of some verification technique. Therefore, these 
techniques can be thought of as vertical verification techniques. 
 There are, however, many other properties of interest that vertical techniques do 
not address, such as timing, which is important for verifying the correct behavior of, say, 
a MAC address learning table. What is needed is a horizontal verification technique, one 
that enables us to reason about a wide variety of temporal properties. Volpano has 
proposed such a technique but with a major twist. Data-plane software is not verified ex 
post facto but rather, it is verified by construction. His approach focuses on building code 
that guarantees the assertions of the specification, instead of attempting to verify the 
assertions after the code has been generated. The correctness of complex networks can be 
verified by simply verifying the basic components that compose it. 
 This thesis explores the feasibility of implementing such an approach by first 
specifying the behaviors of some basic network functions. More complex data-plane 
behavior, such as switching and firewalling, are then built using these basic functions. C 
code is then automatically generated for the data-plane that is guaranteed to exhibit the 
more complex behavior. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Domain-specific programming languages like the P4 language (Programming 
Protocol-Independent Packet Processors) [1] allow one to build switches and routers in 
software. This can result in cheaper network devices compared to proprietary Application 
Specific Integrated Circuits (ASIC). Yet, like other general-purpose programming 
languages, P4 programs can have bugs. Verifying the correctness of P4 programs is done 
in much the same way as verifying conventional programs. Source code is analyzed, 
perhaps semi-automatically, to ensure that it has certain properties. These properties are 
determined in advance and are typically vertical in that they are chosen to illustrate a 
particular verification methodology. For instance, static properties might be considered 
like bounded execution, crash-freedom, filtering [2], control misconfiguration, code 
circumvention [3], proper packet handling and general safety properties [4].  
An alternative to verification of source code is verification by construction. The 
rationale for this alternative is that if one must verify whether assertions hold, as in [3], 
then why not generate code that satisfies the assertions rather than writing code and then 
attempting to verify that the assertions hold. This is the direction taken by Volpano in [5]. 
The particular kind of specifications suggested in [5] admits scalable verification proofs, 
which is new in the industry. As such, network device software, no matter how complex, 
has the potential to be verified by only verifying the rudimentary behaviors that comprise 
it. The challenge remaining in the approach is whether it is feasible to produce, directly 
from a specification, efficient code that is guaranteed to satisfy the specification. If so, 
then the best of both worlds of performance and verified code can be achieved. 
B. MOTIVATION  
The rapid increase of network complexity requires the network infrastructure to 
continuously upgrade the hardware to support it. The increasing complexity of network 
service implemented also increases the number of physical boxes as each network 
function is performed through its own exclusive hardware. A network service is a 
2 
combination of several network functions such as forwarding, routing, stateful firewalling 
and intrusion detection system. In addition to the cost associated with the hardware of 
each added network function, the cost of housing space, cooling, and the difficulty of 
integrating the vast amount of disparate hardware have made the scaling of network 
functionality through hardware a challenging proposition. These challenges make scaling 
of network functionality through software, commonly referred to as Network Function 
Virtualization (NFV), appealing. 
NFV is implementing a network function in software through marshaling physical 
resources at any scale. In NFV, a network service is implemented in software and isolated 
from the hardware, thus enabling multiple network functions to be run on one platform. 
This, in turn, reduces the number of physical boxes requiring rack space and cooling. 
Another benefit of NFV is the reduced time to develop a network function since the 
development of hardware is no longer a concern.  
At the same time, the Virtualized Network Function (VNF) software used to 
implement a network function has thus far been dependent on the coding ability of the 
programmer. Given that VNF software is not bound to the same rigorous testing that a 
physical box solution usually goes through because of the costly nature of producing 
dysfunctional physical box, VNF software is more susceptible to bugs, which limits its 
reliability and correctness. Therefore, the reliability and correctness of the VNF software 
are very susceptible to bugs depending on the expertise and diligence of the programmer. 
A better approach is to allow a network operator to synthesize an implementation of a 
network function based on the properties the operator wants the function to have and to 
provide the operator with proof the implementation is correct. This is the approach taken 
by Volpano in his paper titled “Modular Network Function Virtualization” [5]. Volpano 
decomposes a network function into primitive elements represented as λ-Symbolic Finite 
Automata (SFA), such that verifying the function follows directly from verifying its 
primitive elements. If it were possible to generate efficient code for the functions, then 
we would have a way to build real implementations that are correct by construction. 
Against this background, this thesis investigates the feasibility of generating efficient 
code from these primitive elements. 
3 
C. RELATED WORK 
In the paper “Verifying Isolation Properties in the Presence of Middle Boxes” [6], 
an approach was introduced to verify network properties in a network with devices that 
maintain state. The middleboxes in the network are abstracted into a deterministic model 
using first-order logic. The combination of these middleboxes forms the network model 
representing the network of concern. This model is then verified using model checking to 
determine whether properties such as isolation and reachability hold. Since the model is 
abstracted from the actual implementation of the middleboxes, any conclusions reached 
apply to the network model, not necessarily to the actual network. The model may not 
faithfully represent the network. The approach serves to improve verification of network 
functions including NFV, but for a complex network service, the approach may not be 
well suited due to the difficulty of forming a model that will be fully or sufficiently 
representative of the actual network.  
Research to improve the performance of software-based network functions has 
been conducted, such as in [7]. A new design of Forwarding Information Base (FIB) or 
MAC table using the cuckoo hashing technique is proposed and investigated. The 
approach uses an optimized version of the cuckoo hashing together with batching and 
prefetching to enable its proposed Ethernet software switch to have high packet 
forwarding rate while keeping a large FIB. Although the research serves to improve the 
forwarding performance of a software switch with large memory resource requirement, it 
does not address the scalability of the number of ports on the switch.  
Kohler et al. suggest an architecture for designing a modular software router 
called Click in [8]. The modules in Click are called elements and in an operating router, 
the elements are C++ objects. An element can be described by its element class, ports, 
configuration strings and method interfaces. Some examples of elements are 
FromDevice(), which receives a packet at the device interface specified in argument; 
Counter, which counts the number of packets that pass through it; and Tee, which 
duplicates the packet it receives on its input and sends one copy each to multiple 
interfaces. Usage of the configuration strings would be to specify a Tee element class as 
Tee (2), which sets a Tee element as having two output ports. The elements are connected 
4 
by two functions called push() and pull(). Push() allows the upstream element to initiate 
packet transfer, while pull() allows the downstream element to initiate packet transfer. 
This element essentially segments software router code into function blocks, and the 
router operates by function blocks calling push() or pull() to pass packet through a chain 
of functions for processing. Data in the function processing can be obtained by a method 
interface to the function. This approach is parallel to the approach of [5]. However, in [5], 
the modular elements are λ-SFAs instead of C++ objects. Furthermore, λ-SFAs make 
formal verification proof possible, while focusing on the direct implementation of the 
functionality as C++ classes may result in undesirable behaviors that are difficult to 
discover or verify.  
Software-based network functions shift the data-plane functionalities from 
traditional hardware devices, which have a specific capability built-in, to a more flexible 
platform where behavior is defined exclusively in software by programmers. An example 
is the P4 programming language [4]. P4 is a domain-specific language for describing the 
forwarding semantics of switches at a higher level, which is then compiled. As mentioned 
in [4], it is becoming more difficult to verify the correctness of a network data-plane even 
when expressed in P4. The usual approach is via exhaustive testing; however, this 
approach is expensive and time-consuming, especially with software-defined networking 
devices that handle numerous complex data-plane functionalities, protocols and packet 
formats. An example of the difficulty is given in [4] with respect to a firewall 
implemented in P4. The behavior of the firewall might not be fully defined by the 
programmers for all different types of packet. Based on the specification given by P4, 
undefined conditions will result in random behaviors. For instance, the firewall will 
correctly forward and filter IPv4 packets whose handling has been defined. On the other 
hand, it may incorrectly forward IPv6 packets because their handling is undefined.  
Currently, verification of networking software is limited to point properties 
defined by the investigators doing research in verification. There is a need for correctness 
to be more horizontally addressed in the sense that any property of interest to a network 
operator ought to be verifiable, not just those that researchers can support with their 
methodologies. This thesis explores the feasibility of implementing data-plane 
5 
functionalities in software by first specifying the correct behavior and then automatically 
generating code that is guaranteed to have that behavior. To that end, data-plane software 
is implemented using Intel’s Data Plane Development Kit (DPDK) running on a custom 
Intel QuadCore server. 
D. THESIS ORGANIZATION  
The organization of the thesis is as follows: Chapter II covers the definition of 
primitive SFA for data-plane behaviors. Chapter III covers the introduction of Intel’s 
DPDK and how it is used in our work; Chapter IV shows the code synthesis algorithm 
proposed for synthesizing C code for the primitive SFA covered in Chapter II that runs 
on the DPDK; Chapter V elaborates on new proposed elementary switching behavior, 
namely routing and Network Address Translation (NAT); Chapter VI discusses the 
results of  testing the generated code in Chapter IV; and Chapter VII summarizes the 
work and suggests areas for future work.  
Regarding author contributions to the joint thesis, we note that both authors 
contributed toward the generation of the cross product of SFA in Chapter II. Ronald Se’s 
individual contribution is the discharging of propositions used within the switching SFA 
using the code synthesis algorithm in Chapter IV, generation of C code using the DPDK 
framework and the testing of that code. Ronghua Shi’s individual contribution is the 
routing and Network Address Translation SFA and the code synthesis algorithm.  
6 
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II. SPECIFICATION OF NETWORK FUNCTIONS 
A. BACKGROUND 
In prior work done by Volpano [5], it was proposed that a network function is 
defined through the intersection of elementary network behaviors such as forwarding, 
MAC address learning, and socket learning. The individual elementary functions are 
represented as λ-SFA. A λ-SFA binds the instance of input it sees at the transition out of 
the start state to a λ variable. Subsequent transitions in the SFA can make reference to 
that instance of input by referencing the λ variable.  
A port on a device is divided into ingress and egress locales. An arriving frame to 
the port is received on the ingress side of the port and a frame to be transmitted out of the 
port is placed on the egress side. The desired network function is produced by taking the 
cross product of an appropriate set of these primitive SFAs and getting a resultant λ-SFA 
that will describe the behavior of the network function   
In an SFA, a transition consists of a proposition that dictates behavior such as 
checking the location of a packet and checking the expiration of a MAC table entry. As 
an example, a middlebox implementing a basic switching function for a four-port switch 
was created by taking the product of four Forwarding (FWD) SFAs and one MAC 
address learning (ML) SFA in [5]. The FWD SFAs’ behavior takes the frame received at 
a port and forwards it out at all other ports. Each port on the switch was required to 
prescribe the FWD behavior. Thus, four FWD SFAs were used. The ML SFA’s behavior 
is to learn the MAC address of the host behind the different ports and only allows a 
packet whose destination address has been learned and not yet expired at a port, to 
traverse through the egress port. The decomposition of the network service down to these 
elementary behaviors revealed that different network services could have some common 
elementary behavior, thus allowing reuse of a λ-SFA such as the FWD SFA. Volpano has 
since made an improvement to the SFA by modifying it to be object-oriented and to 
minimize the number of states. The improvement is described in the next section.  
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B. NETWORKING BEHAVIOR FROM BUILDING BLOCKS 
Volpano has proposed extending the work in [5] by making SFA object-oriented 
[9]. He has defined five elementary behaviors using this approach to serve as building 
blocks in constructing more elaborate network device behaviors. The elementary 
behaviors are Forwarding (F), Informed unicast forwarding (U), Stateful firewalling (SF), 
MAC address learning (ML) and Socket learning (SL) [9]. What makes them object-
oriented is that they are parameterized on a port variable self instead of explicit port 
bindings as in [5]. This improvement allows one SFA to be used for any number of ports 
instead of having one SFA for each port, which does not scale-out.  
For example, in the FWD SFA of [5], shown in Figure 1, the transition from A to 
B is for the ingress Port 2 only. Thus, there would be one such FWD SFA for each 
ingress port. An object-oriented version of the FWD SFA is shown in Figure 2. In 
contrast, the transition from f1 to f2 is parameterized on self, which can be bound to any 
port. The variable self takes the value of whichever port “calls” the SFA. This greatly 
improves the scalability of the approach as the total number of SFAs is no longer a 
function of the number of ports on the device. 
 
Figure 1. Forwarding SFA. Source: [5]. 
 
Figure 2. Object-oriented version of forwarding SFA. 
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The five elementary behaviors defined as object-oriented SFAs are presented in 
Tables 1 to 5. Each SFA operates on a system stream that contains elements in the form 
of a tuple. The tuple has the form (𝑓, 𝑙𝑜𝑐, 𝑚𝑙𝑡, 𝑠𝑙𝑡, 𝑡), where 𝑓 represents an Ethernet 
frame, 𝑙𝑜𝑐 is a set of locations, 𝑚𝑙𝑡 is the MAC address learning table, 𝑠𝑙𝑡 is the socket 
learning table, and 𝑡 is the current time. A set of locations contains ingress and egress 
ports for each physical switch port. For instance, {self e} denotes a single egress port, 
namely the egress side of the physical port denoted by self, and egress denotes all egress 
sides of all physical ports. 
SFA F in Table 1 prescribes the behavior that a frame received at a port can be 
forwarded to any ports except to the port from which the frame was received. Any further 
constraint on F will be overstraining it beyond the elementary behavior of forwarding. 
Shaping the desired behavior of a switch will be done by intersecting it with other SFAs, 
which would further constrain the frame’s egress location. State f1 is the start state and 
can only make a transition to f2. State f2 has only one transition as well, which is back to 
the state f1. The arrow to the left of f1 indicates f1 is the start state. The remaining SFA 
tables are interpreted the same way.  
Table 1. Forwarding SFA F. 
 f1 f2 
→f1 - 𝜆𝑥. 𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑖  
f2 𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓 ⇒ 𝑙𝑜𝑐 ⊆ 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑒  - 
 
SFA U in Table 2 prescribes the behavior of unicast forwarding. If a frame’s 
destination MAC address is in the MAC learning table (MLT), then the frame’s egress 
port will be limited to the port that is stated in the MLT entry associated with that MAC 
address, given that the entry was last updated less than 16 seconds ago. The time unit of 
seconds is chosen in line with the norm of most switches’ MAC table aging time. There 
is a check to ensure that the frame’s destination address is a unicast address, 
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differentiating it from multicast or broadcast address. If any of the conditions in the 
premise is false, then the transition is vacuously true. Thus, the SFA does not get stuck, 
meaning it can always make a transition on any tuple.    
Table 2. Informed unicast forwarding SFA U. 
 e1 
→e1 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑒 ∈ 𝑙𝑜𝑐 ∧ 𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 ∧ 𝑡 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 . 𝑡 16 ⇒ 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 . 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓  
 
SFA SF in Table 3 prescribes the behavior of stateful firewalling by means of 
socket identification. A socket consists of an IP address and a transport layer port 
number. For a frame that has the destination socket of a host behind a firewalled port, the 
port will only allow the frame to egress if there is an unexpired entry in the socket 
learning table for that destination socket. Several conditions are checked by the predicate 
ℎ𝑎𝑠_𝑖𝑝_𝑑𝑠𝑡_𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑓  in SFA SF. To ensure that there is a valid socket, the predicate 
checks whether the frame is an IPv4 or IPv6 packet and whether it is a Transmission 
Control Protocol (TCP) or User Datagram Protocol (UDP) packet. It also checks whether 
a UDP destination port number is a DHCPv4 or DHCPv6 protocol client port number, to 
allow DHCP request and response for clients behind the firewall.  
Table 3. Stateful firewalling SFA SF. 
 g1 
→g1 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑒 ∈ 𝑙𝑜𝑐 ∧ ℎ𝑎𝑠_𝑖𝑝_𝑑𝑠𝑡_𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑓 ∧ 𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ⇒ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑠𝑙𝑡 ∧ 𝑡
𝑠𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑡 26 ∧ 𝑠𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓   
 
SFA ML in Table 4 prescribes the behavior of MAC address learning. If a frame 
arrives at an ingress port, the frame’s source address is a unicast address that is not in the 
MAC learning table (MLT), and there is at least one expired entry in the table, then the 
SFA transitions from state m1 to m3. The frame’s source address will then be learned 
11 
(i.e., added to the MLT). If the frame’s source address is already in the table, then the 
associated entry in the table is updated with the current time and port (transition from m1 
to m2 and from m2 to m1).  
Table 4. MAC address learning SFA ML. 
 m1 m2 m3 
→m1 𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ∧ 𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑖 ⇒
𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ∉ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 ∧ ∀𝑖 ∈
𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 . 𝑡 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑖 . 𝑡 16   
𝜆𝑥. 𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑖 ∧
𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ∈
𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡   
𝜆𝑥. 𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑖 ∧ 𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ∧
∃𝑖 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 . 𝑡 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑖 . 𝑡 15 ∧
𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ∉ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡   
m2 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑥. 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ↦ 𝑡
𝑥. 𝑡, 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓   
- - 
m3 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑥. 𝑚𝑙𝑡 ∷ 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ↦
𝑡 𝑥. 𝑡, 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓   
- - 
 
SFA SL in Table 5 prescribes the behavior of socket learning. If a frame arrives at 
a walled ingress port, the frame’s source socket is a valid IPv4 or IPv6 address and valid 
TCP or UDP number, and there is at least one expired entry in the table, the frame’s 
source socket will be learned and added to the table. If the frame’s source socket is 
already in the table, then the associated entry is updated.  
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Table 5. Socket learning SFA SL. 
 s1 s2 s3 
→s1 𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ∧
ℎ𝑎𝑠_𝑖𝑝_𝑠𝑟𝑐_𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑓 ∧
𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ∧ 𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑖 ⇒
𝑓. 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ∉ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑠𝑙𝑡 ∧ ∀𝑖 ∈
𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑠𝑙𝑡 . 𝑡 𝑠𝑙𝑡 𝑖 . 𝑡 26   
𝜆𝑥. 𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑖 ∧
𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ∧
𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ∧
ℎ𝑎𝑠_𝑖𝑝_𝑠𝑟𝑐_𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑓 ∧
𝑓. 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑠𝑙𝑡   
𝜆𝑥. 𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑖 ∧ 𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ∧
𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ∧
ℎ𝑎𝑠_𝑖𝑝_𝑠𝑟𝑐_𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑓 ∧ ∃𝑖 ∈
𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑠𝑙𝑡 . 𝑡 𝑠𝑙𝑡 𝑖 . 𝑡 25 ∧
𝑓. 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ∉ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑠𝑙𝑡   
s2 𝑠𝑙𝑡 𝑥. 𝑠𝑙𝑡 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ↦ 𝑡
𝑥. 𝑡, 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓   
- - 
s3 𝑠𝑙𝑡 𝑥. 𝑠𝑙𝑡 ∷ 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ↦
𝑡 𝑥. 𝑡, 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓   
- - 
 
C. TENSOR PRODUCT OF SFA 
By taking the tensor product of SFA, one can build different networking 
behaviors. The product of two SFAs is formed by taking tandem transitions through each 
individual SFA, which represents one transition of the product SFA. If A and B are SFAs, 
then their tensor product is denoted A X B. The individual propositions on transitions 
taken in tandem are conjoined to form the transition proposition of the product SFA. If 
the conjunct is unsatisfiable then that transition is discarded from the product SFA. An 
example is given in Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3. Illustration of tensor product. 
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With the five elementary behaviors, we can build new data-plane behaviors by 
taking their tensor product. We illustrate two such behaviors: a MAC-address learning 
switch, which we call the basic switching function, and the basic switching function 
extended with stateful firewalling. The latter behavior is also illustrated by taking a 
smaller tensor product to illustrate a different approach to synthesizing code for that 
behavior. Basically, the learning behaviors are lifted from the tensor product and 
composed in parallel instead. 
1. Switching and Learning (FxUxML) 
The basic switching function is composed of the intersection of three elementary 
network behaviors, namely forwarding, unicast forwarding, and MAC address learning. 
The intersection is shown in Table 6. Not every state in the intersection is reachable. 
Conjoining propositions may result in an unsatisfiable proposition, in which case a 
transition labeled with that proposition can never be taken. Such transitions are removed 
and hence the states to which they transition are unreachable. The reachable states are 
given in Table 7, where S indicates that the transition’s proposition is satisfiable.  
The transitions in Table 6 are simplified. All vacuously true implications are 
removed, superfluous terms are removed, Boolean simplification is done, and implication 
reduced. Superfluous terms refer to terms that are already implied by other terms. For 
example, in the transition f1e1m1  f2e1m1, 𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑖  is already in the f1 f2 
transition. Thus, the m1 m1 transition’s premise is already entailed by the former 
𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑖 . All product SFA go through such simplification. The proposition on 
transition in SFA U has been rewritten as follows: 
𝑙𝑜𝑐 ⊆ 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑒 ⇐ 𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 ∧ 𝑡 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 . 𝑡
16 ∧ 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 . 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓  
The self in U is a different instance from self in F and ML because self in F and ML are 
bound to the ingress port. When building a representation to synthesize code, the self in 
the egress transition of a SFA that has an instance of self in the ingress transition is 
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treated separately from the self in an egress transition of a SFA that does not have an 
instance of self in the ingress transition. 
Table 6. Transition proposition of FxUxML Switching SFA. 
 Transition proposition 
f1e1m1  f2e1m1 𝜆𝑥. 𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑖 ∧ 𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ⇒ 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ∉ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 ∧ ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 . 𝑡
𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑖 . 𝑡 16   
f1e1m1  f2e1m2 𝜆𝑥. 𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑖 ∧ 𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡   
f1e1m1  f2e1m3 𝜆𝑥. 𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑖 ∧ 𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ∉ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 ∧ ∃𝑖 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 . 𝑡
𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑖 . 𝑡 15  
f2e1m1  f1e1m1 𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓 ⇒ 𝑙𝑜𝑐 ⊆ 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑒 ∧ 𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 ∧ 𝑡
𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 . 𝑡 16 ∧ 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 . 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ⇒ 𝑙𝑜𝑐 ⊆ 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑒   
f2e1m2  f1e1m1 𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓 ⇒ 𝑙𝑜𝑐 ⊆ 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑒 ∧ 𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 ∧ 𝑡
𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 . 𝑡 16 ∧ 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 . 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ⇒ 𝑙𝑜𝑐 ⊆ 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑒 ∧ 𝑚𝑙𝑡
𝑥. 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ↦ 𝑡 𝑥. 𝑡, 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓   
f2e1m3  f1e1m1 𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓 ⇒ 𝑙𝑜𝑐 ⊆ 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑒 ∧ 𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 ∧ 𝑡
𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 . 𝑡 16 ∧ 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 . 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ⇒ 𝑙𝑜𝑐 ⊆ 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑒 ∧ 𝑚𝑙𝑡
𝑥. 𝑚𝑙𝑡 ∷ 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ↦ 𝑡 𝑥. 𝑡, 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓   
 
Table 7. FxUxML switching SFA. 
 f1e1m1 f2e1m1 f2e1m2 f2e1m3 
→f1e1m1 - S S S 
f2e1m2 S - - - 
f2e1m2 S - - - 
f2e1m3 S - - - 
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To illustrate the operation of the basic switching function, consider the three-port 
switch in Figure 4 running according to the behavior prescribed by the basic switching 
function. Suppose the MLT is filled with records that are expired. The switch starts in 
state f1e1m1. Suppose at time t1, an IPv4 unicast frame from Host A arrives at Port 1, 
destined for Host B. The switch checks whether the source MAC address is unicast. It 
then checks whether the source MAC address is in the MLT and finds it is not. Since the 
switch just started fresh, there is at least one expired entry in the table available for a new 
entry. The switch will then transition to state f2e1m3. The switch queried the table for an 
entry associated with the destination MAC address and failed to find one. Since the MLT 
did not have an entry matching the destination address, the egress constraint 
corresponding to SFA U is vacuously true. Hence, the switch only needs to adhere to the 
constraint of not forwarding to the port from which the frame was received. An entry for 
the frame’s source address was inserted into the MLT along with the port from which it 
was received and the time when the frame was received. The frame is then forwarded out 
of Ports 2 and 3. The switch then transitions back to the start state f1e1m1.  
 
Figure 4. Simple three-port switch with three end hosts. 
Suppose at t1 + 5 seconds, a reply from host B to host A arrived at port 2. The 
switch checked the source MAC address to determine if it is unicast and if it exists in the 
16 
MLT. Since this is the first time the switch saw a packet from host B, there is no previous 
record of host B’s MAC address in the table. The switch enters state f2e1m3 since there 
were expired entries available for new input. The switch then checked the MLT and an 
entry for the destination MAC address and was found. The difference between the current 
time (t1 + 5) and the entry time (t1) is less than 16 seconds. Therefore, all egress ports 
other than the port associated with the address in the table will be excluded from the 
loc(ation) set. An entry for the frame’s source address (host B) was inserted into the MLT 
along with the port (port 2) at which it was received and the time when it was received. 
The frame is then forwarded out the only port left in the egress loc(ation) set that is 
associated with host A, which is port 1. The switch then transitions back to the start state 
f1e1m1.  
2. Switching, Stateful Firewalling and Learning (FxUxSFxMLxSL) 
Stateful firewall functionality can be added to the basic switching function in the 
previous segment by including in the product SFA SF and SFA SL. The transition 
propositions are shown in Table 8, and the reachable states are given in Table 9, where S 
indicates that the transition’s proposition is satisfiable. The proposition on the transition 
for SF has been rewritten as follows: 
𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ∉ 𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑡 𝑠𝑙𝑡 ∨ 𝑡 𝑠𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑡 25 ∨ 𝑠𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡
𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ∧ ℎ𝑎𝑠_𝑖𝑝_𝑑𝑠𝑡_𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑓 ∧ 𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ⇒ 𝑙𝑜𝑐 ⊆ 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑒   
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Table 8. Transition proposition of FxUxSFxMLxSL. 
 Transition proposition 
f1e1g1m1s1  
 f2e1g1m1s1 
𝜆𝑥. 𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑖 ∧ 𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ⇒ 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ∉ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 ∧ ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 . 𝑡 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑖 . 𝑡
16 ∧ 𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓 ∧ ℎ𝑎𝑠_𝑖𝑝_𝑠𝑟𝑐_𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑓 ∧ 𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ⇒ 𝑓. 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ∉ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑠𝑙𝑡 ∧ ∀𝑖 ∈
𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑠𝑙𝑡 . 𝑡 𝑠𝑙𝑡 𝑖 . 𝑡 26   
f1e1g1m1s1  
 f2e1g1m1s2 
𝜆𝑥. 𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑖 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ∉ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 ∧ ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 . 𝑡 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑖 . 𝑡 16 ∧
𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ∧ 𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ∧ ℎ𝑎𝑠_𝑖𝑝_𝑠𝑟𝑐_𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑓 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑠𝑙𝑡   
f1e1g1m1s1  
 f2e1g1m1s3 
𝜆𝑥. 𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑖 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ∉ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 ∧ ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 . 𝑡 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑖 . 𝑡 16 ∧
𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ∧ 𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ∧ ℎ𝑎𝑠_𝑖𝑝_𝑠𝑟𝑐_𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑓 ∧ ∃𝑖 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑠𝑙𝑡 . 𝑡 𝑠𝑙𝑡 𝑖 . 𝑡 25 ∧
𝑓. 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ∉ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑠𝑙𝑡   
f1e1g1m1s1  
 f2e1g1m2s1 
𝜆𝑥. 𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑖 ∧ 𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 ∧ ℎ𝑎𝑠_𝑖𝑝_𝑠𝑟𝑐_𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑓 ∧
𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ⇒ 𝑓. 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ∉ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑠𝑙𝑡 ∧ ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑠𝑙𝑡 . 𝑡 𝑠𝑙𝑡 𝑖 . 𝑡 26   
f1e1g1m1s1  
 f2e1g1m2s2 
𝜆𝑥. 𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑖 ∧ 𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 ∧ 𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ∧
ℎ𝑎𝑠_𝑖𝑝_𝑠𝑟𝑐_𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑓 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑠𝑙𝑡   
f1e1g1m1s1  
 f2e1g1m2s3 
𝜆𝑥. 𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑖 ∧ 𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 ∧ 𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ∧
ℎ𝑎𝑠_𝑖𝑝_𝑠𝑟𝑐_𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑓 ∧ ∃𝑖 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑠𝑙𝑡 . 𝑡 𝑠𝑙𝑡 𝑖 . 𝑡 25 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ∉ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑠𝑙𝑡   
f1e1g1m1s1  
 f2e1g1m3s1 
𝜆𝑥. 𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑖 ∧ 𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ∉ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 ∧ ∃𝑖 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 . 𝑡 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑖 . 𝑡 15 ∧
ℎ𝑎𝑠_𝑖𝑝_𝑠𝑟𝑐_𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑓 ∧ 𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ⇒ 𝑓. 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ∉ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑠𝑙𝑡 ∧ ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑠𝑙𝑡 . 𝑡
𝑠𝑙𝑡 𝑖 . 𝑡 26   
f1e1g1m1s1  
 f2e1g1m3s2 
𝜆𝑥. 𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑖 ∧ 𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ∧ ∃𝑖 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 . 𝑡 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑖 . 𝑡 15 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ∉ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 ∧
𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ∧ ℎ𝑎𝑠_𝑖𝑝_𝑠𝑟𝑐_𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑓 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑠𝑙𝑡   
f1e1g1m1s1  
 f2e1g1m3s3 
𝜆𝑥. 𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑖 ∧ 𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ∧ ∃𝑖 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 . 𝑡 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑖 . 𝑡 15 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ∉ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 ∧
𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ∧ ℎ𝑎𝑠_𝑖𝑝_𝑠𝑟𝑐_𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑓 ∧ ∃𝑖 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑠𝑙𝑡 . 𝑡 𝑠𝑙𝑡 𝑖 . 𝑡 25 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ∉
𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑠𝑙𝑡   
f2e1g1m1s1  
 f1e1g1m1s1 
𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓 ⇒ 𝑙𝑜𝑐 ⊆ 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑒 ∧ 𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 ∧ 𝑡
𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 . 𝑡 16 ∧ 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 . 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ∨ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ∉ 𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑡 𝑠𝑙𝑡 ∨ 𝑡
𝑠𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑡 25 ∨ 𝑠𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ∧ ℎ𝑎𝑠_𝑖𝑝_𝑑𝑠𝑡_𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑓 ∧




𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓 ⇒ 𝑙𝑜𝑐 ⊆ 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑒 ∧ 𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 ∧ 𝑡
𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 . 𝑡 16 ∧ 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 . 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ∨ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ∉ 𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑡 𝑠𝑙𝑡 ∨ 𝑡
𝑠𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑡 25 ∨ 𝑠𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ∧ ℎ𝑎𝑠_𝑖𝑝_𝑑𝑠𝑡_𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑓 ∧
𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ⇒ 𝑙𝑜𝑐 ⊆ 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑒 ∧ 𝑠𝑙𝑡 𝑥. 𝑠𝑙𝑡 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ↦ 𝑡 𝑥. 𝑡, 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡
𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓   
f2e1g1m1s3 
 f1e1g1m1s1 
𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓 ⇒ 𝑙𝑜𝑐 ⊆ 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑒 ∧ 𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 ∧ 𝑡
𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 . 𝑡 16 ∧ 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 . 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ∨ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ∉ 𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑡 𝑠𝑙𝑡 ∨ 𝑡
𝑠𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑡 25 ∨ 𝑠𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ∧ ℎ𝑎𝑠_𝑖𝑝_𝑑𝑠𝑡_𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑓 ∧
𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ⇒ 𝑙𝑜𝑐 ⊆ 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑒 ∧ 𝑠𝑙𝑡 𝑥. 𝑠𝑙𝑡 ∷ 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ↦ 𝑡 𝑥. 𝑡, 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡
𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓   
f2e1g1m2s1 
 f1e1g1m1s1 
𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓 ⇒ 𝑙𝑜𝑐 ⊆ 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑒 ∧ 𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 ∧ 𝑡
𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 . 𝑡 16 ∧ 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 . 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ∨ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ∉ 𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑡 𝑠𝑙𝑡 ∨ 𝑡
𝑠𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑡 25 ∨ 𝑠𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ∧ ℎ𝑎𝑠_𝑖𝑝_𝑑𝑠𝑡_𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑓 ∧
𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ⇒ 𝑙𝑜𝑐 ⊆ 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑒 ∧ 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑥. 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ↦ 𝑡 𝑥. 𝑡, 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡
𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓   
f2e1g1m2s2 
 f1e1g1m1s1 
𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓 ⇒ 𝑙𝑜𝑐 ⊆ 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑒 ∧ 𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 ∧ 𝑡
𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 . 𝑡 16 ∧ 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 . 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ∨ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ∉ 𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑡 𝑠𝑙𝑡 ∨ 𝑡
𝑠𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑡 25 ∨ 𝑠𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ∧ ℎ𝑎𝑠_𝑖𝑝_𝑑𝑠𝑡_𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑓 ∧
𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ⇒ 𝑙𝑜𝑐 ⊆ 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑒 ∧ 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑥. 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ↦ 𝑡 𝑥. 𝑡, 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡
𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ∧ 𝑠𝑙𝑡 𝑥. 𝑠𝑙𝑡 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ↦ 𝑡 𝑥. 𝑡, 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓   
f2e1g1m2s3 
 f1e1g1m1s1 
𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓 ⇒ 𝑙𝑜𝑐 ⊆ 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑒 ∧ 𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 ∧ 𝑡
𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 . 𝑡 16 ∧ 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 . 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ∨ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ∉ 𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑡 𝑠𝑙𝑡 ∨ 𝑡
𝑠𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑡 25 ∨ 𝑠𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ∧ ℎ𝑎𝑠_𝑖𝑝_𝑑𝑠𝑡_𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑓 ∧
𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ⇒ 𝑙𝑜𝑐 ⊆ 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑒 ∧ 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑥. 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ↦ 𝑡 𝑥. 𝑡, 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡
𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ∧ 𝑠𝑙𝑡 𝑥. 𝑠𝑙𝑡 ∷ 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ↦ 𝑡 𝑥. 𝑡, 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓   
f2e1g1m3s1 
 f1e1g1m1s1 
𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓 ⇒ 𝑙𝑜𝑐 ⊆ 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑒 ∧ 𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 ∧ 𝑡
𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 . 𝑡 16 ∧ 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 . 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ∨ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ∉ 𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑡 𝑠𝑙𝑡 ∨ 𝑡
𝑠𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑡 25 ∨ 𝑠𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ∧ ℎ𝑎𝑠_𝑖𝑝_𝑑𝑠𝑡_𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑓 ∧
𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ⇒ 𝑙𝑜𝑐 ⊆ 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑒 ∧ 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑥. 𝑚𝑙𝑡 ∷ 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ↦ 𝑡 𝑥. 𝑡, 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡
𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓   
f2e1g1m3s2 
 f1e1g1m1s1 
𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓 ⇒ 𝑙𝑜𝑐 ⊆ 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑒 ∧ 𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 ∧ 𝑡
𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 . 𝑡 16 ∧ 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 . 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ∨ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ∉ 𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑡 𝑠𝑙𝑡 ∨ 𝑡
𝑠𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑡 25 ∨ 𝑠𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ∧ ℎ𝑎𝑠_𝑖𝑝_𝑑𝑠𝑡_𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑓 ∧
𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ⇒ 𝑙𝑜𝑐 ⊆ 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑒 ∧ 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑥. 𝑚𝑙𝑡 ∷ 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ↦ 𝑡 𝑥. 𝑡, 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡




𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓 ⇒ 𝑙𝑜𝑐 ⊆ 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑒 ∧ 𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 ∧ 𝑡
𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 . 𝑡 16 ∧ 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 . 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ∨ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ∉ 𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑡 𝑠𝑙𝑡 ∨ 𝑡
𝑠𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑡 25 ∨ 𝑠𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ∧ ℎ𝑎𝑠_𝑖𝑝_𝑑𝑠𝑡_𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑓 ∧
𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ⇒ 𝑙𝑜𝑐 ⊆ 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑒 ∧ 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑥. 𝑚𝑙𝑡 ∷ 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ↦ 𝑡 𝑥. 𝑡, 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡
𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ∧ 𝑠𝑙𝑡 𝑥. 𝑠𝑙𝑡 ∷ 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ↦ 𝑡 𝑥. 𝑡, 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓   
 























- S S S S S S S S S 
f2e1g1m
1s1 
S - - - - - - - - - 
f2e1g1m
1s2 
S - - - - - - - - - 
f2e1g1m
1s3 
S - - - - - - - - - 
f2e1g1m
2s1 
S - - - - - - - - - 
f2e1g1m
2s2 
S - - - - - - - - - 
f2e1g1m
2s3 
S - - - - - - - - - 
f2e1g1m
3s1 
S - - - - - - - - - 
f2e1g1m
3s2 
S - - - - - - - - - 
f2e1g1m
3s3 
S - - - - - - - - - 
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To illustrate basic function switching with the Stateful firewall SFA, again 
consider the three-port switch in Figure 4 but with Port 2 firewalled. The switch is 
initialized with both MLT and SLT filled with expired entries.   Suppose at time t1, an 
IPv4 unicast frame from Host A arrives at Port 1, destined for Host B, and that the source 
MAC address is not in the MLT. There is no need to check the source socket since port 1 
is not a firewalled port. The switch checks the frame for a unicast source MAC address 
and the MAC table for expired entries. The switch then enters the state f2e1g1m3s1. The 
source MAC address is added into MLT, along with the port at which the frame was 
received and the time it was received. The egress constraint of F eliminates Port 1 from 
the egress loc(ation) set. The egress constraint of U is not applied since the premise is 
vacuously true because the destination MAC address is not in the table. The egress 
constraint of SF holds for only Port 2. Since Port 2 is firewalled and no entry matching 
destination socket is found in the SLT, Port 2 is eliminated from the egress location set. 
Thus, the frame is only forwarded out of Port 3. The switch returns to the start state 
f1e1g1m1s1. No reply in response to this frame is generated since Host B is behind Port 
2 and does not receive the frame.  
Suppose at time t2, an IPv4 unicast frame from Host B destined for Host C arrives 
at Port 2 of the switch. The source MAC address and socket are not in the MLT and SLT, 
respectively. The switch checks the frame for unicast MAC address and socket. The 
switch also checks for expired entries in both the MLT and socket table. Since all the 
checks pass, the switch enters the state f1e1g1m3s3. The source MAC address and socket 
are added to the MLT and SLT respectively, along with the port at which the frame was 
received and the time it was received. The egress constraint of F eliminates Port 2 from 
the egress loc(ation) set. The egress constraint of U is not applied since the destination 
MAC address is not found in the table. The egress constraint of SF is not applicable since 
Port 2 is already eliminated and Ports 1 and 3 are not firewalled. The frame is forwarded 
to Ports 1 and 3. The switch then returns to state f1e1g1m1s1. 
Suppose at time t2 + 5, a reply from Host C to Host B arrives at the switch Port 3. 
The switch checks the MAC address and socket as per previous instances and enters the 
state f1e1g1m3s3. The source MAC address and socket of Host C are added to the MLT 
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and SLT respectively, along with the port at which the frame was received and the time it 
was received. The egress constraint of F eliminates Port 3 from the egress loc(ation) set. 
The egress constraint of U eliminates Port 1 and Port 3 from the egress loc(ation) set 
because the destination MAC address has an unexpired matching entry in the MLT 
corresponding only to Port 2. The egress constraint of SF also eliminates Port 1 and Port 
3 because the destination socket has an unexpired matching entry in the SLT 
corresponding to only Port 2. The frame is then forwarded out of Port 2, the only port left 
in the egress loc(ation) set and the switch returns back to state f1e1g1m1s1.  
3. Switching, Stateful Firewalling and Parallel Learning (FxUxSF | ML | 
SL) 
Combining the basic switching function with stateful firewall capabilities, as 
shown in Section II.C.2, led to ten different states with a total of 18 different transitions. 
The MAC and socket learning capabilities were removed from the stateful firewall tensor 
product to reduce the number of states and transitions. In this section, MAC and socket 
learning are done as parallel processes updating a common MLT and SLT, which will be 
used by a simplified stateful firewall function (FxUxSF). The transition propositions are 
shown in Table 10, and the reachable states are given in Table 11, where S indicates that 
the transition’s proposition is satisfiable. MAC and socket learning will follow the 
transition shown in Table 4 and Table 5 respectively. 
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Table 10. Transition proposition of FxUxSF. 
 Transition proposition 
f1e1g1  f2e1g1 𝜆𝑥. 𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑖   
f2e1g1  f1e1g1 𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓 ⇒ 𝑙𝑜𝑐 ⊆ 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑒 ∧ 𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 ∧ 𝑡
𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 . 𝑡 16 ∧ 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 . 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ∨ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ∉ 𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑡 𝑠𝑙𝑡 ∨ 𝑡
𝑠𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑡 25 ∨ 𝑠𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ∧ ℎ𝑎𝑠_𝑖𝑝_𝑑𝑠𝑡_𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑓 ∧
𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ⇒ 𝑙𝑜𝑐 ⊆ 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑒   
 
Table 11. FxUxSF switching SFA. 
 f1e1g1 f2e1g1 
→f1e1m1 - S 
f2e1g1 S - 
 
The simplified stateful firewall product resulted in only two states and two 
transition propositions. This helps simplify and shorten the code translated from the 
FxUxSF tensor product. 
For example, we again consider the three-port switch in Figure 4 with Port 2 
firewalled. The switch is initialized in state f1e1g1 with all expired entries in the MLT 
and SLT. Suppose at time t1, an IPv4 unicast frame from Host A arrives at Port 1, 
destined for Host B. With FxUxSF, there is only one transition with one constraint stating 
that the frame enters via an ingress port. Hence the switch directly enters state f2e1g1. 
Since the destination MAC address is not found in the MLT, the premise of U 
propositions is vacuously true. The egress constraint of SF holds for the firewalled Port 2, 
resulting in the frame being forwarded only at Port 3. Subsequently, the switch returns to 
state f1e1g1. The switch then proceeds to process MAC and socket learning, from Table 
4 and Table 5. The frame source MAC address is not found in the domain of MLT, and 
the switch enters the state m3. A new entry is added into the MLT and the switch returns 
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to state m1. Next, socket learning is processed. Since the source socket is not found in the 
SLT, the source socket is added into the SLT via the state s3. The switch finally returns 
to state s1.  
Synthesizing code for FxUxSF|ML|SL is done in three parts, first for FxUxSF and 
then individually for ML and SL. The code synthesized for ML and SL may be run in 
parallel or sequentialized as was described in the preceding paragraph. Whether parallel 
execution is supported, depends on the target architecture.  
Code synthesized for the parallel learning SFA FxUxSF|ML|SL is smaller than it 
is for the full FxUxSFxMLxSL tensor product as we shall see. The number of states and 
transitions in FXUxSF is significantly smaller. The synthesized code therefore has fewer 
branches and checks to perform, which leads to a smaller data-plane footprint. 
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III. DATA PLANE DEVELOPMENT KIT (DPDK) 
This chapters introduces the DPDK framework and the data structures used. It 
also covers the architecture of the synthesized C code. 
A. OVERVIEW OF DPDK 
Synthesized C code is targeted for execution in user space on a platform using 
Intel’s DPDK framework. The DPDK provides a set of data plane software libraries and 
poll-mode drivers. This provides applications with a complete framework for high-speed 
packet processing. The DPDK creates an Environment Abstraction Layer (EAL) which 
hides the environment specification to provide a standard interface which users can link 
with the library to develop data plane applications. The DPDK provides a framework that 
utilizes the hardware for fast speed processing of network frames, reducing latencies and 
interrupts and context switching. The DPDK libraries include APIs for such things as 
hash tables for quick lookup of data, longest prefix matches and ring structures. The 
framework also leverages on the capabilities and technologies of Intel processors to 
accelerate the execution of its own libraries. 
B. DPDK DATA STRUCTURES USED 
This section will cover the DPDK API functions used for the translation of SFA 
to C code.  
1. Hash Table 
The DPDK provides a hash library for the generation of the hash table in the 
rte_hash.h class. The hash table was used for the generation of MLT and SLT. The use of 
hash tables provides an optimized data structure for identifying entries in the MLT and 
SLT using a unique key. For MLT the frame’s source MAC address was set as the unique 
key, in the SLT the source’s socket pair was used.  
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2. Ring 
Volpano has proposed using the DPDK ring structure to manage the expiration of 
entries in the MLT and SLT hash tables [9]. Each hash table entry points to a ring 
element. The ring has a First-In-First-Out (FIFO) property with an expired entry always 
stored at the ring head, if it exists, and new entries enqueued at the ring’s tail. The time of 
the head entry is checked against the timeout settings of the MLT and SLT respectively. 
Since an expired entry, if it exists, is always stored at the ring head, only the ring head 
needs to be inspected for expiration to determine whether the ring is full.  
C. CODE SKELETON 
This section covers the architecture of the synthesized C code. 
1. Initialization 
The DPDK provides a basic forwarding sample application, which can be found 
on the Intel’s DPDK website [10]. The sample application was extended by Volpano to 
include additional learning and stateful firewalling capabilities. The application was 
developed for a Puget server consisting of 4 gigabit Ethernet network ports. The 
application starts by initializing the required data structures. Memory was allocated to 
message buffers (mbufs), which were used to store incoming frame packets. The hash 
tables for MLT and SLT were initialized to be full with default expired entries. MLT and 
SLT table sizes were set to 64 and 512 entries respectively. Subsequently, each of the 
individual ports was initialized with a single receiving ingress queue to receive incoming 
frame packets and a single transmitting egress queue to send outgoing packets. 
2. The Driver Loop 
There’s a main switch control loop in the application, called the driver loop. The 
loop iterates forever through the four Puget Ethernet ports, polling each for incoming 
frames, until the application is stopped. At each iteration, it checks the ingress queue for 
any frames received, processes the frame and sends it out the appropriate egress port. 
Figure 5 shows a snippet of the driver loop. 
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Figure 5. Main application loop. 
The outer loop shown in Figure 5, line 504 allows the application to loop until it 
is stopped. The inner loop at line 506 iterates through the four ports of the Puget server. 
The inner loop represents the binding of self in the SFA tensor product. The self indicates 
the current port during the SFA transition. For example, in the Forwarding SFA shown in 
Table 1, the self is bonded to the current ingress port of the incoming frame. This is 
represented as the port variable of the inner loop. 
The switching functions represented by the SFA tensor products of the previous 
chapter are implemented in the “Main switching functions” region in Figure 5 line 538. 
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This code region handles the transition of the switch states, learning of the MLT and 
SLT, the computation of the egress port mask and the forwarding of the packets out of 
the appropriate egress port.  
Once the packet has been transmitted, the application frees the memory buffers 
allocated to the frame buffers.  
This provides a skeleton for the application which covers the required data 
structure initialization, receiving, processing and transmitting of frame packets. The 
different tensor products derived from this thesis will be translated into code and 
implemented only in the “Main switching functions” block. 
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IV. CODE SYNTHESIS 
This chapter sketches an algorithm for synthesizing executable C code from a 
given SFA. Examples of its application are given, however, they were constructed by 
hand since the algorithm was not implemented. The algorithm’s implementation is an 
area of future work.  
A. GENERATING CODE FROM SFA 
The viability of the modular SFA approach depends on the generation of 
executable code from the representation so that an actual software device can be created. 
For a small cross-product, it is feasible to handcraft and manually generate the code. For 
a bigger cross-product, however, it becomes bulky and complex for programmers to 
cover all conditions in the product faithfully. Even for a small product, leaving the code 
generation in the hands of the programmer to produce it on an ad-hoc basis creates a 
scenario of inconsistencies due to inevitable human error. For this reason, it is preferable 
to have a code synthesis algorithm that takes the SFA representation and produces C code 
that runs on an open platform using the DPDK framework.  
B. DISCHARGING PROPOSITIONS WITH C CODE/FUNCTIONS 
Each proposition in the SFA is mapped to a corresponding C function or code 
block. This allows programmers to select the relevant code block based on the 
propositions and ensures homogeneity of the code developed across different 
programmers. Each code block will only perform the behavior required for the 
proposition. Generating code using the predefined code blocks will ensure that the 
product will only behave exactly as the SFA describes and not have any undesired 
properties. This eliminates the possibility of inconsistencies due to the human error of the 
programmers and any unexpected code behaviors. 
Each proposition, its description, and the corresponding section in the thesis 
giving the C code that discharges it is shown in Table 12. 
30 
Table 12. Discharge table for propositions in the five elementary behaviors 
(F, U, SF, ML, SL). 
Proposition Description Section 
𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑖  
Ensure location of the frame is 
at the ingress port. 
IV.B.1 
𝜆𝑥 
Bind the ingress frame to a 
specific instance at time 𝑥. 
IV.B.2 
𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓 
Ensure that the frame has not 
been changed or modified since 
the time at which x is bound. 
𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑒 ∈ 𝑙𝑜𝑐 
Ensure the current egress port is 
the same as the frame ingress 
port. 
IV.B.3 
𝑙𝑜𝑐 ⊆ 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑒  
Ensure that the frame is 
transmitted out of an egress port 
that is not the frame ingress 
port. 
𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓  
Check if the port is a stateful 
firewall port. 
IV.B.4 
𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎  Check that an IP address is a 
unicast address. 
IV.B.5 𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎  
ℎ𝑎𝑠_𝑖𝑝_𝑠𝑟𝑐_𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑓  
Check that a frame is a valid IP 
packet with a valid source 
address. 
IV.B.6 
ℎ𝑎𝑠_𝑖𝑝_𝑑𝑠𝑡_𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑓  
Check that a frame is a valid IP 
packet with a valid destination 
address. 
𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡  Check that IP address exists in 
MLT 
IV.B.7 
𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡  
𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ∉ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡  
Check that IP address does not 
exist in MLT 
𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑠𝑙𝑡  Check that socket exists in SLT 𝑓. 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑠𝑙𝑡  
𝑓. 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ∉ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑠𝑙𝑡  
Check that socket does not exist 
in SLT 
∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 . 𝑡 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑖 . 𝑡 16 Check that MLT is full. 
IV.B.8 
∃𝑖 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 . 𝑡 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑖 . 𝑡 15 Check that MLT is not full 
∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑠𝑙𝑡 . 𝑡 𝑠𝑙𝑡 𝑖 . 𝑡 26 Check that SLT is full 
IV.B.9 ∃𝑖 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑠𝑙𝑡 . 𝑡 𝑠𝑙𝑡 𝑖 . 𝑡 25 Check that SLT is not full 
𝑡 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 . 𝑡 16 MLT entry has not expired IV.B.10 
𝑡 𝑠𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑡 26 SLT entry has not expired 
𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 . 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 Current port is the same as the 
IP address ingress port recorded 
in MLT. 
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𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 . 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 Current port is not the same as 
the IP address ingress port 
recorded in MLT. 
𝑠𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 Current port is the same as the 
socket ingress port recorded in 
MLT. 
𝑠𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 Current port is not the same as 
the socket ingress port recorded 
in MLT. 
𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑥. 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ↦ 𝑡 𝑥. 𝑡, 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡
𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓  
Only the relevant entry is 
updated in MLT. No changes to 
the other entries are made. 
IV.B.11 
𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑥. 𝑚𝑙𝑡 ∷ 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ↦ 𝑡
𝑥. 𝑡, 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓   
Only the relevant entry is added 
to MLT. No changes to the 
other entries are made. 
IV.B.12 
𝑠𝑙𝑡 𝑥. 𝑠𝑙𝑡 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ↦ 𝑡
𝑥. 𝑡, 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓   
Only the relevant entry is 
updated in SLT. No changes to 
the other entries are made. 
IV.B.13 
𝑠𝑙𝑡 𝑥. 𝑠𝑙𝑡 ∷ 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ↦ 𝑡
𝑥. 𝑡, 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓   
Only the relevant entry is added 
to SLT. No changes to the other 
entries are made. 
IV.B.14 
 
1. Receiving Frames from Ingress Ports 
The proposition 𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑖  checks that the frame is received only at the 
ingress ports. This is enforced by dequeuing only frames from the DPDK receiver buffer 
of each port. Figure 5, lines 511 to 520, shows the code to receive frames in burst from 
the DPDK receiver queue. By accepting only frames from the receiver queue, the 
proposition is always enforced. Hence no additional conditional checking is required.  
2. Binding of Ingress Frame 
Binding of the frame at the point x and ensuring the frame is not modified are 
enforced due to the architecture of the code. From the instant the program receives the 
incoming frame until the point where the respective translation propositions are checked, 
no modification is done to the frame. Hence the conditions are enforced, and no further 
checking is required. 
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3. Sending Frames out Egress Ports 
The propositions 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑒 ∈ 𝑙𝑜𝑐 and 𝑙𝑜𝑐 ⊆ 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑒  represent the 
forwarding of frames out of the egress ports. Frames can be forwarded to any ports 
except for the port from which the frame was received. The discharged code block 
consists of a loop that iterates through all the egress ports. Figure 6 shows the egress 
loop, each egress port is represented by the variable e, which corresponds to the self 
literal of the proposition. The nb_ports represents the total number of ports.  
 
Figure 6. Egress Port Loop. 
A port mask variable is maintained to indicate whether a frame will be sent out of 
a specific port. The port mask uses a binary representation to represent each port. For 
example, a four-port device will have a port mask variable 0000, with the Least 
Significant Bit (LSB) representing Port 0 and the Most Significant Bit (MSB) 
representing Port 3. A 0 value signifies that the frame will not be forwarded out of the 
port while a value of 1 indicates the frame will be forwarded out of the port. For example, 
a port mask of 0101 will result in the frame being forwarded only out of Ports 0 and 2. 
For each port iteration, the egress constraints of the SFA transitions are checked. The 
following algorithm from [9] is used to set the port mask bit: 
𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑘 |  𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑡32_𝑡 ~ 1  𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡  & 1  𝑒  
To unset a port mask bit, we take the complement of (1 <<e) as in: 
𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑘 |  𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑡32_𝑡 ~ 1  𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡  & 1  𝑒  & ~ 1  𝑒  
Consider an example of forwarding F from Table 1 on a four-port device. If a 
frame is received on Port 2, the port_mask value changes, as shown in Table 13. A 
resulting port mask value of 1011 is set after the full iteration of all 4 ports. The frame 
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will be forwarded out of all other ports except the port where the frame was received 
(Port 2). 
Table 13. Port mask value for each iteration of a four-port forwarding SFA. 
Iteration Port Port Mask 
1 0 0001 
2 1 0011 
3 2 0011 
4 3 1011 
 
4. Checking Stateful Firewall Ports 
The WALLED function checks whether a port is a stateful firewall port. The 
function takes in a port number and returns 0 if the port is not firewalled or returns a non 
0 value if the port is firewalled. Figure 7 shows an example of the WALLED function. 
The value 0x05 is a configurable parameter and is a binary representation of which port is 
firewalled. In this instance, 0x05 corresponds to 0101 in binary, indicating that Ports 0 
and 2 are firewalled. The input variable X represents the port number to check for stateful 
firewalling. 
 
Figure 7. Discharged WALLED function. 
5. Checking Unicast IP Addresses  
The literal 𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡  is discharged using the DPDK API function, 
is_unicast_ether_addr, found in the librte_net library class [11]. The function checks 
whether an Ethernet address is unicast. It takes in an Ethernet address and returns True 
(1) if the address is unicast and False (0) otherwise. 
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6. Checking Valid IP Packets 
Both ℎ𝑎𝑠_𝑖𝑝_𝑠𝑟𝑐_𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡  and ℎ𝑎𝑠_𝑖𝑝_𝑑𝑠𝑡_𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡 check for an IP packet with a 
valid source or destination IP addresses respectively. The discharged code block used is 
similar to the discharged code in [5] and was provided by Volpano [9]. 
The literal ℎ𝑎𝑠_𝑖𝑝_𝑠𝑟𝑐_𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡  is discharged to a C code block shown in  
Figure 8. It checks whether the frame is a valid IPv6 or IPv4 packet, with a non-zero 
source IP address encapsulating TCP or UDP protocol. The code returns null if the 
conditions are not met; otherwise, it returns a pointer to an IP socket with the non-zero 
source IP address and port. 
Similarly, the discharged code block for ℎ𝑎𝑠_𝑖𝑝_𝑑𝑠𝑡_𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡 is shown in Figure 9. 
It checks whether the frame is a valid IPv6 or IPv4 packet encapsulating TCP or UDP 
packet and returns a pointer to an IP socket with the destination IP address and port. 
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Figure 9. Discharged C code to check for valid destination IP 
packets. 
7. Checking Domain for Entries 
Checking for the existence of an entry in the MLT or SLT is discharged using the 
C function, check_dom(), shown in Figure 10. This function takes in two parameters and 
37 
returns a value of 1 if the entry is found, 0 otherwise. The first parameter, rte_hash 
*table_lookup, is a pointer to the hash table which is the MLT or SLT. The second 
parameter, void *item, is the search key which corresponds to the MLT or SLT entry to 
search for. The C function uses an Application Programming Interface (API) call, 
rte_hash_lookup(), to the DPDK API library [11]. The DPDK operation provides a quick 
and optimized way to find an entry in the hash table. 
 
Figure 10. Discharged C code to check for existence in MLT 
or SLT domain. 
8. Checking for Space in the MLT 
Entries in the MLT are also stored separately in a DPDK ring structure. The ring 
structure stores the oldest entry at the head and the newest entry at the tail. For quick 
query on vacancies in MLT, only the ring head entry is checked. If the ring head entry 
exceeds the expiration threshold for MLT, there will be at least an empty slot to add a 
new entry into the MLT. Otherwise, the MLT is full. Volpano provided function 
ring_head which is used to retrieve the ring head entry. 
The discharged C function is shown in Figure 11. The function takes in two 
parameters, rte_ring *mlt_ring, which is the ring structure storing the MLT entries and 
uint64_t cur_tsc, which correspond to the current timestamp. The function compares the 
frame received time of the head entry, mlt_entry -> tsc, with the current timestamp 
against the MLT expiration time, mlt_timeout. If the difference does not exceed the 
timeout, the MLT is full and the function returns a value of 0. Otherwise, it returns a 
value of 1, which signifies that there is space in the MLT.  
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Figure 11. Discharged code for checking space in the MLT. 
9. Checking for Space in SLT 
The technique for checking vacancy in the SLT is similar to that of the MLT 
presented in Section IV.B.8. Figure 12 shows the discharged C function. 
 
Figure 12. Discharged code for checking space in SLT. 
10. Accessing Data Stored in MLT and SLT Hash Tables 
To retrieve an entry from the MLT or SLT hash tables, the DPDK function 
rte_hash_lookup_data(), found in the librte_hash class [11], is used. The function has 
three input parameters; h, key and data. The parameter h refers to the hash table to look 
in, for example, the MLT or SLT. The parameter key refers to the search key match for 
the entry, MLT uses the source MAC address of the frame as the search key, and SLT 
uses the frame source socket. Lastly, data is an output pointer to the data returned from 
the hash table.  
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11. Updating MLT Entry 
The proposition 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑥. 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ↦ 𝑡 𝑥. 𝑡, 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓  updates an 
entry in the MLT that matches the frame source address. Figure 13 shows the 
corresponding C function block. The function uses a DPDK API call to the 
rte_hash_lookup_data() function to search for the relevant entry. The entry’s timestamp 
and port are updated with the received frame timestamp and received port. 
 
Figure 13. Discharged function to update MLT entry. 
12. Adding a New Entry in the MLT 
The oldest expired entry has first to be removed from the MLT hash table and 
ring buffer before a new entry can be added. The oldest entry in the ring buffer can 
simply be removed by dequeuing the ring head. The DPDK function rte_hash_del_key 
[11] is used to remove an entry from the hash table. The DPDK call searches and deletes 
the relevant entry from the MLT hash table. Subsequently, the function creates a new 
entry using the frame’s source MAC address as the key and stores the frame’s received 
time and port. The entry is then added to the MLT hash table and is queued at the tail end 
of the ring buffer. The discharged C function is shown in Figure 14. 
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Figure 14. Discharged function to add new MLT entry. 
13. Updating an SLT Entry 
Updating an entry in the SLT uses similar methodology as updating the MLT 
entry seen in Section IV.B.11, except the frame source socket is used as the search key 
instead. The discharged C function is shown in Figure 15. 
 
Figure 15. Discharged function to update SLT entry. 
14. Adding a New Entry in the SLT 
Similarly, adding a new entry into the SLT follows the MLT methodology. The 
discharged C function is shown in Figure 16. 
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Figure 16. Discharged function to add new SLT entry. 
C. CODE SYNTHESIS ALGORITHM 
The code synthesis algorithm operates on a given SFA. The algorithm expects the 
propositions along transitions of the SFA to be in a particular form, specifically, every 
implication 𝐴 ⇒ 𝐵 in the checkable conditions must be converted to the form 𝐴 ∨ 𝐴 ∧
𝐵 . Furthermore, all ingress instances of self must be replaced with i and any self e that 
follows after the ingress instance of self must also be replaced with i. Examples of such 
cases are the self in SFA F and ML. For example, consider FxUxML. The transition 
f1e1m1 f2e1m3 would be transformed into 
𝜆𝑥. 𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑖 𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 ∧ 𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ∉ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡
∧ ∃𝑗 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 . 𝑡 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑗 . 𝑡
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And the transition f2e1m3f1e1m1 would be transformed into 
𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓 ⇒ 𝑙𝑜𝑐 ⊆ 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑖 𝑒 ∧ 𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡
∧ 𝑡 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 . 𝑡
16 ∧ 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 . 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ⇒ 𝑙𝑜𝑐 ⊆ 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑒
∧ 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑥. 𝑚𝑙𝑡 ∷ 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ↦ 𝑡 𝑥. 𝑡, 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑖  
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Note that the self in the first conjunct (𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓 ⇒ 𝑙𝑜𝑐 ⊆ 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑖 𝑒  has been 
replaced with i because it follows from the ingress self of SFA F and the self in the 
update, the last conjunct (𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑥. 𝑚𝑙𝑡 ∷ 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ↦ 𝑡 𝑥. 𝑡, 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑖 , is also 
replaced with i because it follows from the ingress self in SFA ML. The second self 
(𝑙𝑜𝑐 ⊆ 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑒 , on the right of the implication, does not get replaced with i 
because there is no ingress instance of self that precedes it. 
The code synthesis algorithm is presented in Table 14 and there are three parts to 
it: NewState(), Split() and MCL(). An SFA M = (T, N) is described by T, the set of all 
satisfiable transitions in it, and N, the set of all states in it. A transition from state n to a 
state m with a set of checkable conditions C, updates u and egress constraints e is 
represented by the tuple (n,m,C,u,e). The code synthesis begins by calling NewState(M, 
M.s) where M is a SFA with start state M.s as the current state (cs). NewState() selects the 
transitions that are outbound of the current state into successor states other than itself. 
Split() is then called with SFA M, the set of transitions sieved out and the current state.  
Split() is where the bulk of the work is done and can be broken down into several 
steps: In step ‘a,’ if the checkable condition of a transition is fully synthesized, then the 
SFA moves to the successor state. If the next state is the start state and if the egress 
constraint is an empty set, then the block of code for the update is inserted. Note that it is 
possible that there are no updates to be done, in which case the block of code will be 
empty. If the egress constraint is not empty, then a block of code for the egress constraint 
is inserted as well. If the next state is not the start state, then aside from code for update 
and egress, NewState() is called on the next state m.  
If there is no transition with checkable condition proposition fully synthesized, 
then the process now proceeds to step ‘b,’ calling MCL() to find the most common literal 
of the checkable conditions among all transitions in T. MCL() picks a literal c for Split() 
to work on.  
Next, in step ‘c,’ the transition set T is split into two sets T1 and T2. T1 contains 
the transitions that have the chosen literal c in its checkable conditions, and T2 contains 
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the transitions that have the negation of c. Transitions whose propositions have neither c 
nor its negation, belong to T1 and T2.  
In step ‘d,’ the literal c and its negation are substituted with true in the 
propositions of transitions in T1 and T2. For proposition of a transition that have neither c 
nor its negation, the checkable conditions set remains unchanged. The set of transitions 
whose proposition has undergone substitution is denoted T1’ and T2’ 
Lastly, in step ‘e,’ if both the T1 and T2 sets are not empty, if-else code is inserted 
for the Boolean value of c. In the block of code under c=true, Split() is called on T1’, 
while in the block of code under c=false, Split() is called on T2’. If T1 is empty, then ¬c 
is true is inserted and a call for Split() on T2’ is made. If instead T2 is empty, then c is 
true is inserted and a call for Split() on T1’ is made.  
The last part of the synthesis algorithm is MCL(), referring to Most Common 
Literal. The function takes a set of transitions and determines the most common literal in 
the checkable conditions of these transitions and returns it. First, an iteration is made to 
scan through all the literals in the checkable condition of the transitions and builds a 
unique set of available literals. Next, another iteration is made to count the number of 
appearances of each literal, with the negation of a literal counting towards the appearance 
of the literal as well. Lastly, the counts are checked to determine which literal has the 
highest count and that literal is returned as the output of the function. If several literals 
have the same highest count, then the leftmost literal with the highest count is selected. 
Leftmost is determined by the order in which literals appear in a proposition. The order 
reflects literals that should be checked before others. For example, ℎ𝑎𝑠_𝑖𝑝_𝑑𝑠𝑡_𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡   
appears before 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑠𝑙𝑡  because we want to ensure that the destination IP 
address is valid before checking whether the destination socket is in the SLT.   
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Table 14. Code synthesis algorithm for SFA M. 
𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑀, 𝑐𝑠  : 
 
 //picking out transition out of the current state  
 𝑇 𝑛, 𝑚, 𝐶, 𝑢, 𝑒 |𝑚, 𝑛 ∈ 𝑀. 𝑁 ∧ 𝑛 𝑐𝑠 ∧ 𝑛, 𝑚, 𝐶, 𝑢, 𝑒 ∈ 𝑀. 𝑇 ∧ 𝑚 𝑛  
 𝑆𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡 𝑀, 𝑇 , 𝑐𝑠  
 
𝑆𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡 𝑀, 𝑇, 𝑐𝑠  : 
   
 //step a: check if any transition’s checkable condition set is evaluated true  
 𝑖𝑓 𝑇 𝑛, 𝑚, 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒, 𝑢, 𝑒  
  //transition back to start state  
  𝑖𝑓 𝑚 𝑀. 𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 
   𝑖𝑓 𝑒 ∅  𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 
    𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑡  
𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑢𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒  
   𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒  
    𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑡 
     𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑢𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒  
     𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡  
  𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒  
   𝑖𝑓 𝑒 ∅  𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛  
    𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑡  
𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑢𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒  
𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑀, 𝑚   
   𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒  
    𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑡  
     𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑢𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒  
     𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡  
     𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑀, 𝑚   
 𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒  
  //step b: find the most common literal  
𝑐 𝑀𝐶𝐿 𝑇   
//step c: split the original set of transitions into two sets  
  𝑇1 𝑛, 𝑚, 𝐶, 𝑢, 𝑒 | 𝑛, 𝑚, 𝐶, 𝑢, 𝑒 ∈ 𝑇 ∧ 𝑐 ∈ 𝐶 ∨ 𝑐 ∉ 𝐶 ∧ 𝑐 ∉ 𝐶 ∨  
  𝑇2 𝑛, 𝑚, 𝐶, 𝑢, 𝑒 | 𝑛, 𝑚, 𝐶, 𝑢, 𝑒 ∈ 𝑇 ∧ 𝑐 ∈ 𝐶 ∨ 𝑐 ∉ 𝐶 ∧ 𝑐 ∉ 𝐶  
  //step d: substitution of literal or its negation with true  
  𝑇1′ 𝑛, 𝑚, 𝐶 , 𝑢, 𝑒 | 𝑛, 𝑚, 𝐶, 𝑢, 𝑒 ∈ 𝑇1 ∧ 𝐶 𝑠𝑢𝑏 𝐶, 𝑐, 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 ∨ 𝐶 𝐶 ∧ 𝑐 ∉ 𝐶  
  𝑇2′ 𝑛, 𝑚, 𝐶 , 𝑢, 𝑒 | 𝑛, 𝑚, 𝐶, 𝑢, 𝑒 ∈ 𝑇2 ∧ 𝐶 𝑠𝑢𝑏 𝐶, 𝑐, 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 ∨ 𝐶 𝐶 ∧ 𝑐 ∉ 𝐶  
  //step e: call function Split on T1 and T2, if set not empty  
  𝑖𝑓 𝑇1 ∅ ∧ 𝑇2 ∅  
   𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑡  
    𝑖𝑓 𝑐 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑆𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡 𝑀, 𝑇1 , 𝑐𝑠  𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑆𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡 𝑀, 𝑇2 , 𝑐𝑠   
  𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑖𝑓 𝑇1 ∅  
   𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑡  
    𝑖𝑓 𝑐 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑆𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡 𝑀, 𝑇2 , 𝑐𝑠   
  𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑖𝑓 𝑇2 ∅  
   𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑡  
    𝑖𝑓 𝑐 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑆𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡 𝑀, 𝑇1 , 𝑐𝑠   
 
𝑀𝐶𝐿 𝑇  : 
  
 𝑋    
 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡    
 𝑀𝑎𝑥 0  
  
 //listing the available literals 
 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑛. 𝑚. 𝐶. 𝑢. 𝑒  𝑖𝑛 𝑇  
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  𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑐 𝑖𝑛 𝐶  
   𝑖𝑓 𝑐 ∉ 𝑋  
    𝑎𝑑𝑑 𝑐 𝑡𝑜 𝑋  
    𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑐 0  
 //counting the appearance of literal or its negation   
 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑛. 𝑚. 𝐶. 𝑢. 𝑒  𝑖𝑛 𝑇  
  𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑐 𝑖𝑛 𝑋  
   𝑖𝑓 𝑐 ∈ 𝐶 ∨ 𝑐 ∈ 𝐶  
    𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑐 1  
 //finding the literal with the highest count of appearance 
 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑐 𝑖𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡  
  𝑖𝑓 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑐′ 𝑀𝑎𝑥  
   𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑐   
   𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡 𝑐 
 
 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡 
 
 
D. CODE SYNTHESIS FOR SWITCHING FUNCTIONS  
The code synthesis is applied in this section to SFA FxUxML, SFA 
FxUxSF|ML|SL and SFA FxUxSFxMLxSL. 
1. F x U x ML 
The code synthesis algorithm is illustrated by applying it to the basic switching 
function F x U x ML of Chapter II. In this section, and in those that follow, the algorithm 
is applied manually, as time did not permit the algorithm to be implemented. 
First, NewState(FxUxML, f1e1m1) is called. Transitions from f1e1m1 to f2e1m1, 
f2e1m2, and f2e1m3 are selected and input to Split(FxUxML, {A,B,C}, f1e1m1), with A = 
f1e1m1f2e1m1 , B = f1e1m1f2e1m2, and C = f1e1m1f2e1m3. The first literal 
selected by MCL({A, B,C}) is ucast(f.sa) because it has a count of 3. The transitions are 
then split into two sets with T1 being {A, B, C} and T2 being {A}. Note that 
f1e1m1f2e1m1 is in T1 and T2 because the conversion of implication 𝐴 ⇒ 𝐵 into the 
form 𝐴 ∨ 𝐴 ∧ 𝐵  means that both ucast(f.sa) and ¬ucast(f.sa) are in the transition. The 
ucast(f.sa) in T1 is substituted with true while ucast(f.sa) in T2 is substituted with false 
(e.g. ¬ucast(f.sa) evaluated as true). The transitions with substitution done are denoted 
with an apostrophe at the end of a transition e.g. (f1e1m1f2e1m2)’. If-else code is then 
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inserted, and Split(FxUxML, {A’, B’, C’}, f1e1m1) and Split(FxUxML, {A’}, f1e1m1) are 
called; an example of the current state of code is shown in Table 15.  
Table 15. Code synthesized after the first call of NewState and Split. 
//𝐴′ 𝑓1𝑒1𝑚1𝑓2𝑒1𝑚1 ′  
//𝐵′ 𝑓1𝑒1𝑚1𝑓2𝑒1𝑚2 ′  
//𝐶′ 𝑓1𝑒1𝑚1𝑓2𝑒1𝑚3 ′  
 
𝑖𝑓 𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎  𝑖𝑠 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛  
 𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑡𝑜 𝑏𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑆𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡 𝐹𝑥𝑈𝑥𝑀𝐿, 𝐴 , 𝐵 , 𝐶 , 𝑓1𝑒1𝑚1  
𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒  
 𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑡𝑜 𝑏𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑆𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡 𝐹𝑥𝑈𝑥𝑀𝐿, 𝐴’ , 𝑓1𝑒1𝑚1
 
Next, continuing down the path of Split(FxUxML, {A’, B’, C’}, f1e1m1), the 
literal chosen by MCL this time is 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡  because it has a count of 3, the 
highest. The transitions are split again, now T1 being {B’} and T2 being {A’, C’}. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ∈
𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡  in T1 and T2 are then substituted with true and false respectively. If-else code 
is again inserted, and Split(FxUxML, {B’’}, f1e1m1) and Split(FxUxML, {A’’, C’’}, 
f1e1m1) are called. The code at this stage is shown in Table 16.  
Table 16. Code synthesized after the second call of Split. 
//𝐴′′ 𝑓1𝑒1𝑚1𝑓2𝑒1𝑚1 ′′  
//𝐵′′ 𝑓1𝑒1𝑚1𝑓2𝑒1𝑚2 ′′  
//𝐶′′ 𝑓1𝑒1𝑚1𝑓2𝑒1𝑚3 ′′  
 
𝑖𝑓 𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎  𝑖𝑠 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛  
 𝑖𝑓 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑖𝑠 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 
  𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑡𝑜 𝑏𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑆𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡 𝐹𝑥𝑈𝑥𝑀𝐿, 𝐵′′ , 𝑓1𝑒1𝑚1  
 𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒 
  𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑡𝑜 𝑏𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑆𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡 𝐹𝑥𝑈𝑥𝑀𝐿, 𝐴 , 𝐶′′ , 𝑓1𝑒1𝑚1  
𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒  
 𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑡𝑜 𝑏𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑆𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡 𝐹𝑥𝑈𝑥𝑀𝐿, 𝑓1𝑒1𝑚1𝑓2𝑒1𝑚1 ’ , 𝑓1𝑒1𝑚1
 
Further down the path of Split(FxUxML, {B’’}, f1e1m1), there is now a transition, 
B’’, with checkable condition evaluated to be true. Since the next state, f2e1m2 is not the 
start state and there is no egress constraint or update in B’’, the algorithm only calls 
NewState(FxUxML, f2e1m2) for the new state that it has transitioned to. The current state 
of code is in Table 17. 
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Table 17. Code synthesized after reaching state f2e1m2. 
//𝐴′′ 𝑓1𝑒1𝑚1𝑓2𝑒1𝑚1 ′′  
//𝐵′′ 𝑓1𝑒1𝑚1𝑓2𝑒1𝑚2 ′′  
//𝐶′′ 𝑓1𝑒1𝑚1𝑓2𝑒1𝑚3 ′′  
 
𝑖𝑓 𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎  𝑖𝑠 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛  
 𝑖𝑓 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑖𝑠 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 
  𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑡𝑜 𝑏𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐹𝑥𝑈𝑥𝑀𝐿, 𝑓2𝑒1𝑚2  
 𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒 
  𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑡𝑜 𝑏𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑆𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡 𝐹𝑥𝑈𝑥𝑀𝐿, 𝐴 , 𝐶′′ , 𝑓1𝑒1𝑚1  
𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒  
 𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑡𝑜 𝑏𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑆𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡 𝐹𝑥𝑈𝑥𝑀𝐿, 𝑓1𝑒1𝑚1𝑓2𝑒1𝑚1 ’ , 𝑓1𝑒1𝑚1  
 
In NewState(FxUxML, f2e1m2), only one transition, f2e1m2f1e1m1, is 
associated with it. This single transition set is then passed on to Split(FxUxML, 
f2e1m2f1e1m1, f2e1m2). Since the proposition in the transition has no checkable 
conditions, the proposition is vacuously true. The state to which it is transitioning is the 
start state of FxUxML and the transition has egress constraint and update in it; thus, code 
for egress constraint and update is to be inserted (Table 18) and no further call of 
NewState() is required. 
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Table 18. Code synthesized after calling Split(FxUxML,f2e1m2f1e1m1, 
f2e1m2). 
//𝐴′′ 𝑓1𝑒1𝑚1𝑓2𝑒1𝑚1 ′′  
//𝐵′′ 𝑓1𝑒1𝑚1𝑓2𝑒1𝑚2 ′′  
//𝐶′′ 𝑓1𝑒1𝑚1𝑓2𝑒1𝑚3 ′′  
 
𝑖𝑓 𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎  𝑖𝑠 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛  
 𝑖𝑓 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑖𝑠 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 
  //𝑖𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑓2𝑒1𝑚2 
  𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑢𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑓2𝑒1𝑚2𝑓1𝑒1𝑚1  
  𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑓2𝑒1𝑚2𝑓1𝑒1𝑚1  
 𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒 
  𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑡𝑜 𝑏𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑆𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡 𝐹𝑥𝑈𝑥𝑀𝐿, 𝐴 , 𝐶′′ , 𝑓1𝑒1𝑚1  
𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒  
 𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑡𝑜 𝑏𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑆𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡 𝐹𝑥𝑈𝑥𝑀𝐿, 𝑓1𝑒1𝑚1𝑓2𝑒1𝑚1 ’ , 𝑓1𝑒1𝑚1  
 
The code synthesized to reach all the states is shown in Table 19. 
Table 19. Code synthesized for all states in FxUxML. 
𝑖𝑓 𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎  𝑖𝑠 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛  
 𝑖𝑓 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑖𝑠 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 
  //𝑖𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑓2𝑒1𝑚2 
  𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑢𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑓2𝑒1𝑚2𝑓1𝑒1𝑚1  
  𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑓2𝑒1𝑚2𝑓1𝑒1𝑚1  
 𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒 
  𝑖𝑓 ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 . 𝑡 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑖 . 𝑡 16𝑖𝑠 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 
   //𝑖𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑓2𝑒1𝑚1 
   𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑓2𝑒1𝑚1𝑓1𝑒1𝑚1  
  𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒 
   //𝑖𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑓2𝑒1𝑚3 
   𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑢𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑓2𝑒1𝑚3𝑓1𝑒1𝑚1  
   𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑓2𝑒1𝑚3𝑓1𝑒1𝑚1  
𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒  
 //𝑖𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑓2𝑒1𝑚1 
 𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑓2𝑒1𝑚1𝑓1𝑒1𝑚1
 
2. F x U x SF | ML | SL 
With parallel composition of ML and SL, the forwarding function with stateful 
firewalling and learning are processed separately. This results in three tensor products: 
(1) FxUxSF, (2) ML, and (3) SL. 
Consider FxUxSF; the transitions are converted into the required form. Transition 
f1e1g1f2e1g1 is labeled with: 
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𝜆𝑥. 𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑖   
Transition f2e1g1 back to f1e1g1 in required form is annotated with: 
𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 ∧ 𝑡 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 . 𝑡 16 ∧
𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 . 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ∨  𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ∧ ℎ𝑎𝑠_𝑖𝑝_𝑑𝑠𝑡_𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑓 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ∉
𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑡 𝑠𝑙𝑡 ∨ 𝑡 𝑠𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑡 25 ∨ 𝑠𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ⇒ 𝑙𝑜𝑐 ⊆
𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑒   
Since there are no checkable conditions for the transition f1e1g1f2e1g1, the 
code synthesis algorithm will generate a code that immediately enters the f2e1g1 state 
when ingress frames are received.  
Upon receiving an incoming frame, the switch enters the state f2e1g1. At the 
f2e1g1 state, the egress constraints are discharged. The code in Figure 17 is generated by 
mapping each literal to the corresponding C code. 
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Figure 17. C code for discharging egress constraints of 
FxUxSF. 
Next, consider MAC learning. The transitions are first converted into the required 
form. The stutter transition from m1m1 becomes: 
𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ∨ 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ∉ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 ∧ ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 . 𝑡 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑖 . 𝑡 16  
Transition m1m2 becomes: 
𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡  
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Transition m1m3 becomes: 
𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ∧ ∃𝑖 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 . 𝑡 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑖 . 𝑡 15 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ∉ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡  
Table 20 shows the generated pseudo-code for MAC learning. 
Table 20. Code synthesized for ML. 
𝑖𝑓 𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎  𝑖𝑠 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛  
 𝑖𝑓 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡  𝑖𝑠 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 
  //𝑖𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑚2 
  𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑢𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑚2𝑚1  
  𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑚2𝑚1  
 𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒 
  𝑖𝑓 ∃𝑖 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 . 𝑡 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑖 . 𝑡 15 𝑖𝑠 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 
   //𝑖𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑚3 
   𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑢𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑚3𝑚1  
   𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑚3𝑚1  
 
  𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒 
   //𝑖𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑚1 
   𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑚1𝑚1  
𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒  
 //𝑖𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑚1 
 𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑚1𝑚1  
 
Finally, the SFA for socket learning is discharged. Again, the SL transition is 
converted into the required form. The stutter transition from s1s1 becomes: 
𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ∨ ℎ𝑎𝑠_𝑖𝑝_𝑠𝑟𝑐_𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑓 ∨ 𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓  ∨ 𝑓. 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘
∉ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑠𝑙𝑡 ∧ ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑠𝑙𝑡 . 𝑡 𝑠𝑙𝑡 𝑖 . 𝑡 26  
Transition s1s2 becomes: 
𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ∧ ℎ𝑎𝑠_𝑖𝑝_𝑠𝑟𝑐_𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑓 ∧ 𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑠𝑙𝑡  
Transition s1s3 becomes: 
𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ∧ ℎ𝑎𝑠_𝑖𝑝_𝑠𝑟𝑐_𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑓 ∧ 𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ∉ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑠𝑙𝑡 ∧ ∃𝑖
∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑠𝑙𝑡 . 𝑡 𝑠𝑙𝑡 𝑖 . 𝑡 25 
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The pseudo-code for socket learning is given in Table 21 using the code synthesis 
algorithm. 
Table 21. Code synthesized for SL. 
𝑖𝑓 𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎  𝑖𝑠 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛  
 𝑖𝑓 ℎ𝑎𝑠_𝑖𝑝_𝑠𝑟𝑐_𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑓  𝑖𝑠 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 
  𝑖𝑓 𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓  𝑖𝑠 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 
   𝑖𝑓 𝑓. 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑠𝑙𝑡  𝑖𝑠 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 
    //𝑖𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑠2 
    𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑢𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑠2𝑠1  
    𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑠2𝑠1  
   𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒 
    𝑖𝑓 ∃𝑖 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑠𝑙𝑡 . 𝑡 𝑠𝑙𝑡 𝑖 . 𝑡 25 𝑖𝑠 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 
     //𝑖𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑠3 
     𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑢𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑠3𝑠1  
     𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑠3𝑠1  
 
    𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒 
     //𝑖𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑠1 
     𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑠1𝑠1  
  𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒  
   //𝑖𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑠1 
   𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑠1𝑠1  
 𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒  
  //𝑖𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑠1 
  𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑠1𝑠1  
𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒  
 //𝑖𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑠1 
 𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑠1𝑠1  
 
Each literal is directly mapped, using the discharge table shown in Table 12, to 
the corresponding C function blocks. The C code generated is shown in Appendix A.   
3. F x U x SF x ML x SL 
Using the full cross product, FxUxSFxMLxSL, results in ten different states with 
18 different transitions. The full cross-product was discharged and converted to C code to 
analyze the difference in complexity and the synthesized code size.  
Using the code synthesis algorithm, pseudo-code is generated as shown in  
Table 22. 
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Table 22. Code synthesized for FxUxSFxMLxSL. 
if ucast f.sa  is true then
if f.sa ∈ dom mlt  is true then 
if walled self  is true then
if has_ip_src_socket f is true then
if f.ssock ∈ dom slt is true then
//in state f2e1g1m2s2
else 









If   ∃𝑖 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 . 𝑡 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑖 . 𝑡 15 is true then
if walled self  is true then
if has_ip_src_socket f is true then
if f.ssock ∈ dom slt is true then
//in state f2e1g1m3s2
else









if walled self  is true then
if has_ip_src_socket f is true then
if f.ssock ∈ dom slt is true then
//in state f2e1g1m1s2
else










//in state f2e1g1m1s1 
 
The actual C code synthesized is shown in Appendix B.  
a. Code Comparison 
The main switching block of the code synthesized for FxUxSFxMLxSL is 
significantly longer than for FxUxSF|ML|SL. This was due to the former having to 
discharge the egress conditions for each of the different branch cases, resulting in 
discharging the egress conditions a total of 15 times. By contrast, the latter had only one 
branch case where the egress condition was discharged. 
The code synthesized for FxUxSFxMLxSL has a total of 15 branch cases. The 
worst-case scenario to reach a specific state involves seven conditional checks. For 
example, the transition f1e1g1m1s1 to f2e1g1m3s3 consists of checking seven different 
conditional literals: 
𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ∉ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 ∧ ∃𝑖 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 . 𝑡 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑖 . 𝑡 15 ∧
𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ∧ ℎ𝑎𝑠_𝑖𝑝_𝑠𝑟𝑐_𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑓 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ∉ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑠𝑙𝑡 ∧ ∃𝑖 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑠𝑙𝑡 . 𝑡
𝑠𝑙𝑡 𝑖 . 𝑡 25  
The best-case scenario involves a total of only two conditional checks, for 
instance, the f1e1f1m1s1 f2e1g1m1s1 transition via the following checks:  
𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ∉ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡  
In the case of FxUxSF|ML|SL, the conditional branches for FxUxSF, ML, and SL are 
separated. FxUxSF has no conditional check to transit from f1e1g1 to f2e1g1 state, hence 
only one branch. ML has a total of four branches and SL a total of six branches. The 
worst-case scenario to reach a specific state involves eight conditional checks (zero 
checks from FxUxSF, three for ML and five for SL), as in for instance f1e1g1f2e1g1 
with parallel learning m1m3 and s1s3. On the other hand, the best-case scenario also 
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involves two conditional checks (zero checks from FxUxSF, one for ML and one for SL), 
as in for instance f1e1g1f2e1g1 with parallel learning m1m1 and s1s1. 
In summary, FxUxSFxMLxSL results in a larger number of branch cases to 
transition to the different states. FxUxSFxMLxSL, however, has a smaller maximum 
number of conditional checks for its worst-case scenario. This is due to the removal of 
duplicated conditions during the full cross-product. 
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V. SFA FOR A HOME GATEWAY 
A. ROUTING SFA 
The construction of other network services can be achieved by further increasing 
the inventory of elementary behavior SFA available for cross-product construction. This 
chapter presents three more primitive SFAs, namely Routing SFA, NAT Table SFA and 
Translation SFA for the construction of a home IPv4 gateway.  
The routing SFA’s (Table 23) fundamental behavior checks that frames are 
intended for outbound or inbound of the home network and then changes the destination 
MAC address of the frames to travel the next bound of link. The router’s ports are 
separated into two kinds: uplink port and non-uplink port. Uplink port refers to the port 
that is connected to the Internet Service Provider’s (ISP) gateway and to the Internet. 
Non-uplink port refers to the port that is facing inward, connecting to the host within the 
internal home network. For this version of the home gateway, a static and preloaded 
routing table and Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) table are assumed; thus, SFA for 
route learning and ARP learning are omitted. The two tables are denoted as rt and arp in 
Table 23. The local_ip term refers to the assigned IPv4 address of the router port when a 
frame is meant for the router itself. The predicate has_dest_ip(f) takes a frame and checks 
for valid IPv4 destination address, returning true if that is the case.  
There are a few functions used in Table 23: 1) rt(IPv4_address) takes an IPv4 
address as input and returns the associated port recorded in the routing table; 2) 
arp(IPv4_address).haddr takes an IPv4 address as input and returns the associated MAC 
address recorded in the ARP table; and 3) haddr(port) takes a port number as input and 
returns the MAC address of that router port.  
State r2 represents the case where a frame is received at the uplink ingress port of 
the router. Several checks are done on the frame: 1) the destination MAC address of the 
frame is checked to be the address of the uplink port; 2) the frame is checked to have a 
valid IPv4 destination address; 3) the frame’s destination IP is checked to have a 
matching entry in the routing table and the ARP table; and  4) the destination IP is not a 
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local IP address of the router. From state r2, the SFA returns to the start state r1 by 
restricting the egress location to be the port specified in the routing table, rewriting the 
frame’s destination MAC address to be the address in ARP table associated with the 
frame’s destination IP address, and rewriting the frame’s source MAC address to be the 
address of the egress port specified by rt given the frame’s destination IP.  
State r3 represents the case where a frame is received at a non-uplink port of the 
router. The frame is checked to have the destination the MAC address of the port that 
received it and has a valid IPv4 destination address that is not a local IP address of the 
router. Returning to the start state consists of constraining the egress location to be the 
uplink egress port, rewriting the frame’s destination MAC address to be the address of 
the ISP gateway, and rewriting the frame’s source address to be the address of the uplink 
port.  
State r1’s condition represents all conditions under which the routing SFA will 
not route and remain in r1 awaiting the next frame.  
Table 23. Routing SFA. 
 r1 r2 r3 
→r1 𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑖 ⇒ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ∨
ℎ𝑎𝑠_𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡_𝑖𝑝 𝑓 ∨ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑖𝑝 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙_𝑖𝑝 ∨
𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘_𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑖𝑝 ∉ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑟𝑡 ∨
𝑓. 𝑑𝑖𝑝 ∉ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑎𝑟𝑝   
𝜆𝑥. 𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑖 ∧ 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓
𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘_𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎
ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ∧
ℎ𝑎𝑠_𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡_𝑖𝑝 𝑓 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑖𝑝
𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙_𝑖𝑝 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑖𝑝 ∈
𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑟𝑡 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑖𝑝 ∈
𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑎𝑟𝑝   
𝜆𝑥. 𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑖 ∧
𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘_𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 ∧
𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ∧
ℎ𝑎𝑠_𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡_𝑖𝑝 𝑓 ∧
𝑓. 𝑑𝑖𝑝 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙_𝑖𝑝  
r2 𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑟𝑡 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑑𝑖𝑝 . 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑒 ∧  𝑓
𝑥. 𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ↦
𝑎𝑟𝑝 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑑𝑖𝑝 . ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟, 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ↦
ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟 𝑟𝑡 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑑𝑖𝑝   
- - 
r3 𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘_𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑒 ∧  𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ↦
𝑎𝑟𝑝 𝑖𝑠𝑝_𝑔𝑤 . ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟, 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ↦




The routing SFA is for a home gateway that does not perform Network Address 
Translation (NAT). One common additional functionality for the home gateway is NAT. 
The routing SFA can be modified to cater for the inclusion of this functionality. The 
modification is not to execute the NAT behavior itself but to work with the NAT 
behavior SFA. Any home gateway with no NAT functionality will use the former routing 
SFA while the home gateway with NAT will use the latter.  
The modification of the routing SFA is in changing the check of the frame’s 
destination IP in the routing table and ARP table to the check of the translated IP (from 
NAT table) in the routing table and ARP table. The modification also added checks for 
entry in the NAT table associated with destination socket and whether it has expired. The 
routing table and ARP will looked up with the translated IP, instead of the allocated 
public IP, in transition r2 to r1 in Table 24. The function nt(socket).ip takes a socket as an 
input and returns the translated IP. If the socket is a public socket, then the translated IP 
returned is the associated private IP.  
Table 24. Routing for NAT SFA R. 
 r1 r2 r3 
→r1 𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑖 ⇒ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ∨
ℎ𝑎𝑠_𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡_𝑖𝑝 𝑓 ∨ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑖𝑝 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙_𝑖𝑝 ∨
𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘_𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ∉
𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑛𝑡 ∧ 𝑡 𝑛𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑡 60 ∨
𝑛𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑖𝑝 ∉ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑟𝑡 ∨
𝑛𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑖𝑝 ∉ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑎𝑟𝑝   
𝜆𝑥. 𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑖 ∧ 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓
𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘_𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎
ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ∧
ℎ𝑎𝑠_𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡_𝑖𝑝 𝑓 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑖𝑝
𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙_𝑖𝑝 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ∈
𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑛𝑡 ∧ 𝑡
𝑛𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑡 61 ∧
𝑛𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑖𝑝 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑟𝑡 ∧
𝑛𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑖𝑝 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑎𝑟𝑝   
𝜆𝑥. 𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑖 ∧
𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘_𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 ∧
𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ∧
ℎ𝑎𝑠_𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡_𝑖𝑝 𝑓 ∧
𝑓. 𝑑𝑖𝑝 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙_𝑖𝑝  
r2 𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑟𝑡 𝑛𝑡 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑖𝑝 . 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑒 ∧
 𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ↦
𝑎𝑟𝑝 𝑛𝑡 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑖𝑝 . ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟, 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ↦
ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟 𝑟𝑡 𝑛𝑡 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑖𝑝   
- - 
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 r1 r2 r3 
r3 𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘_𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑒 ∧  𝑓
𝑥. 𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ↦
𝑎𝑟𝑝 𝑖𝑠𝑝_𝑔𝑤 . ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟, 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ↦
ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟 𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘_𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡   
- - 
 
B. NAT TABLE SFA 
Network Address Translation is the act of mapping a private IP space socket to a 
public IP space socket and rewriting the client IP address of packets that are transiting 
between the two domains, to facilitate the connectivity of the domains. The NAT 
functionality is important because it allows the increase of host connectivity to the 
Internet despite the shortage of IPv4 addresses and it obfuscates the internal network 
topology from public view. The NAT functionality is separated into two elementary 
behaviors, NAT learning behavior and translation behavior. The NAT learning SFA in 
Table 25 generates a public socket for a private socket host and keeps this mapping for 
the duration of a connection before timing out. The function GenPubSock(Private IP) 
takes a private socket as input and generates a new public socket for return.  
The state n2 represents the case where a frame arrives at the uplink port of the 
router and has an established connection in the NAT table. The transition to n2 consists 
of several conditions: 1) the frame’s destination MAC address be that of the receiving 
port, 2) the frame’s destination IP be a valid IPv4 address, 3) the frame’s destination IP is 
not a local IP of the router, and 4) the frame’s destination socket is in the NAT table and 
the entry in the table has not expired. The return transition to start state n1 executes an 
update to the NAT table, updating the timing of the entry associated with the destination 
socket to the time at which the frame was received.  
State n3 represents the case where a frame arrives at a non-uplink port, coming 
from a host within the private network and already having an established connection in 
the NAT table. The transition imposes conditions 1, 2, 3 above and requires that the 
frame’s source socket has an entry in the NAT table. The return transition to start state n1 
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executes an update to the NAT table, updating the timing of the entry associated with the 
source socket to the time at which the frame was received. 
State n4 represents the case where a frame arrives at a non-uplink port, coming 
from a host within the private network but does not yet have an established connection in 
the NAT table. The transition imposes conditions 1, 2, 3 above and requires that the 
frame’s source socket does not have an entry in the NAT table. The return transition to 
start state n1 generates a new public socket for the private source socket and inserts a 
record of it in the NAT table.  
State n1’s transition represents all conditions under which the NAT learning SFA 
does not update the NAT table and instead waits for the next frame. 
Table 25. NAT learning SFA NL. 
 n1 n2 n3 n4 
→n1 𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑖 ⇒ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎
ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ∨
ℎ𝑎𝑠_𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡_𝑖𝑝 𝑓 ∨ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑖𝑝
𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙_𝑖𝑝 ∨ 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓
𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘_𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ∉
𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑛𝑡 ∨ 𝑡 𝑛𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑡
60 )  






𝑓. 𝑑𝑖𝑝 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙_𝑖𝑝 ∧
𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ∈
𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑛𝑡 ∧ 𝑡
𝑛𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑡 61 






𝑓. 𝑑𝑖𝑝 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙_𝑖𝑝 ∧
𝑓. 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ∈
𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑛𝑡   






𝑓. 𝑑𝑖𝑝 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙_𝑖𝑝 ∧
𝑓. 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ∉
𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑛𝑡   
n2 𝑛𝑡 𝑥. 𝑛𝑡 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ↦
𝑡 𝑥. 𝑡   
- - - 
n3 𝑛𝑡 𝑥. 𝑛𝑡 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ↦
𝑡 𝑥. 𝑡   
- - - 
n4 𝑛𝑡 𝑥. 𝑛𝑡 ∷ 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ↦
𝑡 𝑥. 𝑡, 𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑘
𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘   
- - - 
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C. TRANSLATION SFA 
The translation SFA prescribes the behavior of rewriting the public destination 
socket of an incoming packet from the public network to the private network and 
rewriting the private source socket of outgoing packets from the private network to the 
public network. It is given in Table 26. The SFA rewrites the sockets based on the NAT 
table entry. Thus, the transition to update a NAT table entry, such as the generation of the 
public socket, must happen before the translation transition. This is to ensure that a valid 
entry is available for translation. The function nt(socket).skt takes a public or private 
socket as input and returns the associated private or public socket respectively.  
State t2 represents the case where a frame arrives at the uplink port and the 
destination socket is in the NAT table and has not expired. The transition performs a 
check on the frame’s destination MAC address to be that of the uplink port. The 
transition also performs checks on the frame’s IP address to be a valid IPv4 address and 
on the destination IP to not match the router’s local IP. The return transition to start state 
t1 rewrites the frame’s destination socket to be the private socket associated with it in the 
NAT table.  
State t3 represents the case where a frame arrives at the non-uplink port of the 
router and is destined for the Internet. The transition contains the same three checks on 
the destination MAC address, IPv4 address validity and destination IP. The return 
transition to start state t1 rewrites the frame’s source socket to be the public socket 
associated in the NAT table.  
State t1’s condition represents all conditions under which the SFA does not do 
any rewrite any sockets and instead waits for the next frame.  
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Table 26. Translation SFA T. 
 t1 t2 t3 
→t1 𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑖 ⇒ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ∨
ℎ𝑎𝑠_𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡_𝑖𝑝 𝑓 ∨ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑖𝑝 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙_𝑖𝑝 ∨
𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘_𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ∉
𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑛𝑡 ∨ 𝑡 𝑛𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑡 60   
𝜆𝑥. 𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑖 ∧
𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘_𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 ∧
𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ∧
ℎ𝑎𝑠_𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡_𝑖𝑝 𝑓 ∧
𝑓. 𝑑𝑖𝑝 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙_𝑖𝑝 ∧
𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑛𝑡 ∧
𝑡 𝑛𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑡 61  
𝜆𝑥. 𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑖 ∧
𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘_𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 ∧
𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ∧
ℎ𝑎𝑠_𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡_𝑖𝑝 𝑓 ∧
𝑓. 𝑑𝑖𝑝 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙_𝑖𝑝  
t2 𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ↦ 𝑛𝑡 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑠𝑘𝑡  - - 
t3 𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ↦ 𝑛𝑡 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑠𝑘𝑡  - - 
 
D. TENSOR PRODUCT FOR HOME GATEWAY 
The behavior composition of a basic home gateway is produced by synthesizing 
code for the tensor product FxUxMLxRxNLxT. The tensor product is an SFA with 16 
states including start state, with 15 transitions out of the start state and 15 transitions into 
the start state, as shown in Table 27.  
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Table 27. Transitions of SFA FxUxMLxRxNLxT. 
 Transition Proposition 
f1e1m1r1n1t1 
f2e1m1r1n1t1 
𝜆𝑥. 𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑖 ⇒ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ∨ ℎ𝑎𝑠_𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡_𝑖𝑝 𝑓 ∨ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑖𝑝 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙_𝑖𝑝 ∨
𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘_𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ∉ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑛𝑡 ∨ 𝑡 𝑛𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 60 ∨
𝑛𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑖𝑝 ∉ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑟𝑡 ∨ 𝑛𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑖𝑝 ∉ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑎𝑟𝑝 ∧ 𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ⇒
𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ∉ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 ∧ ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 . 𝑡 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑖 . 𝑡 16   
f1e1m1r1n1t1 
f2e1m1r1n2t2 
𝜆𝑥. 𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑖 ⇒ 𝑛𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘. 𝑖𝑝 ∉ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑟𝑡 ∨ 𝑛𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑖𝑝 ∉ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑎𝑟𝑝 ∧
𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘_𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ∧ ℎ𝑎𝑠_𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡_𝑖𝑝 𝑓 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑖𝑝 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙_𝑖𝑝 ∧
𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑛𝑡 ∧ 𝑡 𝑛𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑡 61 ∧ 𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ⇒ 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ∉
𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 ∧ ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 . 𝑡 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑖 . 𝑡 16   
f1e1m1r1n1t1 
f2e1m1r2n2t2 
𝜆𝑥. 𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑖 ∧ 𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ⇒ 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ∉ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 ∧ ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 . 𝑡
𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑖 . 𝑡 16 ∧ 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘_𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ∧ ℎ𝑎𝑠_𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡_𝑖𝑝 𝑓 ∧
𝑓. 𝑑𝑖𝑝 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙_𝑖𝑝 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑛𝑡 ∧ 𝑛𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑖𝑝 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑟𝑡 ∧
𝑛𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑎𝑟𝑝 ∧ 𝑡 𝑛𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑡 61  
f1e1m1r1n1t1 
f2e1m1r3n3t3 
𝜆𝑥. 𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑖 ∧ 𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ⇒ 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ∉ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 ∧ ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 . 𝑡
𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑖 . 𝑡 16 ∧ 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘_𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ∧ ℎ𝑎𝑠_𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡_𝑖𝑝 𝑓 ∧
𝑓. 𝑑𝑖𝑝 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙_𝑖𝑝 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑛𝑡   
f1e1m1r1n1t1 
f2e1m1r3n4t3 
𝜆𝑥. 𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑖 ∧ 𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ⇒ 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ∉ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 ∧ ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 . 𝑡
𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑖 . 𝑡 16 ∧ 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘_𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ∧ ℎ𝑎𝑠_𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡_𝑖𝑝 𝑓 ∧
𝑓. 𝑑𝑖𝑝 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙_𝑖𝑝 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ∉ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑛𝑡   
f1e1m1r1n1t1 
f2e1m2r1n1t1 
𝜆𝑥. 𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑖 ⇒ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ∨ ℎ𝑎𝑠_𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡_𝑖𝑝 𝑓 ∨ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑖𝑝 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙_𝑖𝑝 ∨
𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘_𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ∉ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑛𝑡 ∨ 𝑡 𝑛𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 60 ∨
𝑛𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑖𝑝 ∉ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑟𝑡 ∨ 𝑛𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑖𝑝 ∉ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑎𝑟𝑝 ∧ 𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ∈
𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡   
f1e1m1r1t1n1 
f2e1m2r1n2t2 
𝜆𝑥. 𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑖 ⇒ 𝑛𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘. 𝑖𝑝 ∉ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑟𝑡 ∨ 𝑛𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑖𝑝 ∉ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑎𝑟𝑝 ∧
𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘_𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ∧ ℎ𝑎𝑠_𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡_𝑖𝑝 𝑓 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑖𝑝 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙_𝑖𝑝 ∧
𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑛𝑡 ∧ 𝑡 𝑛𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑡 61 ∧ 𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡   
f1e1m1r1t1n1 
f2e1m2r2n2t2 
𝜆𝑥. 𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑖 ∧ 𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 ∧ 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘_𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎
ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ∧ ℎ𝑎𝑠_𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡_𝑖𝑝 𝑓 ∧ 𝑛𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑖𝑝 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑟𝑡 ∧ 𝑛𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ∈
𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑎𝑟𝑝 ∧ 𝑡 𝑛𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑡 61 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑖𝑝 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙_𝑖𝑝 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑛𝑡   
f1e1m1r1t1n1 
f2e1m2r3n3t3 
𝜆𝑥. 𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑖 ∧ 𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 ∧ 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘_𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎




𝜆𝑥. 𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑖 ∧ 𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 ∧ 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘_𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎
ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ∧ ℎ𝑎𝑠_𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡_𝑖𝑝 𝑓 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑖𝑝 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙_𝑖𝑝 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ∉ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑛𝑡   
f1e1m1r1t1n1 
f2e1m3r1n1t1 
𝜆𝑥. 𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑖 ⇒ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ∨ ℎ𝑎𝑠_𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡_𝑖𝑝 𝑓 ∨ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑖𝑝 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙_𝑖𝑝 ∨
𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘_𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ∉ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑛𝑡 ∨ 𝑡 𝑛𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 60 ∨
𝑛𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑖𝑝 ∉ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑟𝑡 ∨ 𝑛𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑖𝑝 ∉ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑎𝑟𝑝 ∧ 𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ∧ ∃𝑖 ∈
𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 . 𝑡 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑖 . 𝑡 15 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ∉ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡   
f1e1m1r1t1n1 
f2e1m3r1n2t2 
𝜆𝑥. 𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑖 ⇒ 𝑛𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘. 𝑖𝑝 ∉ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑟𝑡 ∨ 𝑛𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑖𝑝 ∉ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑎𝑟𝑝 ∧
𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘_𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ∧ ℎ𝑎𝑠_𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡_𝑖𝑝 𝑓 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑖𝑝 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙_𝑖𝑝 ∧
𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑛𝑡 ∧ 𝑡 𝑛𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑡 61 ∧ 𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ∧ ∃𝑖 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 . 𝑡
𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑖 . 𝑡 15 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ∉ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡   
f1e1m1r1t1n1 
f2e1m3r2n2t2 
𝜆𝑥. 𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑖 ∧ 𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ∧ ∃𝑖 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 . 𝑡 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑖 . 𝑡 15 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ∉
𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 ∧ 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘_𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ∧ ℎ𝑎𝑠_𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡_𝑖𝑝 𝑓 ∧
𝑛𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑖𝑝 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑟𝑡 ∧ 𝑛𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑎𝑟𝑝 ∧ 𝑡 𝑛𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑡 61 ∧
𝑓. 𝑑𝑖𝑝 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙_𝑖𝑝 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑛𝑡   
f1e1m1r1t1n1 
f2e1m3r3n3t3 
𝜆𝑥. 𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑖 ∧ 𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ∧ ∃𝑖 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 . 𝑡 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑖 . 𝑡 15 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ∉
𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 ∧ 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘_𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ∧ ℎ𝑎𝑠_𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡_𝑖𝑝 𝑓 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑖𝑝
𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙_𝑖𝑝 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑛𝑡   
f1e1m1r1t1n1 
f2e1m3r2n4t3 
𝜆𝑥. 𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑖 ∧ 𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ∧ ∃𝑖 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 . 𝑡 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑖 . 𝑡 15 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ∉
𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 ∧ 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘_𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ∧ ℎ𝑎𝑠_𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡_𝑖𝑝 𝑓 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑖𝑝
𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙_𝑖𝑝 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ∉ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑛𝑡   
f2e1m1r1n1t1 
f1e1m1r1t1n1 
𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓 ⇒ 𝑙𝑜𝑐 ⊆ 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑒 ∧ 𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 ∧ 𝑡
𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 . 𝑡 16 ∧ 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 . 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ⇒ 𝑙𝑜𝑐 ⊆ 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑒   
f2e1m1r1n2t2 
f1e1m1r1n1t1 
𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓 ⇒ 𝑙𝑜𝑐 ⊆ 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑒 ∧ 𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 ∧ 𝑡
𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 . 𝑡 16 ∧ 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 . 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ⇒ 𝑙𝑜𝑐 ⊆ 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑒 ∧ 𝑛𝑡
𝑥. 𝑛𝑡 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ↦ 𝑡 𝑥. 𝑡 ∧ 𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ↦ 𝑛𝑡 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑠𝑘𝑡   
f2e1m1r2n2t2 
f1e1m1r1n1t1 
𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓 ⇒ 𝑙𝑜𝑐 ⊆ 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑒 ∧ 𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 ∧ 𝑡
𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 . 𝑡 16 ∧ 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 . 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ⇒ 𝑙𝑜𝑐 ⊆ 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑒 ∧ 𝑙𝑜𝑐
𝑟𝑡 𝑛𝑡 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑖𝑝 . 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑒 ∧  𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ↦
𝑎𝑟𝑝 𝑛𝑡 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑖𝑝 . ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟, 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ↦ ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟 𝑟𝑡 𝑛𝑡 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑖𝑝 ∧ 𝑛𝑡
𝑥. 𝑛𝑡 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ↦ 𝑡 𝑥. 𝑡 ∧ 𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ↦ 𝑛𝑡 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑠𝑘𝑡   
f2e1m1r3n3t3 
f1e1m1r1n1t1 
𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓 ⇒ 𝑙𝑜𝑐 ⊆ 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑒 ∧ 𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 ∧ 𝑡
𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 . 𝑡 16 ∧ 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 . 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ⇒ 𝑙𝑜𝑐 ⊆ 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑒 ∧ 𝑙𝑜𝑐
𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘_𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑒 ∧  𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ↦ 𝑎𝑟𝑝 𝑖𝑠𝑝_𝑔𝑤 . ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟, 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ↦
ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟 𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘_𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 ∧ 𝑛𝑡 𝑥. 𝑛𝑡 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ↦ 𝑡 𝑥. 𝑡 ∧ 𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ↦




𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓 ⇒ 𝑙𝑜𝑐 ⊆ 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑒 ∧ 𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 ∧ 𝑡
𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 . 𝑡 16 ∧ 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 . 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ⇒ 𝑙𝑜𝑐 ⊆ 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑒 ∧ 𝑙𝑜𝑐
𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘_𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑒 ∧  𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ↦ 𝑎𝑟𝑝 𝑖𝑠𝑝_𝑔𝑤 . ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟, 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ↦
ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟 𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘_𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 ∧ 𝑛𝑡 𝑥. 𝑛𝑡 ∷ 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ↦ 𝑡 𝑥. 𝑡, 𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑘
𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ∧ 𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ↦ 𝑛𝑡 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑠𝑘𝑡   
f2e1m2r1n1t1 
f1e1m1r1n1t1 
𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓 ⇒ 𝑙𝑜𝑐 ⊆ 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑒 ∧ 𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 ∧ 𝑡
𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 . 𝑡 16 ∧ 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 . 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ⇒ 𝑙𝑜𝑐 ⊆ 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑒 ∧ 𝑚𝑙𝑡
𝑥. 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ↦ 𝑡 𝑥. 𝑡, 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓   
f2e1m2r1n2t2 
f1e1m1r1n1t1 
𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓 ⇒ 𝑙𝑜𝑐 ⊆ 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑒 ∧ 𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 ∧ 𝑡
𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 . 𝑡 16 ∧ 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 . 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ⇒ 𝑙𝑜𝑐 ⊆ 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑒 ∧ 𝑚𝑙𝑡
𝑥. 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ↦ 𝑡 𝑥. 𝑡, 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ∧ 𝑛𝑡 𝑥. 𝑛𝑡 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ↦ 𝑡 𝑥. 𝑡 ∧ 𝑓
𝑥. 𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ↦ 𝑛𝑡 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑠𝑘𝑡   
f2e1m2r2n2t2 
f1e1m1r1n1t1 
𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓 ⇒ 𝑙𝑜𝑐 ⊆ 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑒 ∧ 𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 ∧ 𝑡
𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 . 𝑡 16 ∧ 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 . 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ⇒ 𝑙𝑜𝑐 ⊆ 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑒 ∧ 𝑚𝑙𝑡
𝑥. 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ↦ 𝑡 𝑥. 𝑡, 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ∧ 𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑟𝑡 𝑛𝑡 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑖𝑝 . 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑒 ∧
 𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ↦ 𝑎𝑟𝑝 𝑛𝑡 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑖𝑝 . ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟, 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ↦
ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟 𝑟𝑡 𝑛𝑡 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑖𝑝 ∧ 𝑛𝑡 𝑥. 𝑛𝑡 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ↦ 𝑡 𝑥. 𝑡 ∧ 𝑓
𝑥. 𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ↦ 𝑛𝑡 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑠𝑘𝑡   
f2e1m2r3n3t3 
f1e1m1r1n1t1 
𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓 ⇒ 𝑙𝑜𝑐 ⊆ 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑒 ∧ 𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 ∧ 𝑡
𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 . 𝑡 16 ∧ 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 . 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ⇒ 𝑙𝑜𝑐 ⊆ 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑒 ∧ 𝑚𝑙𝑡
𝑥. 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ↦ 𝑡 𝑥. 𝑡, 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ∧ 𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘_𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑒 ∧  𝑓
𝑥. 𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ↦ 𝑎𝑟𝑝 𝑖𝑠𝑝_𝑔𝑤 . ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟, 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ↦ ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟 𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘_𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 ∧ 𝑛𝑡
𝑥. 𝑛𝑡 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ↦ 𝑡 𝑥. 𝑡 ∧ 𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ↦ 𝑛𝑡 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑠𝑘𝑡   
f2e1m2r3n4t3 
f1e1m1r1n1t1 
𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓 ⇒ 𝑙𝑜𝑐 ⊆ 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑒 ∧ 𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 ∧ 𝑡
𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 . 𝑡 16 ∧ 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 . 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ⇒ 𝑙𝑜𝑐 ⊆ 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑒 ∧ 𝑚𝑙𝑡
𝑥. 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ↦ 𝑡 𝑥. 𝑡, 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ∧ 𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘_𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑒 ∧  𝑓
𝑥. 𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ↦ 𝑎𝑟𝑝 𝑖𝑠𝑝_𝑔𝑤 . ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟, 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ↦ ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟 𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘_𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 ∧ 𝑛𝑡 𝑥. 𝑛𝑡 ∷
𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ↦ 𝑡 𝑥. 𝑡, 𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ∧ 𝑓
𝑥. 𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ↦ 𝑛𝑡 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑠𝑘𝑡   
f2e1m3r1n1t1 
f1e1m1r1n1t1 
𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓 ⇒ 𝑙𝑜𝑐 ⊆ 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑒 ∧ 𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 ∧ 𝑡
𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 . 𝑡 16 ∧ 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 . 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ⇒ 𝑙𝑜𝑐 ⊆ 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑒 ∧ 𝑚𝑙𝑡
𝑥. 𝑚𝑙𝑡 ∷ 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ↦ 𝑡 𝑥. 𝑡, 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓   
f2e1m3r1n2t2 
f1e1m1r1n1t1 
𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓 ⇒ 𝑙𝑜𝑐 ⊆ 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑒 ∧ 𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 ∧ 𝑡
𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 . 𝑡 16 ∧ 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 . 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ⇒ 𝑙𝑜𝑐 ⊆ 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑒 ∧ 𝑚𝑙𝑡
𝑥. 𝑚𝑙𝑡 ∷ 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ↦ 𝑡 𝑥. 𝑡, 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ∧ 𝑛𝑡 𝑥. 𝑛𝑡 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ↦ 𝑡 𝑥. 𝑡 ∧




𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓 ⇒ 𝑙𝑜𝑐 ⊆ 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑒 ∧ 𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 ∧ 𝑡
𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 . 𝑡 16 ∧ 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 . 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ⇒ 𝑙𝑜𝑐 ⊆ 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑒 ∧ 𝑚𝑙𝑡
𝑥. 𝑚𝑙𝑡 ∷ 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ↦ 𝑡 𝑥. 𝑡, 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ∧ 𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑟𝑡 𝑛𝑡 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑖𝑝 . 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑒 ∧
 𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ↦ 𝑎𝑟𝑝 𝑛𝑡 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑖𝑝 . ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟, 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ↦
ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟 𝑟𝑡 𝑛𝑡 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑖𝑝 ∧ 𝑛𝑡 𝑥. 𝑛𝑡 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ↦ 𝑡 𝑥. 𝑡 ∧ 𝑓
𝑥. 𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ↦ 𝑛𝑡 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑠𝑘𝑡   
f2e1m3r3n3t3 
f1e1m1r1n1t1 
𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓 ⇒ 𝑙𝑜𝑐 ⊆ 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑒 ∧ 𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 ∧ 𝑡
𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 . 𝑡 16 ∧ 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 . 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ⇒ 𝑙𝑜𝑐 ⊆ 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑒 ∧ 𝑚𝑙𝑡
𝑥. 𝑚𝑙𝑡 ∷ 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ↦ 𝑡 𝑥. 𝑡, 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ∧ 𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘_𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑒 ∧  𝑓
𝑥. 𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ↦ 𝑎𝑟𝑝 𝑖𝑠𝑝_𝑔𝑤 . ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟, 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ↦ ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟 𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘_𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 ∧ 𝑛𝑡
𝑥. 𝑛𝑡 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ↦ 𝑡 𝑥. 𝑡 ∧ 𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ↦ 𝑛𝑡 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑠𝑘𝑡   
f2e1m3r3n4t3 
f1e1m1r1n1t1 
𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓 ⇒ 𝑙𝑜𝑐 ⊆ 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑒 ∧ 𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ∧ 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑙𝑡 ∧ 𝑡
𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 . 𝑡 16 ∧ 𝑚𝑙𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 . 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ⇒ 𝑙𝑜𝑐 ⊆ 𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑒 ∧ 𝑚𝑙𝑡
𝑥. 𝑚𝑙𝑡 ∷ 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ↦ 𝑡 𝑥. 𝑡, 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 ∧ 𝑙𝑜𝑐 𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘_𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑒 ∧  𝑓
𝑥. 𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ↦ 𝑎𝑟𝑝 𝑖𝑠𝑝_𝑔𝑤 . ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟, 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ↦ ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟 𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘_𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 ∧ 𝑛𝑡 𝑥. 𝑛𝑡 ∷
𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ↦ 𝑡 𝑥. 𝑡, 𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ∧ 𝑓
𝑥. 𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ↦ 𝑛𝑡 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑠𝑘𝑡   
 
E. CODE SYNTHESIS FOR HOME GATEWAY 
Synthesizing code for the home gateway requires discharging propositions in the 
tensor product that defines it. Discharging all the new propositions to actual, executable 
C code exceeds the scope of this thesis. However, this section suggests ways the DPDK 
framework can be used to discharge these new propositions. Table 28 summarizes the 
discharging obligations for the Routing, NAT and Translation SFA.  
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Table 28. Proposed method for discharging Routing, NAT and Translation 
SFA. 
Proposition Description Remarks 
𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓  
Checking that the frame 
destination address is 
equivalent to the switch 
interface address. 
See Section V.E.1 
𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓  
Checking that the frame 
destination address is not 
equivalent to the switch 
interface address. 
𝑓. 𝑑𝑖𝑝 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙_𝑖𝑝 
Checking that the frame 
destination IP address is 
equivalent to the switch 
interface IP address. 
Frame destination IP 
can be retrieved 
using the frame 
socket from Section 
IV.B.6 
𝑓. 𝑑𝑖𝑝 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙_𝑖𝑝 
Checking that the frame 
destination IP address is not 
equivalent to the switch 
interface IP address. 
𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘_𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 
Checking current ingress port 
is an uplink port. 
See Section V.E.2 
𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘_𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 
Checking current ingress port 
is not an uplink port. 
𝑓. 𝑑𝑖𝑝 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑟𝑡  Checking that the frame 
destination IP address entry 
exists in the routing hash table. 
Similar methodology 
as Section IV.B.7 
can be adopted to 
check the routing, 
ARP and NAT 
tables for specific 
entries. 
𝑓. 𝑑𝑖𝑝 ∉ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑟𝑡  
𝑓. 𝑑𝑖𝑝 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑎𝑟𝑝  Checking that the frame 
destination IP address entry 
exists in the ARP hash table. 
𝑓. 𝑑𝑖𝑝 ∉ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑎𝑟𝑝  
𝑓. 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑛𝑡  
Checking that the socket exists 
in NAT table. 
𝑓. 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ∉ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑛𝑡  
𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ∉ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑛𝑡  
𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑛𝑡  
𝑛𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑖𝑝 ∉ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑟𝑡  
Checking that the NAT socket 
entry exists in the routing table.
𝑛𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑖𝑝 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑎𝑟𝑝  Checking that the NAT socket 
entry exists in the ARP table. 𝑛𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑖𝑝 ∉ 𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑎𝑟𝑝  
𝑡 𝑛𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑡 60 
Checking that the NAT entry 
has expired 
Similar methodology 
as Section IV.B.10 
can be adopted to 
retrieve an entry 
from the hash table 
and to access its 
stored parameters. 
𝑡 𝑛𝑡 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑡 61 
Checking that the NAT entry 
has not expired 
𝑛𝑡 𝑥. 𝑛𝑡 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ↦ 𝑡 𝑥. 𝑡  Updating a NAT table entry. Updating and adding
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𝑛𝑡 𝑥. 𝑛𝑡 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ↦ 𝑡 𝑥. 𝑡  new entries to the 
NAT table is similar 
to that of MLT and 
SLT covered in 
Sections IV.B.11-
IV.B.14 
𝑛𝑡 𝑥. 𝑛𝑡 ∷ 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘
↦ 𝑡 𝑥. 𝑡, 𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑘
𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘  
Add a new entry into the NAT 
table. 
𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ↦
𝑎𝑟𝑝 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑑𝑖𝑝 . ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟, 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ↦
ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟 𝑟𝑡 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑑𝑖𝑝   
Rewrite a frame destination 
addresses. 
See Section V.E.3 
𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎 ↦
𝑎𝑟𝑝 𝑖𝑠𝑝_𝑔𝑤 . ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟, 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎 ↦
ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟 𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘_𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡   
𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎
↦ 𝑎𝑟𝑝 𝑛𝑡 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑖𝑝 . ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟, 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠
↦ ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟 𝑟𝑡 𝑛𝑡 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑖𝑝  
𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑑𝑎
↦ 𝑎𝑟𝑝 𝑖𝑠𝑝_𝑔𝑤 . ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟, 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑎
↦ ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟 𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘_𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡  
𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘
↦ 𝑛𝑡 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑑𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑠𝑘𝑡  
Rewrite a frame source and 
destination socket. 
See Section V.E.4 
𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 ↦
𝑛𝑡 𝑥. 𝑓. 𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑘 . 𝑠𝑘𝑡   
 
1. Comparing Hardware Address of Ethernet Interface with Frame 
Address 
The hardware address of the Network Interface Card (NIC) interface port can be 
retrieved by calling the rte_eth_macaddr_get() function from the DPDK API [11]. The 
function takes two parameters, the first being the port identifier for the NIC device and 
the second parameter being a pointer to the ether_addr object type to be filled with the 
hardware address of the NIC device. Once the hardware address is retrieved, it can be 
compared with the frame source or destination address. 
2. Checking Uplink Port 
A function similar to walled(self), covered in Section IV.B.4, can be adopted to 
check for the uplinked port. The function can be defined as shown in Figure 18: 
 
Figure 18. Discharge Uplink function. 
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3. Rewriting Frame Destination Addresses 
The routing capabilities require the rewriting of a frame destination address to 
route to the proper network space. This can be done by calling the DPDK API to retrieve 
the layer 2 header of the frame and then reassigning the destination MAC address. Figure 
19 shows the proposed discharged function, get_ether_header(), to retrieve the Ethernet 
header. A DPDK API call, rte_pktmbuf_mtod(), is used to point to the start of the data of 
the packet frame (mbuf). The frame is then cast into the ether_hdr structure and the 
structure is returned by the function. 
 
Figure 19. C function to retrieve layer 2 Ethernet header. 
The C code shown in Figure 20 can be used to assign a new destination address. 
First, the Ethernet header is retrieved using the get_ether_header() function. The 
destination address can be accessed by pointing to the relevant parameter in the Ethernet 
header via ether_header->d_addr, and assigning it a new value. 
 
Figure 20. C code to assign new destination MAC address. 
4. Rewriting Frame Source and Destination Socket 
NAT capabilities require the mapping of a private IP space socket to a public IP 
space socket and rewriting the frame source or destination IP address. The proposed C 
function, get_ipv4_header(), shown in Figure 21, retrieves the IPv4 header of a packet. 
The code uses several DPDK API calls to perform its function. 
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Figure 21. Discharged C function to retrieve Layer 3 IP 
header. 
The layer 2 Ethernet header is first retrieved using the get_ether_header() function. Next, 
the frame is checked to verify that it is an IPv4 packet. The DPDK call 
RTE_ETH_IPV4_HDR() checks whether the layer 3 header is of IPv4 type. Additionally, 
if the packet type is unknown, mbuf->packet_type ==0, the layer 2 header is checked 
whether it is of ETHER_TYPE_IPv4. The DPDK function rte_pktmbuf_mtod_offset() 
points to the location of the IP header in the frame via an offset, (sizeof(struct 
ether_hdr)), from the start of the frame to skip the Ethernet header. The function casts the 
relevant bytes into the ipv4_hdr structure. 
To rewrite a socket address, the layer 3 header is first retrieved and the relevant IP 
address in the layer 3 header is modified to rewrite the frame socket addresses. The layer 
3 header is extracted using the get_ipv4_header() function. The source and destination IP 
address can be accessed by pointing to the relevant parameter in the IPv4 header. The 
code to rewrite a socket address is shown in Figure 22. 
 
Figure 22. C code to rewrite socket address. 
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Rewriting IPv6 socket address is similar. Figure 23 shows the proposed C 
function to get the IPv6 header, and Figure 24 shows the C code to rewrite the frame’s 
source and destination socket address. 
 
Figure 23. Discharged C function to get IPv6 header. 
 
 
Figure 24. Discharge C function to rewrite the frame’s socket 
address. 
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VI. SYNTHESIZED CODE TESTING RESULTS 
The code synthesized for switching with firewalling and parallel learning, as 
covered in Section II.C.3, was tested in a lab for correctness and for performance. This 
chapter covers the tests performed, the hardware used, its configuration and the results.  
A. TEST CONFIGURATION 
The hardware and software used in the testing are identified in this section. 
1. Equipment Used 
The following subsections identify the equipment used in the testing. 
a. Laptops 
Table 29 lists the IP addresses of each of the three laptops used in the testing. 
Table 29. List of laptops used. 






Table 30 lists the port configuration of the server used in the testing. 
Table 30. List of server and port configuration used. 
Item Ethernet Ports Configuration 
Puget Server 
0 









Table 31 lists other hardware used in the testing. 
Table 31. List of other hardware used. 
Item Model 




2. Software Used 
Table 32 lists the software used in the testing. 
Table 32. List of software used. 
Software Version 
Wireshark 2.6.10 
Netcat OpenBSD netcat (Debian patch 
1.187) 
 
B. VERIFYING LEARNING 
The setup, procedures, and results for verifying MAC learning, and socket 
learning are identified in this section. 
1. MAC Learning 
This test procedure aims to verify that the Puget server will insert the MAC 
addresses for both Host 1 and Host 2 into its MLT upon receiving a packet from each 
host. 
a. Setup 
Figure 25 shows the equipment setup for testing the MLT. 
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Figure 25. Test setup for verifying ML, SL, and ICMP 
forwarding. 
The Puget server is connected to both Host 1 and Host 2 via Ethernet cables to 
Port 0 and Port 1 of the server respectively.  
b. Procedure 
The procedure (Table 33) uses the ping command to send packets between Host 1 
and 2. Host 1 initiates an echo request to Host 2. Upon receiving the echo request, Host 2 
automatically sends an echo reply message back to Host 1. This ensures that both hosts 
will send a packet through the Puget server. 
Table 33. Procedure for verifying MAC learning. 
No. Steps 
1 Start-up basicfwd application on Puget server. Ensure MLT entries are all 
expired. 
2 Send a ping packet from Host 1 to Host 2. Observe MLT on Puget server. 
3 Continue sending packets from Host 1 to Host 2. Observe MLT on Puget 
server. 
4 Disconnect Host 1 and Host 2 from Puget server and wait >16 seconds.  
Observe MLT on Puget server. 
 
c. Results 
The results of verifying MAC learning are summarized in Table 34. 
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Table 34. Results from verifying MAC learning. 
No. Steps Observed Results 
1 Start-up basicfwd application on Puget server. 
Ensure MLT entries are all expired. 
 
2 Send a ping packet from Host 1 to Host 2. 
Observe MLT on Puget server. 
MLT gets populated with 
MAC addresses of Host 1 
and Host 2. 
3 Continue sending packets from Host 1 to Host 2. 
Observe MLT on Puget server. 
Host 1 and Host 2 MAC 
addresses persist in MLT  
4 Disconnect Host 1 and Host 2 from Puget server 
and wait >16 seconds.  
Observe MLT on Puget server. 
Host 1 and Host 2 MAC 
addresses in Puget server 
expires. 
 
The MLT successfully recorded the MAC address of both Host 1 and Host 2 
during the ping exchange between both hosts (Table 34). Figure 26 shows the MLT after 
Host 1 initiated the echo request and received an echo reply from Host 2. 
 
Figure 26. MLT updates MAC addresses for both Host 1 and 
Host 2. 
As Host 1 continued to send the ping command to Host 2, the MAC addresses 
were continuously updated in the MLT. 
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Subsequently, Host 1 stopped sending ping and both Host 1 and Host 2 were 
disconnected from the Puget server to prevent any background packets from sending to 
the Puget server. After 16 seconds, it was observed that the MAC address entries for both 
Host 1 and Host 2 were expired in the MLT (Figure 27).  
 
Figure 27. MLT after disconnection of Host 1 and Host 2 and 
waiting for at least 16 seconds. 
From this test, the MLT was observed to be able to successfully learn the source 
MAC address of incoming packets and also detected any expired entry in its records. 
2. Socket Learning 
This procedure aims to verify that Host 1’s socket pair (IP address and port) is 
recorded in the SLT when it sends a packet to a stateful-firewalled (SF) port, in this case, 
Port 0. 
a. Setup 
The same hardware setup to test the MLT, Figure 25, is also used to conduct the 
testing for the SLT.  
Host 1 is connected via Ethernet cable to Port 0 of the Puget server, which is 
configured as an SF port. Host 2 is connected via Ethernet cable to Port 1 of the server. 
Port 1 is not an SF port. 
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b. Procedure 
To verify SLT, the Netcat application is used to simulate network traffic between 
Host 1 and Host 2. Host 2 acts as a UDP server. It initiates a UDP socket, waits and 
listens on Port 50000 for any incoming packets. Host 1 takes the role of a UDP client. It 
sends a UDP packet to Host 2, through the Puget server. The test procedure is 
summarized in Table 35, and the results are recorded in Table 36.  
Table 35. Procedure for verifying socket learning. 
No. Steps 
1 Start-up basicfwd application on Puget server. Ensure all SLT entries are 
expired 
2 On Host 2, open a UDP socket to listen for packets onPport 50000 using 
the Netcat command: 
 
nc -l -u -p 50000 
3 On Host 1, open a UDP socket via Netcat command: 
 
nc -u 192.168.1.10 50000 
4 Send a string “Testing SL table” from Host 1 to Host 2. 
5 Disconnect Host 1 and Host 2 from Puget server and wait >26seconds.  
 
Observe SLT on Puget server. 
6 Reconnect Host 1 to Port 0 and Host 2 to Port 1 of the Puget server. 
Repeat the test with Host 1 as a UDP server and Host 2 as a UDP Client. 
7 On Host 1, open a UDP socket to listen for packets on Port 50001 using the 
Netcat command: 
 
nc -l -u -p 50001 
 
8 On Host 2, open a UDP socket to send packets to Host 1 via the Netcat 
command: 
 
nc -u 192.168.1.10 50001 
 
9 Send a string “Testing SL table” from Host 2 to Host 1. 
 




The results of verifying socket learning are summarized in Table 36. 
Table 36. Results for verifying socket learning. 
No. Steps Observed Results 
1 Start up basicfwd application on Puget server. Ensure all 
SLT entries are expired 
 
2 On Host 2, open a UDP socket to listen for packets on 
Port 50000 using the Netcat command: 
 
nc -l -u -p 50000 
 
3 On Host 1, open a UDP socket to send packets to Host 2 
via the Netcat command: 
 
nc -u 192.168.1.20 50000 
 
4 Send a string “Testing SL table” from Host 1 to Host 2. 
 
Observe SLT on Puget. 
SLT gets populated 
with Host 1 socket pair. 
5 Disconnect Host 1 and Host 2 from Puget server and wait 
>26 seconds.  
 
Observe SLT on Puget server. 
Host 1 entry in SLT 
expires. 
6 Reconnect Host 1 to Port 0 and Host 2 to Port 1 of the 
Puget server. 
Repeat the test with Host 1 as a UDP server and Host 2 as 
a UDP client. 
 
7 On Host 1, open a UDP socket to listen for packets on 
Port 50001 using the Netcat command: 
 
nc -l -u -p 50001 
 
8 On Host 2, open a UDP socket to send packets to Host 1 
via the Netcat command: 
 
nc -u 192.168.1.10 50001
 
9 Send a string “Testing SL table” from Host 2 to Host 1. 
 
Observe SLT on Puget. 
SLT does not add Host 
2 socket into its record. 
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In Step 4, Host 1 sends a packet to Host 2 via the ingress Port 0 of the Puget 
server. Since Port 0 is configured as an SF port, the packet’s source socket was learned 
by the SLT. Figure 28 shows Host 1 socket; IP address 192.168.1.10 and port 44303, was 
successfully learned by the SLT. 
 
Figure 28. SLT learning Host 1 socket. 
In Step 5, both Host 1 and Host 2 were disconnected from the Puget server. After 
26 seconds wait, Host 1 socket entry in the SLT was observed to have expired. Figure 29 
shows the SLT records taken after 26 seconds from the disconnection of Host 1 and  
Host 2. 
 
Figure 29. Host 1 socket entry expires in SLT. 
The test was repeated with Host 1 initializing as a UDP server and Host 2 as a 
UDP client. In step 9, it was observed that upon sending of packets from Host 2 to Host 
1, Host 2 socket was not learned by the SLT. This is because Host 2 is connected to a 
non-SF port. Hence, no socket learning is done at the non-SF ingress port. Stateful 
firewall capabilities are covered in Section VI.D. 
From this procedure, SLT was verified to learn a socket from the SF ingress port. 
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C. TESTING OF THE FORWARDING MECHANISM 
The forwarding mechanism is tested by sending Internet Control Message 
Protocol (ICMP) packets, UDP unicast packets, UDP broadcast packets, and TCP 
packets. 
1. Internet Control Message Protocol Packets 
This procedure aims to verify that the Puget server is able to forward IP packets 
that have a nonzero source IP address and not encapsulating TCP or UDP. 
a. Setup 
The following procedure (Table 37) uses the hardware setup as shown in Figure 
25. 
b. Procedure 
Table 37 details the steps for verifying the forwarding of ICMP packets.  
Table 37. Procedure for verifying forwarding of ICMP packets. 
No. Steps 
1 Start-up basicfwd application on the Puget server.  
2 Start Wireshark on Host 1. 
3 Open a terminal on Host 1. Continuously send ping packets from Host 1 to 
Host 2 via the command: 
ping 192.168.1.20 
Observe the terminal output and Wireshark console on Host 1. 
4 Observe the terminal output and Wireshark console on Host 1. 




The results for verifying the forwarding of ICMP packets are summarized in 
Table 38. 
 
Table 38. Results for verifying forwarding of ICMP packets. 
No. Steps Observed Results 
1 Start-up basicfwd application on the Puget 
server.  
 
2 Start Wireshark on Host 1.  
3 Open a terminal on Host 1. Continuously send 




4 Observe the terminal output and Wireshark 
console on Host 1. 
Observe port mask output on the Puget server. 
Terminal shows Host 1 
receiving ICMP echo reply 
from Host 2. 
Wireshark console shows 
Host 1 transmitting and 
receiving ICMP and ARP 
protocol packets. 
The Puget server shows 
egress portmask=2 for 
packets at ingress Port 0 and 
egress portmask=1 for 
packets at ingress Port 1. 
 
Figure 30 shows the ping output observed on Host 1 during step 4. Host 1 is able 
to receive the ICMP echo reply from Host 2. Upon further analysis on Host 1 Wireshark 
console, shown in Figure 31, it is evident that the Puget server is verified to have 




Figure 30. Forwarding ICMP messages: Terminal output on 
Host 1. 
 
Figure 31. Forwarding ICMP messages: Wireshark console on 
Host 1. 
Figure 32 shows the output of the Puget server. The ICMP echo request packets 
received at Port 0 of the Puget server were computed to have a port mask value of 2. This 
translates to 0010 in binary form, where the LSB digit represents the mask status for Port 
0 and the MSB represents the status for Port 3. Value of 0 signifies that the packet will 
not be forwarded out of the corresponding port, while a value of 1 indicates it will. 
Hence, 0010 represents that the ICMP echo request received at Port 0, which is connected 
to Host 1, was only forwarded to Port 1, where Host 2 is connected. Similarly, ICMP 
echo reply messages arriving at Port 1 have a port mask value of 1, which translates to 
0001 in binary. Hence, ICMP echo reply messages were only forwarded out Port 0. 
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Figure 32. Forwarding ICMP messages: Puget console output. 
From this test, the computation of the port mask was verified to be correct and the 
Puget server was able to forward non-TCP or UDP encapsulating messages. 
2. UDP Unicast 
This procedure aims to verify that the Puget server is able to forward IP packets 
that have nonzero source IP address encapsulating UDP protocol. 
a. Setup 
Figure 33 shows the hardware setup for testing the Puget server forwarding 
capabilities for UDP unicast packets. 
 
Figure 33. Test setup for UDP unicast. 
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Host 1 is connected via Ethernet cable to Port 1 of the Puget server. Similarly, 
Host 2 is connected via Ethernet cable to Port 3 of the Puget server. Both Port 1 and 3 are 
non-SF ports. 
b. Procedure 
This procedure (Table 39) sets up a UDP server-client transmission between Host 
1 and Host 2. Host 2 is initialized as a UDP server listening on Port 50000. Host 1 
simulates a UDP client sending a UDP message to Host 1 via Port 50000. 
Table 39. Procedure for verifying forwarding of UDP unicast packets. 
No. Steps 
1 Start-up basicfwd application on the Puget server.  
2 On Host 2, open a UDP socket to listen for packets on Port 50000 using the 
Netcat command: 
 
nc -l -u -p 50000 
 
3 On Host 1, open a UDP socket to send packets to Host 2 via Netcat command: 
 
nc -u 192.168.1.20 50000 
 
4 Send a string “Hello from .10” from Host 1 to Host 2. 
 
Observe terminal at Host 2. 
5 Send a string “Msg received from .20” from Host 2 to Host 1. 
 
Observe terminal at Host 1. 
 
c. Results 
The results for verifying the forwarding of UDP unicast packets is summarized in 
Table 40. 
Table 40. Results for verifying forwarding of UDP unicast packets. 
No. Steps Observed Results 
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1 Start-up basicfwd application on the Puget 
server.  
 
2 On Host 2, open a UDP socket to listen for 
packets on Port 50000 using the Netcat 
command: 
 
nc -l -u -p 50000 
 
 
3 On Host 1, open a UDP socket to send packets 
to Host 2 via the Netcat command: 
 
nc -u 192.168.1.20 50000 
 
 
4 Send a string “Hello from .10” from Host 1 to 
Host 2. 
 
Observe terminal at Host 2. 
“Hello from .10” was 
observed on Host 2. 
5 Send a string “Msg received from .20” from 
Host 2 to Host 1. 
 
Observe terminal at Host 1. 
“Msg received from .20” 
was observed on Host 1. 
 
UDP unicast packets were successfully forwarded between Host 1 and 2 through 
the Puget server. Figure 34 shows the terminal output from Host 1 and Host 2.  
 
Figure 34. UDP unicast: (Left) Terminal output on Host 1. 
(Right) Terminal output on Host 2.  
3. UDP Broadcast 
This procedure verifies that the Puget server is able to forward UDP broadcast 
packets out the correct ports. 
a. Setup 
Figure 35 shows the hardware setup for the test procedure. Host 1,2 and 3 are 
connected to the Puget server Ports 0,1 and 3 respectively via Ethernet cables. 
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Figure 35. Test setup for UDP Broadcast. 
b. Procedure 
In the procedure given in Table 41, Host 2 and Host 3 are initialized as UDP 
servers listening on Port 50000 using the Netcat application. Host 1 simulates a UDP 
client and sends a broadcast message out to the network. 
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Table 41. Procedure for verifying forwarding of UDP broadcast packets. 
No. Steps 
1 Start-up basicfwd application on the Puget server.  
2 On Host 2 and Host 3, open a UDP socket to listen for packets on Port 50000 
using the Netcat command: 
 
nc -l -u -p 50000 
 
3 On Host 1, open a UDP socket to send the broadcast packet via the Netcat 
command: 
 
nc -u -b 192.168.1.255 50000 
 
4 Broadcast a string “Hello from .10” from Host 1. 
 
Observe terminal at Host 2. 
 
c. Results 
The results for verifying the forwarding of UDP broadcast packets is summarized 
in Table 42. 
Table 42. Results for verifying forwarding of UDP broadcast packets. 
No. Steps Observed Results 
1 Start-up basicfwd application on the Puget 
server.  
 
2 On Host 2 and Host 3, open a UDP socket to 
listen for packets on Port 50000 using the Netcat 
command: 
 
nc -l -u -p 50000 
 
 
3 On Host 1, open a UDP socket to send the 
broadcast packet via the Netcat command: 
 
nc -u -b 192.168.1.255 50000 
 
 
4 Broadcast a string “Hello from .10” from Host 1.
 
Observe terminal at Host 2. 
“Hello from .10” was 
observed on Host 2. 
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The Puget server received the broadcasted message from Host 1 via Port 0. The 
port mask computed had a value of 10, which translate to 1010 in binary form. From the 
port mask, the broadcasted message is forwarded out Port 1 and Port 3, as verified on the 
terminal console on Host 1 and Host 3 respectively. The message was not forwarded out 
Port 2 as it is an SF egress port, which does not forward UDP broadcast packets as UDP 
broadcast IP addresses are not stored in the SLT.  
4. TCP 
This procedure verifies that the Puget server is able to forward IP packets that 
have nonzero source IP address encapsulating TCP protocol. 
 
a. Setup 
Figure 36 shows the hardware setup for testing the forwarding mechanism for 
TCP protocol. Host 1 and Host 3 are connected to Port 1 and 3 of the Puget server 
respectively. 
 
Figure 36. Test setup for TCP. 
b. Procedure 
In the procedure given in Table 43, Host 1 is initialized as a TCP server to listen 
for incoming packets on Port 50001. Host 2 takes the role of a TCP client and establishes 
a connection with Host 1. Packets were exchanged through the Puget server. 
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Table 43. Procedure for verifying forwarding of TCP packets. 
No. Steps 
1 Start-up basicfwd application on the Puget server.  
2 On Host 1, open a TCP socket to listen for packets on Port 50001 using the 
Netcat command: 
 
nc -l -p 50001 
 
Open Wireshark application to observe network traffic on Host 1. 
3 On Host 2, establish a TCP connection with Host 1 using the Netcat command: 
 
nc 192.168.1.10 50001 
 
Observe Wireshark console on Host 1. 
4 Send a string “Hello from .20” from Host 2 to Host 1. 
 
Observe Wireshark console on Host 1. 
5 Send a string “Msg received” from Host 1 to Host 2. 
 
Observe Wireshark console on Host 1. 
6 Close connection on both Host 1 and Host 2. 
 
c. Results 




Table 44. Results for verifying forwarding of TCP packets. 
No. Steps Observed Results 
1 Start-up basicfwd application on the Puget 
server.  
 
2 On Host 1, open a TCP socket to listen for 
packets on Port 50001 using the Netcat 
command: 
 
nc -l -p 50001 
 
Open Wireshark application to observe network 
traffic on Host 1. 
 
 
3 On Host 2, established a TCP connection with 
Host 1 using the Netcat command: 
 
nc 192.168.1.10 50001 
 
Observe Wireshark console on Host 1. 
TCP three-way handshake 
was observed on Wireshark.  
4 Send a string “Hello from .20” from Host 2 to 
Host 1. 
 
Observe Wireshark console on Host 1. 
TCP communications were 
observed on Wireshark.  
5 Send a string “Msg received” from Host 1 to 
Host 2. 
 
Observe Wireshark console on Host 1. 
6 Close connection on both Host 1 and Host 2. TCP four-way closing 
handshake was observed on 
Wireshark. 
 
When Host 2 established a TCP connection with Host 1, the Puget server was able 
to forward the three-way handshake between Host 1 and Host 2. Figure 37 shows the 




Figure 37. TCP three-way handshake. 
During the message exchange, the Puget server was able to forward the TCP 
packets and the corresponding TCP acknowledgment packets to the correct host. Figure 
38 shows the TCP data and acknowledgment packet transfer captured on Wireshark for 
step 3. 
 
Figure 38. TCP data and acknowledgment packets for “Hello 
from .20” message. 
Upon closing the TCP connection (step 6), both Host 1 and Host 2 initiate the 
four-way TCP shutdown handshake (Figure 39). Host 1 sends a TCP Finish (FIN) packet 
to Host 2. Host 2 replies with an TCP Acknowledgement (ACK) packet and a FIN packet 
of its own. Finally, Host 1 closes the connection by sending an ACK packet. 
 
Figure 39. TCP four-way shutdown. 
The Puget server was able to forward both the TCP handshake and the data 
packets between the hosts. From the output of the Puget server shown in Figure 40, the 
TCP three-way handshake and data-acknowledgment communication were observed. 
Packets from Host 2 at the Puget ingress Port 3 have a port mask value of 2, which is 
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0010 in binary form, and will be forwarded to the egress Port 1. Similarly, packets from 
Host 1 will arrive at the ingress Port 1 and be forwarded only to the egress Port 3. 
 
Figure 40. Puget server output for TCP communication. 
D. TESTING STATEFUL FIREWALL 
This section covers the testing of the stateful firewall functionality. 
1. Between Two SF Ports 
The objective of this test is to verify the communication between two hosts before 
stateful firewall ports. If both host sockets are not learned in the SLT, the Puget server 
will not forward the packets between the hosts. 
a. Setup 
Host 1 and Host 2 were connected to Port 0 and Port 2 of the Puget server as 
shown in Figure 41. Both Port 0 and Port 2 were configured as a stateful firewall. 
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Figure 41. Test setup for stateful firewall. 
b. Procedure 
UDP protocol was used to test the stateful firewall properties of the Puget server. 
Host 1 was initialized as a UDP server and Host 2 as a UDP client.  
Table 45. Procedure for verifying stateful firewall. 
No. Steps 
1 Start-up basicfwd application on the Puget server.  
2 On Host 1, open a UDP socket to listen for packets on Port 50000 using the 
Netcat command: 
 
nc -l -u -p 50000 
 
Open Wireshark on Host 1 to observe network traffic. 
 Q 
q3 
On Host 2, open a UDP socket to send packets to Host 2 via the Netcat 
command: 
 
nc -u 192.168.1.10 50000 
 
Open Wireshark on Host 2 to observe network traffic. 
4 Send a string “Hello” from Host 2 to Host 1. 
 
Observe Wireshark console on Host 1 and Host 2. 
 
c. Results 
The results for verifying the stateful firewall capability is summarized in  
Table 46. 
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Table 46. Results for verifying stateful firewall. 
No. Steps Observed Results 
1 Start-up basicfwd application on the Puget 
server.  
 
2 On Host 1, open a UDP socket to listen for 
packets on Port 50000 using the Netcat 
command: 
 
nc -l -u -p 50000 
 
Open Wireshark on Host 1 to observe network 
traffic. 
 
3 On Host 2, open a UDP socket to send packets 
to Host 2 via the Netcat command: 
 
nc -u 192.168.1.10 50000 
 
Open Wireshark on Host 2 to observe network 
traffic. 
 
4 Send a string “Hello” from Host 2 to Host 1. 
 
Observe Wireshark console on Host 1 and Host 
2. 
Wireshark on Host 2 shows 
message being sent out but 
Host 1 did not receive it.  
 
Stateful firewall only allows communication if the source socket has been 
previously learned in the SLT. In the testing, the SLT was initialized with expired entries. 
As shown in Figure 42, Wireshark recorded the outgoing “Hello” message from Host 2. 
However, as shown in Figure 43, the packet did not arrive at Host 1. The Puget server did 
not forward the packets as both Host 1 and Host 2 sockets were not learned in the SLT. 
Hence, this test verified that the stateful firewall ports were performing correctly.  
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Figure 42. Wireshark capture of stateful firewall testing from 
Host 2. 
 
Figure 43. Wireshark capture of stateful firewall testing from 
Host 1. 
E. PERFORMANCE TEST 
This test compares the performance speed of the Puget server and a commercial-
off-the-shelf (COTS) switch. Both pieces of hardware have similar speed specification. 
The COTS switch is labeled as having 1 Gps speed specification. The Puget server 
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consists of 2 Network Interface Cards (NIC). Figure 44 shows that each NIC can achieve 
a maximum speed of 1000baseT, which correspond to 1Gbps. 
 
Figure 44. Puget server NIC speed. 
This procedure aims to verify the actual real-time speed of both devices and see 
how the performance of switching SFA as compared to general COTS devices. 
1. Puget Server 
This section covers the performance testing of the Puget Server. 
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a. Setup 
Figure 45 shows the test setup for the Puget performance test. Host 1 and Host 2 
were connected to the non-SF Port 1 and Port 3 of the Puget server. 
 
Figure 45. Test setup for Puget performance test. 
b. Procedure 
Table 47 details the steps for verifying the forwarding of ICMP packets. 
Table 47. Procedure for Performance test of the Puget server. 
No. Steps 
1 Start-up basicfwd application on the Puget server.  
2 On Host 1, open a TCP socket to listen for packets on Port 50000 using the Netcat 
command: 
 
nc -l -n -p 50000 | wc --bytes 
 
Open Wireshark application to observe network traffic in Host 1. 
 
3 On Host 2, establish a TCP connection with Host 1 using the Netcat command: 
 
time yes | nc -v -v -n 192.168.1.10 50000 
4 Stop after ten seconds by typing Ctrl-C. 
5 Observe the number of bytes received on the terminal and compute the bandwidth 
speed. 
 
Compare results with Wireshark statistics.  
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Host 1 is set up as a TCP server listening on Port 50000. The output is piped into 
the byte count function via the command wc –bytes. This will record the number of bytes 
received on Host 1. Host 2 initializes a TCP client socket to send packets to Host 1. It 
continuously sends “y” using the time yes command and piping the output into the 
sending socket. The yes command continuously pipes “y” to the TCP socket to be sent 
over the connection. The time command will determine the duration the yes command has 
been running. Figure 46 shows the time yes command ensures that the socket 
continuously sends packets to maximize the bandwidth. 
 
Figure 46. Wireshark capture of Host 2 sending packets. 
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c. Results 
Figure 47 and Figure 48 shows a total of 957587456 bytes were received on Host 
1 for the duration of 10.068s. Multiplying the number of bytes by eight to get the total 
bits and then dividing by the duration gives a link speed of approximately 760Mbps. This 
was verified using the Wireshark capture on Host 1 and viewing the conversation 
statistics as shown in Figure 49. A similar speed of 762 Mbps was calculated by 
Wireshark. 
 
Figure 47. Number of bytes received on Host 1 via the Puget 
server. 
 
Figure 48. Duration of performance test via the Puget server. 
 
Figure 49. Wireshark conversation statistics for the Puget 
server. 
2. COTS Switch 
The test was repeated using a COTS switch by Netgear to perform the switching 
instead of the Puget server. 
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a. Setup 
Figure 50 shows the hardware setup for the performance test of the Netgear 
switch. The switch has a 1Gbps speed specification. 
 
Figure 50. Test setup for Netgear performance test. 
b. Procedure 
The test procedure given in Table 48 is similar to the performance test of the 
Puget server. 
Table 48. Procedure for Performance test of the Netgear switch. 
No. Steps 
1 Connect Host 1 and Host 2 to the Netgear switch.  
2 On Host 1, open a TCP socket to listen for packets on port 50000 using Netcat 
command: 
 
nc -l -n -p 50000 | wc --bytes 
 
Open Wireshark application to observe network traffic in Host 1. 
 
3 On Host 2, establish a TCP connection with Host 1 using the Netcat command: 
 
time yes | nc -v -v -n 192.168.1.10 50000 
4 Stop after ten seconds by typing Ctrl-C. 
5 Observe the number of bytes received on the terminal and compute the bandwidth 
speed. 
 




Figure 51 and Figure 52 show Host 1 received a total of 1205436416 bytes for the 
duration of 10.348 seconds. This computes to a link speed of approximately 931Mbps. 
Wireshark statistics show a link speed of 877Mbps, as shown in Figure 53 
 
Figure 51. Number of bytes received on Host 1 via the Netgear 
switch. 
 
Figure 52. Duration of performance test via the Netgear 
switch. 
 
Figure 53. Wireshark conversation statistics for Netgear 
switch. 
From the test, it is evident that the Puget server has a lower link speed 
performance as compared to COTS devices such as the Netgear switch (762Mbps vs 
877Mbps based on Wireshark). Nevertheless, the main advantage of using the approach 
in this thesis is that the data-plane software is correct by construction. The code running 
on the Puget server is guaranteed to satisfy the specification given by FxUxSF|ML|SL. 
Therefore, we assured no undesirable behaviors are present.  
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Two basic switching functions are introduced in this thesis. Each is defined in 
terms of 5 elementary behaviors, each expressed as an SFA. The elementary behaviors 
required to define these functions requires the breakdown of conventional services into 
fundamental parts that may not be intuitive or evident at first. The challenge in creating 
these elementary SFA lies in distilling what should be considered a fundamental behavior 
and what should distinguish them. Good fundamental behaviors will be ones that can be 
succinctly described by SFA transitions and are modular for broad reuse across different 
network functions. One important attribute of an elementary behavior is the number of 
states it has. The number of states in a cross product of two SFAs is the product of the 
number of states in each of them. As network behavior is described in more detail, the 
number of states increases. This can result in substantially more states in a tensor product 
since the number of states in the product will multiply.  
The modular approach of using SFA to build a reliable software network 
devicethat is verifiable by construction and allows timely customization based on the 
requirements of the operatoris shown to be attractive and viable in this thesis. Baseline 
modular parts have been shown to synthesize into working code of basic network 
functions like switching, routing, and firewalling. The modular parts are reusable and 
adding functionality like a firewall on basic switching is as simple as conjoining two 
more SFAs to the existing device representation. Even for more sophisticated network 
services, the production of running code is still possible by using the synthesis algorithm 
and discharging functions to construct the code in a scalable manner.  
The next step in further validating the approach will be to prove the invariant of 
the individual modular SFA holds in the combined cross-product. The invariant of 
complex network service can be difficult to prove while the invariant of an elementary 
behavior may be proven much easier in comparison. Therefore, if the proof of the state 
invariants of the complex function can be leveraged in the proof of the state invariants of 
the smaller modular components, then the approach would ease the difficulty in verifying 
state invariants of more complex data-planes.  
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Future work in this area includes the development of other elementary behavior 
SFAs to aid in building data-planes with more functions such as a load balancer, flow 
monitor, and proxy firewall. The code synthesis algorithm must also be automated. That 
includes putting propositions into the required form and automating the proposition 
discharge step where propositions are mapped to DPDK API calls or other C functions.  
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APPENDIX A.  C CODE FOR SWITCHING, STATEFUL 
FIREWALLING AND PARALLEL LEARNING (FXUXSF|ML|SL) 









































#define RX_RING_SIZE 128 
#define TX_RING_SIZE 512 
 
#define NUM_MBUFS 8191 
#define MBUF_CACHE_SIZE 250 
#define BURST_SIZE 32 
#define MAX_CPUS 16 
#define MAX_PORTS 8 
 
#define MLT_SLT_DUMP 1 
#define IPv6_TCP_UDP_DUMP 0 
#define SLT_QUERIES 0 
 
static const struct rte_eth_conf port_conf_default = { 
    .rxmode = { .max_rx_pkt_len = ETHER_MAX_LEN } 
}; 
 
static uint32_t all_ports_mask; 
 
static struct mlt_entry mlt_mem[MAX_MLT_SIZE]; 
static struct slt_entry slt_mem[MAX_SLT_SIZE]; 
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static inline void 
dump_mlt(uint64_t tsc, uint64_t timeout) 
{ 
    unsigned i; 
    for (i = 0; i < MAX_MLT_SIZE; i++) { 
        print_mac(&mlt_mem[i].mac_addr); 
        if ((tsc - mlt_mem[i].tsc) < timeout)  
            printf("  port %" PRIu8 "\n", mlt_mem[i].port); 
        else 
            printf(" expired\n"); 
    } 
} 
 
static inline void 
dump_slt(uint64_t tsc, uint64_t timeout) 
{ 
    unsigned i; 
    for (i = 0; i < MAX_SLT_SIZE; i++) { 
        print_ip_socket(&slt_mem[i].s_sock); 
        if ((tsc - slt_mem[i].tsc) < timeout)  
            printf("  port %" PRIu8 "\n", slt_mem[i].port); 
        else 
            printf(" expired\n"); 
    } 
} 
 
static inline uint32_t 
bitcnt(uint32_t v) 
{ 
    uint32_t n; 
    for (n = 0; v != 0; v &= v - 1, n++) 
        ; 
    return n; 
} 
 
/* Try sending packet to all ports described by port_mask. */ 
static inline void 
send_pkt(struct rte_mbuf *pkt, uint16_t queue_id, uint32_t port_mask) 
{ 
    uint32_t port_num; 
    uint8_t port; 
 
    if (port_mask == 0)  
        return; 
 
    port_num = bitcnt(port_mask); 
 
    /* printf("pkt refcnt  = %" PRIu16 "\n", pkt->refcnt);*/ 
 
    /* 
     * Mark all mbuf segments of pkt as referenced port_num more times since  
     * the mbuf pointer is put into a TX ring at each of port_num eth devices. 
     */ 
 
    rte_pktmbuf_refcnt_update(pkt, (uint16_t)port_num); 
 
    for (port = 0; port_mask != 0; port_mask >>= 1, port++) { 
        if ((port_mask & 1) != 0) {     /* true port_num times */ 
 
            uint16_t num_packets = rte_eth_tx_burst(port, queue_id, &pkt, 1); 
            if (unlikely(num_packets < 1)) { 
                                rte_pktmbuf_free(pkt); 
            } 
            /* else printf("pkt sent to port %" PRIu8 "\n", port);*/ 
        } 






 * Initializes a given port using global settings and with the RX buffers 
 * coming from the mbuf_pool passed as a parameter. 
 */ 
static inline int 
port_init(uint8_t port, struct rte_mempool *mbuf_pool) 
{ 
    struct rte_eth_conf port_conf = port_conf_default; 
    const uint16_t rx_rings = 1, tx_rings = 1; 
    int retval; 
    uint16_t q; 
 
    if (port >= rte_eth_dev_count()) 
        return -1; 
 
    /* Configure the Ethernet device. */ 
    retval = rte_eth_dev_configure(port, rx_rings, tx_rings, &port_conf); 
    if (retval != 0) 
        return retval; 
 
    /* Allocate and set up 1 RX queue per Ethernet port. */ 
    for (q = 0; q < rx_rings; q++) { 
        retval = rte_eth_rx_queue_setup(port, q, RX_RING_SIZE, 
                rte_eth_dev_socket_id(port), NULL, mbuf_pool); 
        if (retval < 0) 
            return retval; 
    } 
 
    /* Allocate and set up 1 TX queue per Ethernet port. */ 
    for (q = 0; q < tx_rings; q++) { 
        retval = rte_eth_tx_queue_setup(port, q, TX_RING_SIZE, 
                rte_eth_dev_socket_id(port), NULL); 
        if (retval < 0) 
            return retval; 
    } 
 
    /* Start the Ethernet port. */ 
    retval = rte_eth_dev_start(port); 
    if (retval < 0) 
        return retval; 
 
    /* Display the port MAC address. */ 
    struct ether_addr addr; 
    rte_eth_macaddr_get(port, &addr); 
    printf("Port %u MAC: %02" PRIx8 " %02" PRIx8 " %02" PRIx8 
               " %02" PRIx8 " %02" PRIx8 " %02" PRIx8 "\n", 
            (unsigned)port, 
            addr.addr_bytes[0], addr.addr_bytes[1], 
            addr.addr_bytes[2], addr.addr_bytes[3], 
            addr.addr_bytes[4], addr.addr_bytes[5]); 
 
    /* Enable RX in promiscuous mode for the Ethernet device. */ 
    rte_eth_promiscuous_enable(port); 
 
    return 0; 
} 
 
static inline int  
check_dom(struct rte_hash *table_lookup, void *item) 
{ 
  if(rte_hash_lookup(table_lookup, item) >= 0) 
    return 1; 
  else 
    return 0; 
} 
 
static inline int 
check_slt_full(struct rte_ring *slt_ring, uint64_t cur_tsc) 
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{ 
  struct slt_entry *slt_entry; 
  const uint64_t slt_timeout = get_timeout(SLT_ENTRY_TIMEOUT_MS); 
 
  slt_entry = (struct slt_entry *) ring_head(slt_ring); 
  if ((cur_tsc - slt_entry->tsc) > slt_timeout) 
    return 0; 
  else 
    return 1; 
} 
 
static inline int 
check_dom_mlt(struct rte_hash *mlt_lookup, void *addr) 
{ 
  if(rte_hash_lookup(mlt_lookup, addr) >= 0) 
    return 1; 
  else 
    return 0; 
} 
 
static inline int  
check_mlt_full(struct rte_ring *mlt_ring, uint64_t cur_tsc) 
{ 
  struct mlt_entry *mlt_entry; 
  const uint64_t mlt_timeout = get_timeout(MLT_ENTRY_TIMEOUT_MS); 
   
  mlt_entry = (struct mlt_entry *) ring_head(mlt_ring); 
  if ((cur_tsc - mlt_entry->tsc) > mlt_timeout) 
    return 0; 
  else 
    return 1; 
} 
 
static inline struct mlt_entry 
update_mlt(struct rte_hash *mlt_lookup, struct ether_addr *sa, uint64_t cur_tsc, uint8_t 
port) 
{ 
    void *data1; 
    struct mlt_entry *mlt_entry; 
 
    /* dis(mlt = x.mlt(x.f.sa |-> (t = x.t, port = self))) */ 
    rte_hash_lookup_data(mlt_lookup, (void *) sa, &data1); 
    mlt_entry = (struct mlt_entry *) data1; 
    mlt_entry->tsc = cur_tsc; 
    mlt_entry->port = port; 
 
    return *mlt_entry; 
} 
 
static inline struct mlt_entry 
add_mlt_entry(struct rte_ring *mlt_ring, struct rte_hash *mlt_lookup, struct ether_addr *sa, 
uint64_t cur_tsc, uint8_t port) 
{ 
    /*add entry into mlt table*/ 
 
    void *data1; 
    struct mlt_entry *mlt_entry; 
 
    /*dis(mlt = x.mlt :: {x.f.sa |-> {t = x.t, port = self}})*/ 
    if (rte_ring_dequeue(mlt_ring, &data1) != 0) 
        rte_exit(EXIT_FAILURE, "unable to dequeue mlt\n"); 
 
    mlt_entry = (struct mlt_entry *) data1; 
 
    if (rte_hash_del_key(mlt_lookup, (void *) &mlt_entry->mac_addr) < 0) 
        rte_exit(EXIT_FAILURE, "unable to delete mac addr from mlt\n"); 
 
    ether_addr_copy(sa, &mlt_entry->mac_addr); 
    mlt_entry->tsc = cur_tsc; 
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    mlt_entry->port = port; 
 
    if (rte_hash_add_key_data(mlt_lookup, (void *) sa, data1) < 0) 
        rte_exit(EXIT_FAILURE, "unable to add mac addr to mlt\n"); 
 
    if (rte_ring_enqueue(mlt_ring, data1) == -ENOBUFS) 
        rte_exit(EXIT_FAILURE, "unable to enqueue mlt\n"); 
 
    return *mlt_entry; 
} 
 
static inline struct slt_entry 
update_slt(struct rte_hash *slt_lookup, struct ip_socket ssock, uint64_t cur_tsc, uint8_t 
port) 
{ 
    void *data1; 
    struct slt_entry *slt_entry; 
 
    /* dis(slt = x.slt(x.f.ssock |-> (t = x.t, port = self))) */ 
    rte_hash_lookup_data(slt_lookup, (void *) &ssock, &data1); 
    slt_entry = (struct slt_entry *) data1; 
    slt_entry->tsc = cur_tsc; 
    slt_entry->port = port; 
 
    return *slt_entry; 
} 
 
static inline struct slt_entry 
add_slt_entry(struct rte_ring *slt_ring, struct rte_hash *slt_lookup, struct ip_socket 
ssock, uint64_t cur_tsc, uint8_t port) 
{ 
    void *data1; 
    struct slt_entry *slt_entry; 
 
    /*dis(slt = x.slt :: {x.f.ssock |-> {t = x.t, port = self}})*/ 
    if (rte_ring_dequeue(slt_ring, &data1) != 0) 
        rte_exit(EXIT_FAILURE, "unable to dequeue slt\n"); 
 
    slt_entry = (struct slt_entry *) data1; 
    if (rte_hash_del_key(slt_lookup, (void *) &slt_entry->s_sock) < 0) 
        rte_exit(EXIT_FAILURE, "unable to delete socket from slt\n"); 
 
    rte_mov16(slt_entry->s_sock.ip_addr, ssock.ip_addr); 
    slt_entry->s_sock.l4_port = ssock.l4_port; 
    slt_entry->tsc = cur_tsc; 
    slt_entry->port = port; 
 
    if (rte_hash_add_key_data(slt_lookup, (void *) &ssock, data1) < 0) 
        rte_exit(EXIT_FAILURE, "unable to add socket to slt\n"); 
 
    if (rte_ring_enqueue(slt_ring, data1) == -ENOBUFS) 
        rte_exit(EXIT_FAILURE, "unable to enqueue slt\n"); 
 
    return *slt_entry; 
} 
/* 
 * The lcore main. This is the main thread that does the work, reading from 





static __attribute__((noreturn)) void 
lcore_main(void) 
{ 
    const uint8_t nb_ports = rte_eth_dev_count(); 
 
    const struct rte_hash_parameters mlt_hash_params = { 
        .name = "MLT_LOOKUP_TABLE", 
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        .entries = MAX_MLT_SIZE * 2, 
        .key_len = sizeof(struct ether_addr), 
        .socket_id = rte_socket_id(), 
        .hash_func = rte_jhash, 
        .hash_func_init_val = 0, 
    }; 
    const struct rte_hash_parameters slt_hash_params = { 
        .name = "SLT_LOOKUP_TABLE", 
        .entries = MAX_SLT_SIZE * 2, 
        .key_len = sizeof(struct ip_socket), 
        .socket_id = rte_socket_id(), 
        .hash_func = rte_jhash, 
        .hash_func_init_val = 0, 
    }; 
 
    /* timeouts in CPU cycles */ 
    const uint64_t mlt_timeout = get_timeout(MLT_ENTRY_TIMEOUT_MS); 
    const uint64_t slt_timeout = get_timeout(SLT_ENTRY_TIMEOUT_MS); 
 
    uint64_t cur_tsc; 
    struct rte_hash *mlt_lookup, *slt_lookup; 
    struct rte_ring *mlt_ring, *slt_ring; 
    struct ip_socket dsock, ssock; 
    struct ether_addr *sa, *da; 
    struct mlt_entry *mlt_entry; 
    struct slt_entry *slt_entry; 
    void *data1, *data2; 
    uint8_t port; 
 
    //void *starters[] = { &&f1m1e1s1g1, &&f1m1e1g1 }; 
    void *nextstate[MAX_PORTS]; 
 
    /* 
     * Check that the port is on the same NUMA node as the polling thread 
     * for best performance. 
     */ 
    for (port = 0; port < nb_ports; port++) 
        if (rte_eth_dev_socket_id(port) > 0 && 
                rte_eth_dev_socket_id(port) != 
                        (int)rte_socket_id()) 
            printf("WARNING, port %u is on remote NUMA node to " 
                    "polling thread.\n\tPerformance will " 
                    "not be optimal.\n", port); 
 
    printf("\nCore %u forwarding packets. [Ctrl+C to quit]\n", 
            rte_lcore_id()); 
 
    /* Init nextstate for each port. */ 
    /*for (port = 0; port < nb_ports; port++) 
        nextstate[port] = WALLED(port) ? starters[0] : starters[1];  
    */ 
    /* Create single-producer(SP), single-consumer(SC) mlt and slt rings */ 
        if ((mlt_ring = rte_ring_create("MLT_RING", MAX_MLT_RING_SIZE, rte_socket_id(), 
                    RING_F_SP_ENQ | RING_F_SC_DEQ)) == NULL) 
        rte_exit(EXIT_FAILURE, "Cannot create mlt ring\n"); 
 
        if ((slt_ring = rte_ring_create("SLT_RING", MAX_SLT_RING_SIZE, rte_socket_id(), 
                    RING_F_SP_ENQ | RING_F_SC_DEQ)) == NULL) 
        rte_exit(EXIT_FAILURE, "Cannot create slt ring\n"); 
 
    /* Create hash tables for MAC address and socket learning */ 
    if ((mlt_lookup = rte_hash_create(&mlt_hash_params)) == NULL) 
        rte_exit(EXIT_FAILURE, "Cannot create mlt lookup table\n"); 
 
    if ((slt_lookup = rte_hash_create(&slt_hash_params)) == NULL) 
        rte_exit(EXIT_FAILURE, "Cannot create slt lookup table\n"); 
 
    cur_tsc = rte_rdtsc(); 
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    /* Fill mlt ring and mlt hash table with expired entries. */
    uint16_t i; 
    for (i = 0; i < MAX_MLT_SIZE; i++) { 
        data1 = &mlt_mem[i]; 
        if ((rte_ring_sp_enqueue(mlt_ring, data1)) == -ENOBUFS) 
            rte_exit(EXIT_FAILURE, "Unable to initialize mlt ring\n"); 
 
        /* Set as expired or to the smallest period before expiration. */ 
        mlt_mem[i].tsc = (mlt_timeout > cur_tsc) ? mlt_timeout - cur_tsc : cur_tsc - mlt_timeout; 
 
        /* Need unique invalid mac addresses as hash keys to fill mac learning table. */ 
        mlt_mem[i].mac_addr.addr_bytes[0] = (uint8_t) (i >> 8); 
        mlt_mem[i].mac_addr.addr_bytes[1] = (uint8_t) (i & 0xFF); 
        mlt_mem[i].mac_addr.addr_bytes[2] = 0; 
        mlt_mem[i].mac_addr.addr_bytes[3] = 0; 
        mlt_mem[i].mac_addr.addr_bytes[4] = 0; 
        mlt_mem[i].mac_addr.addr_bytes[5] = 0; 
 
        if ((rte_hash_add_key_data(mlt_lookup, (void *) &mlt_mem[i].mac_addr, data1)) < 0) 
            rte_exit(EXIT_FAILURE, "Unable to initialize mlt hash table\n"); 
    } 
 
    /* Fill slt ring and slt hash table with expired entries. */ 
    for (i = 0; i < MAX_SLT_SIZE; i++) { 
        data1 = &slt_mem[i]; 
        if ((rte_ring_sp_enqueue(slt_ring, data1)) == -ENOBUFS) 
            rte_exit(EXIT_FAILURE, "Unable to initialize slt ring\n"); 
 
        /* Set as expired or to the smallest period before expiration. */ 
        slt_mem[i].tsc = (slt_timeout > cur_tsc) ? slt_timeout - cur_tsc : cur_tsc - slt_timeout; 
 
        /* Need unique invalid IP sockets as hash keys to fill socket learning table. */ 
        memset(slt_mem[i].s_sock.ip_addr, 0, IPv6_ADDR_LEN * 
sizeof(slt_mem[0].s_sock.ip_addr[0])); 
        slt_mem[i].s_sock.l4_port = i; 
 
        if ((rte_hash_add_key_data(slt_lookup, (void *) &slt_mem[i].s_sock, data1)) < 0) 
            rte_exit(EXIT_FAILURE, "Unable to initialize slt hash table\n"); 
    } 
 
#if MLT_SLT_DUMP 
    uint64_t prev_tsc = rte_rdtsc(); 
    uint64_t mlt_dump_timer_period = get_timeout(8000); 
#endif 
 
    /* Run until the application is quit or killed. */ 
    for (;;) { 
 
        for (port = 0; port < nb_ports; port++) { 
 
            /* Get burst of RX packets from port */ 
              
            struct rte_mbuf *bufs[BURST_SIZE]; 
            const uint16_t nb_rx = rte_eth_rx_burst(port, 0, bufs, BURST_SIZE); 
 
            /* printf("%d packets Rx from port %d\n", nb_rx, port); */ 
            if (unlikely(nb_rx == 0)) 
                continue; 
 
            uint16_t buf; 
 
            for (buf = 0; buf < nb_rx; buf++) { 
                 
                uint32_t port_mask = 0; 
 
                cur_tsc = rte_rdtsc(); 
 




         
                if ((cur_tsc - prev_tsc) > mlt_dump_timer_period) { 
                    printf("\n+++MLT Table+++\n"); 
                    dump_mlt(cur_tsc, mlt_timeout); 
                    printf("\n\n+++SLT Table+++\n"); 
                    dump_slt(cur_tsc, slt_timeout); 
                    prev_tsc = cur_tsc; 
                    printf("\n++++++\n"); 
                } 
                 
#endif 
 
                da = dst_haddr(bufs[buf]); 
                sa = src_haddr(bufs[buf]); 
                 
                /*Code synthesize for switch sfa*/ 
                 
                //Ingress(P) 
                //if dis(empty) 
 
                //egress(U,E) 
                //no updates 
 
                //Discharge egress f2e1g1 
                //SAT_FOR 
 
                //if (rte_hash_lookup_data(slt_lookup, (void *) &dsock, &data2) >= 0){ 
                //  slt_entry = (struct slt_entry *) data2; 
                //} 
                //else 
                //  continue; 
 
                //if (has_ip_dst_socket(bufs[buf], &dsock) == NULL) 
                //  printf("No dst soc\n"); 
                //  continue; 
 
                //for self in egress 
                int e = 0; 
                for(e =0;  e < nb_ports; e++){ 
                    /* 
                    if dis( (ucast(f.da) and  f.da in dom(mlt) and 
                    t - mlt(f.da).t < 16  and mlt(f.da).port != self) or 
 
                    ((f.dsock not in  dom(slt)  or  t - slt(f.dsock).t > 25   or 
                    slt(f.dsock).port  !=  self )   and 
                    has_ip_dst_socket(f)  and  walled(self))): 
                    */ 
                     
                    int MaskCmpl = 0; 
 
                    if(is_unicast_ether_addr(da)){ 
                        if (check_dom(mlt_lookup, (void*)da) > 0) { 
 
                            rte_hash_lookup_data(mlt_lookup, (void*)da, &data1); 
                            mlt_entry = (struct mlt_entry*) data1; 
 
                            if ((cur_tsc - mlt_entry->tsc) < mlt_timeout) { 
                                if(mlt_entry->port != e) { 
                                    MaskCmpl = 1; 
                                } 
                            } 
                        } 
                    } 
 
                    if(WALLED(e)){ 
                        if (has_ip_dst_socket(bufs[buf], &dsock)) { 
                            if (rte_hash_lookup_data(slt_lookup, (void*)& dsock, &data2)) { 
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                                slt_entry = (struct slt_entry*) data2;
 
                                if ((check_dom(slt_lookup, (void*)& dsock) == 0) || 
                                    ((cur_tsc - slt_entry->tsc) > slt_timeout) || 
                                    slt_entry->port != e) { 
 
                                    MaskCmpl = 1; 
                                } 
                            } 
                        } 
                    } 
 
                    if(MaskCmpl){ 
                        /*Set port mask*/ 
                        port_mask |= (uint32_t)((~(1 << e)) & (~(1 << port)) & (1 << e)); 
                    } 
                    else{ 
                        port_mask |= (uint32_t)((~(1 << port)) & (1 << e)); 
                    } 
                } 
 
 
                /* mac address learning */ 
                //ML p1: ucast(f.sa) 
                //printf("\n+++MAC Learning+++\n"); 
                if(is_unicast_ether_addr(sa)){ 
                    //printf("\nis_unicast_ether_addr(sa)\n"); 
                    //ML p2: f.sa in dom(mlt) 
                    if(check_dom(mlt_lookup, (void *) sa) > 0){ 
                        //state m2: updating mlt 
                        //printf("Update mlt entry\n"); 
                        update_mlt(mlt_lookup, sa, cur_tsc, port); 
                    } 
                    //ML !p2: f.sa not in dom(mlt) 
                    else{ 
                        //ML p3: mlt free 
                        if(check_mlt_full(mlt_ring, cur_tsc) == 0){ 
                            //state m3: add mlt 
                            //printf("MLT got space\n"); 
                            add_mlt_entry(mlt_ring, mlt_lookup, sa, cur_tsc, port); 
                        } 
                        // ML ~p3: mlt full 
                        else{ 
                            //state m1: stutter. no learning 
                            //printf("MLT full\n"); 
                        } 
                    } 
 
                } 
                //ML !p1: !ucast(f.sa) 
                else{ 
                    //state m1: stutter no learning/// 
                    //printf("\nNot unicast(sa)\n"); 
                } 
                //printf("\n+++End MAC Learning+++\n"); 
                /* socket learning */ 
                //SL p1: ucast(f.sa) 
                 
                //printf("\n+++Soc Learning+++\n"); 
                if(is_unicast_ether_addr(sa)){ 
                    //SL p2: has_ip_src_socket(f) 
                    //printf("unicast sa\n"); 
                    if(has_ip_src_socket(bufs[buf], &ssock)){ 
                        //SL p3: walled(self) 
                        //printf("has ip src\n"); 
                        if(WALLED(port)){ 
                            //printf("Is walled port\n"); 
                            //SL p4: f.ssock in dom(slt) 
                            if(check_dom(slt_lookup, (void *) &ssock) > 0){ 
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                                //state s2: update slt 
                                update_slt(slt_lookup, ssock, cur_tsc, port); 
                            } 
                            //SL !p4: f.ssock not in dom(slt) 
                            else{ 
                                //SL p5: slt free 
                                if(check_slt_full(slt_ring, cur_tsc) == 0){ 
                                    //state s3: add new slt 
                                    add_slt_entry(slt_ring, slt_lookup, ssock, cur_tsc, port); 
                                } 
                                //SL !p5 
                                else{ 
                                    //state s1: stutter no learning 
                                } 
                            } 
                        } 
                        //SL !p3: !walled(self) 
                        else{ 
                            //state s1: stutter no learning 
                            //printf("not walled port\n"); 
                        } 
                    } 
                    //SL !p2: !has_ip_src_socket(f) 
                    else{ 
                        //state s1: stutter no learning 
                        //printf("not ip src\n"); 
                    } 
                } 
                //SL ~p1: !ucast(f.sa) 
                else{ 
                    //state s1: stutter no learning 
                    //printf("not unicast sa\n"); 
                } 
                //printf("\n+++End Soc Learning+++\n"); 
                 
                printf("\nPortmask = %d\n", port_mask); 
                send_pkt(bufs[buf], 0, port_mask); 
                rte_pktmbuf_free(bufs[buf]);  
                printf("====================\n\n"); 
            } 
        } 




 * The main function, which does initialization and calls the per-lcore functions. 
 */ 
int 
main(int argc, char *argv[]) 
{ 
    struct rte_mempool *mbuf_pool; 
    unsigned nb_ports; 
    uint8_t portid; 
 
 
    /* Initialize the Environment Abstraction Layer (EAL). */ 
    int ret = rte_eal_init(argc, argv); 
    if (ret < 0) 
        rte_exit(EXIT_FAILURE, "Error with EAL initialization\n"); 
 
    argc -= ret; 
    argv += ret; 
 
    nb_ports = rte_eth_dev_count(); 
 
    if (nb_ports != 4) rte_exit(EXIT_FAILURE, "eth dev count not 4\n"); 
 
    /* Initialize all_ports_mask. */ 
    for (portid = 1, all_ports_mask = 1; portid < nb_ports; portid++) 
115 
        all_ports_mask = (all_ports_mask << 1) | 1;
 
    /* Check that there is an even number of ports to send/receive on. 
    if (nb_ports < 2 || (nb_ports & 1)) 
        rte_exit(EXIT_FAILURE, "Error: number of ports must be even\n"); 
    */ 
 
    /* Creates a new mempool in memory to hold the mbufs. */ 
    mbuf_pool = rte_pktmbuf_pool_create("MBUF_POOL", NUM_MBUFS * nb_ports, 
        MBUF_CACHE_SIZE, 0, RTE_MBUF_DEFAULT_BUF_SIZE, rte_socket_id()); 
 
    if (mbuf_pool == NULL) 
        rte_exit(EXIT_FAILURE, "Cannot create mbuf pool\n"); 
 
    /* Initialize all ports. */ 
    for (portid = 0; portid < nb_ports; portid++) 
        if (port_init(portid, mbuf_pool) != 0) 
            rte_exit(EXIT_FAILURE, "Cannot init port %"PRIu8 "\n", 
                    portid); 
 
    if (rte_lcore_count() > 1) 
        printf("\nWARNING: Multiple lcores enabled. Only 1 used.\n"); 
 
    /* Call lcore_main on the master core only. */ 
     
    printf("\nRunning Version %s\n", VERSION); 
     
    lcore_main(); 
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APPENDIX B.  C CODE FOR SWITCHING, STATEFUL 
FIREWALLING AND LEARNING (FXUXSFXMLXSL) 









































#define RX_RING_SIZE 128 
#define TX_RING_SIZE 512 
 
#define NUM_MBUFS 8191 
#define MBUF_CACHE_SIZE 250 
#define BURST_SIZE 32 
#define MAX_CPUS 16 
#define MAX_PORTS 8 
 
#define MLT_SLT_DUMP 1 
#define IPv6_TCP_UDP_DUMP 0 
#define SLT_QUERIES 0 
 
static const struct rte_eth_conf port_conf_default = { 
    .rxmode = { .max_rx_pkt_len = ETHER_MAX_LEN } 
}; 
 
static uint32_t all_ports_mask; 
 
static struct mlt_entry mlt_mem[MAX_MLT_SIZE]; 
static struct slt_entry slt_mem[MAX_SLT_SIZE]; 
 
118 
static inline void 
dump_mlt(uint64_t tsc, uint64_t timeout) 
{ 
    unsigned i; 
    for (i = 0; i < MAX_MLT_SIZE; i++) { 
        print_mac(&mlt_mem[i].mac_addr); 
        if ((tsc - mlt_mem[i].tsc) < timeout)  
            printf("  port %" PRIu8 "\n", mlt_mem[i].port); 
        else 
            printf(" expired\n"); 
    } 
} 
 
static inline void 
dump_slt(uint64_t tsc, uint64_t timeout) 
{ 
    unsigned i; 
    for (i = 0; i < MAX_SLT_SIZE; i++) { 
        print_ip_socket(&slt_mem[i].s_sock); 
        if ((tsc - slt_mem[i].tsc) < timeout)  
            printf("  port %" PRIu8 "\n", slt_mem[i].port); 
        else 
            printf(" expired\n"); 
    } 
} 
 
static inline uint32_t 
bitcnt(uint32_t v) 
{ 
    uint32_t n; 
    for (n = 0; v != 0; v &= v - 1, n++) 
        ; 
    return n; 
} 
 
/* Try sending packet to all ports described by port_mask. */ 
static inline void 
send_pkt(struct rte_mbuf *pkt, uint16_t queue_id, uint32_t port_mask) 
{ 
    uint32_t port_num; 
    uint8_t port; 
 
    if (port_mask == 0)  
        return; 
 
    port_num = bitcnt(port_mask); 
 
    /* printf("pkt refcnt  = %" PRIu16 "\n", pkt->refcnt);*/ 
 
    /* 
     * Mark all mbuf segments of pkt as referenced port_num more times since  
     * the mbuf pointer is put into a TX ring at each of port_num eth devices. 
     */ 
 
    rte_pktmbuf_refcnt_update(pkt, (uint16_t)port_num); 
 
    for (port = 0; port_mask != 0; port_mask >>= 1, port++) { 
        if ((port_mask & 1) != 0) {     /* true port_num times */ 
 
            uint16_t num_packets = rte_eth_tx_burst(port, queue_id, &pkt, 1); 
            if (unlikely(num_packets < 1)) { 
                                rte_pktmbuf_free(pkt); 
            } 
            /* else printf("pkt sent to port %" PRIu8 "\n", port);*/ 
        } 






 * Initializes a given port using global settings and with the RX buffers 
 * coming from the mbuf_pool passed as a parameter. 
 */ 
static inline int 
port_init(uint8_t port, struct rte_mempool *mbuf_pool) 
{ 
    struct rte_eth_conf port_conf = port_conf_default; 
    const uint16_t rx_rings = 1, tx_rings = 1; 
    int retval; 
    uint16_t q; 
 
    if (port >= rte_eth_dev_count()) 
        return -1; 
 
    /* Configure the Ethernet device. */ 
    retval = rte_eth_dev_configure(port, rx_rings, tx_rings, &port_conf); 
    if (retval != 0) 
        return retval; 
 
    /* Allocate and set up 1 RX queue per Ethernet port. */ 
    for (q = 0; q < rx_rings; q++) { 
        retval = rte_eth_rx_queue_setup(port, q, RX_RING_SIZE, 
                rte_eth_dev_socket_id(port), NULL, mbuf_pool); 
        if (retval < 0) 
            return retval; 
    } 
 
    /* Allocate and set up 1 TX queue per Ethernet port. */ 
    for (q = 0; q < tx_rings; q++) { 
        retval = rte_eth_tx_queue_setup(port, q, TX_RING_SIZE, 
                rte_eth_dev_socket_id(port), NULL); 
        if (retval < 0) 
            return retval; 
    } 
 
    /* Start the Ethernet port. */ 
    retval = rte_eth_dev_start(port); 
    if (retval < 0) 
        return retval; 
 
    /* Display the port MAC address. */ 
    struct ether_addr addr; 
    rte_eth_macaddr_get(port, &addr); 
    printf("Port %u MAC: %02" PRIx8 " %02" PRIx8 " %02" PRIx8 
               " %02" PRIx8 " %02" PRIx8 " %02" PRIx8 "\n", 
            (unsigned)port, 
            addr.addr_bytes[0], addr.addr_bytes[1], 
            addr.addr_bytes[2], addr.addr_bytes[3], 
            addr.addr_bytes[4], addr.addr_bytes[5]); 
 
    /* Enable RX in promiscuous mode for the Ethernet device. */ 
    rte_eth_promiscuous_enable(port); 
 
    return 0; 
} 
 
static inline int  
check_dom(struct rte_hash *table_lookup, void *item) 
{ 
  if(rte_hash_lookup(table_lookup, item) >= 0) 
    return 1; 
  else 
    return 0; 
} 
 
static inline int 
check_slt_full(struct rte_ring *slt_ring, uint64_t cur_tsc) 
{ 
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  struct slt_entry *slt_entry; 
  const uint64_t slt_timeout = get_timeout(SLT_ENTRY_TIMEOUT_MS); 
 
  slt_entry = (struct slt_entry *) ring_head(slt_ring); 
  if ((cur_tsc - slt_entry->tsc) > slt_timeout) 
    return 0; 
  else 
    return 1; 
} 
 
static inline int 
check_dom_mlt(struct rte_hash *mlt_lookup, void *addr) 
{ 
  if(rte_hash_lookup(mlt_lookup, addr) >= 0) 
    return 1; 
  else 
    return 0; 
} 
 
static inline int  
check_mlt_full(struct rte_ring *mlt_ring, uint64_t cur_tsc) 
{ 
  struct mlt_entry *mlt_entry; 
  const uint64_t mlt_timeout = get_timeout(MLT_ENTRY_TIMEOUT_MS); 
   
  mlt_entry = (struct mlt_entry *) ring_head(mlt_ring); 
  if ((cur_tsc - mlt_entry->tsc) > mlt_timeout) 
    return 0; 
  else 
    return 1; 
} 
 
static inline mlt_entry 
update_mlt(struct rte_hash *mlt_lookup, struct ether_addr *sa, uint64_t cur_tsc, 
uint8_t port) 
{ 
    void *data1; 
    struct mlt_entry *mlt_entry; 
 
    /* dis(mlt = x.mlt(x.f.sa |-> (t = x.t, port = self))) */ 
    rte_hash_lookup_data(mlt_lookup, (void *) sa, &data1); 
    mlt_entry = (struct mlt_entry *) data1; 
    mlt_entry->tsc = cur_tsc; 
    mlt_entry->port = port; 
 
    return *mlt_entry; 
} 
 
static inline mlt_entry 
add_mlt_entry(struct rte_ring *mlt_ring, struct rte_hash *mlt_lookup, struct ether_addr 
*sa, uint64_t cur_tsc, uint8_t port) 
{ 
    /*add entry into mlt table*/ 
 
    void *data1; 
    struct mlt_entry *mlt_entry; 
 
    /*dis(mlt = x.mlt :: {x.f.sa |-> {t = x.t, port = self}})*/ 
    if (rte_ring_dequeue(mlt_ring, &data1) != 0) 
        rte_exit(EXIT_FAILURE, "unable to dequeue mlt\n"); 
 
    mlt_entry = (struct mlt_entry *) data1; 
 
    if (rte_hash_del_key(mlt_lookup, (void *) &mlt_entry->mac_addr) < 0) 
        rte_exit(EXIT_FAILURE, "unable to delete mac addr from mlt\n"); 
 
    ether_addr_copy(sa, &mlt_entry->mac_addr); 
    mlt_entry->tsc = cur_tsc; 
    mlt_entry->port = port; 
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    if (rte_hash_add_key_data(mlt_lookup, (void *) sa, data1) < 0) 
        rte_exit(EXIT_FAILURE, "unable to add mac addr to mlt\n"); 
 
    if (rte_ring_enqueue(mlt_ring, data1) == -ENOBUFS) 
        rte_exit(EXIT_FAILURE, "unable to enqueue mlt\n"); 
 
    return *mlt_entry; 
} 
 
static inline slt_entry 
update_slt(struct rte_hash *slt_lookup, struct ip_socket ssock, uint64_t cur_tsc, 
uint8_t port) 
{ 
    void *data1; 
    struct slt_entry *slt_entry; 
 
    /* dis(slt = x.slt(x.f.ssock |-> (t = x.t, port = self))) */ 
    rte_hash_lookup_data(slt_lookup, (void *) &ssock, &data1); 
    slt_entry = (struct slt_entry *) data1; 
    slt_entry->tsc = cur_tsc; 
    slt_entry->port = port; 
 
    return *slt_entry; 
} 
 
static inline slt_entry 
add_slt_entry(struct rte_ring *slt_ring, struct rte_hash *slt_lookup, struct ip_socket 
ssock, uint64_t cur_tsc, uint8_t port) 
{ 
    void *data1; 
    struct slt_entry *slt_entry 
 
    /*dis(slt = x.slt :: {x.f.ssock |-> {t = x.t, port = self}})*/ 
    if (rte_ring_dequeue(slt_ring, &data1) != 0) 
        rte_exit(EXIT_FAILURE, "unable to dequeue slt\n"); 
 
    slt_entry = (struct slt_entry *) data1; 
    if (rte_hash_del_key(slt_lookup, (void *) &slt_entry->s_sock) < 0) 
        rte_exit(EXIT_FAILURE, "unable to delete socket from slt\n"); 
 
    rte_mov16(slt_entry->s_sock.ip_addr, ssock.ip_addr); 
    slt_entry->s_sock.l4_port = ssock.l4_port; 
    slt_entry->tsc = cur_tsc; 
    slt_entry->port = port; 
 
    if (rte_hash_add_key_data(slt_lookup, (void *) &ssock, data1) < 0) 
        rte_exit(EXIT_FAILURE, "unable to add socket to slt\n"); 
 
    if (rte_ring_enqueue(slt_ring, data1) == -ENOBUFS) 
        rte_exit(EXIT_FAILURE, "unable to enqueue slt\n"); 
 
    return *slt_entry; 
} 
/* 
 * The lcore main. This is the main thread that does the work, reading from 
 * an input port and writing to an output port. 
 */ 
 
static inline uint32_t 
discharge_e1g1(uint8_t nb_ports, uint8_t port, 
struct ether_addr *da, struct ip_socket dsock, 
struct rte_hash *mlt_lookup, struct rte_hash *slt_lookup, 
struct rte_mbuf *bufs, uint16_t buf, 
uint64_t cur_tsc, uint64_t mlt_timeout, uint64_t slt_timeout) 
{ 
    struct ip_socket dsock; 
    void *data1, *data2; 
    struct mlt_entry *mlt_entry; 
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    struct slt_entry *slt_entry; 
 
    uint32_t port_mask = 0; 
 
    //discharge egress 
    if (rte_hash_lookup_data(mlt_lookup, (void *) da, &data1) >= 0){ 
        mlt_entry = (struct mlt_entry *) data1; 
    } 
    else 
        return 0; 
 
    has_ip_dst_socket(bufs[buf], &dsock); 
    if (rte_hash_lookup_data(slt_lookup, (void *) &dsock, &data2) >= 0){ 
        slt_entry = (struct slt_entry *) data2; 
    } 
    else 
        return 0; 
 
    //SAT-FOR 
    //for self in egress do 
    int e = 0; 
    for(e =0;  e < nb_ports; e++){ 
 
        /*if dis( (ucast(f.da) and f.da in dom(mlt) and 
        t-mlt(f.da)<16 and mlt(f.da).port != self) or 
        ( (f.dsock not in dom(slt) or t-slt(f.dsock).t>25 or slt(f.dsock).port != self) 
and 
        has_ip_dstsocket(f) and walled(self) )) */ 
 
        if( (is_unicast_ether_addr(da) && (check_dom(mlt_lookup, (void *) da) > 0) && 
        ((cur_tsc - mlt_entry->tsc) < mlt_timeout) && mlt_entry->port != e) || 
        ( ( (check_dom(slt_lookup, (void *) &dsock) == 0) || ((cur_tsc - slt_entry-
>tsc) > slt_timeout) ||  slt_entry->port != e) 
        && has_ip_dst_socket(bufs[buf], &dsock) && WALLED(e) )) 
        { 
             /*Set port mask*/ 
            port_mask |= (uint32_t)((~(1 << e)) & (~(1 << port)) & (1 << e)); 
        } 
        else 
        { 
            port_mask |= (uint32_t)((~(1 << port)) & (1 << e)); 
        } 
    } 
 





static __attribute__((noreturn)) void 
lcore_main(void) 
{ 
    const uint8_t nb_ports = rte_eth_dev_count(); 
 
    const struct rte_hash_parameters mlt_hash_params = { 
        .name = "MLT_LOOKUP_TABLE", 
        .entries = MAX_MLT_SIZE * 2, 
        .key_len = sizeof(struct ether_addr), 
        .socket_id = rte_socket_id(), 
        .hash_func = rte_jhash, 
        .hash_func_init_val = 0, 
    }; 
    const struct rte_hash_parameters slt_hash_params = { 
        .name = "SLT_LOOKUP_TABLE", 
        .entries = MAX_SLT_SIZE * 2, 
        .key_len = sizeof(struct ip_socket), 
        .socket_id = rte_socket_id(), 
        .hash_func = rte_jhash, 
        .hash_func_init_val = 0, 
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    }; 
 
    /* timeouts in CPU cycles */ 
    const uint64_t mlt_timeout = get_timeout(MLT_ENTRY_TIMEOUT_MS); 
    const uint64_t slt_timeout = get_timeout(SLT_ENTRY_TIMEOUT_MS); 
 
    uint64_t cur_tsc; 
    struct rte_hash *mlt_lookup, *slt_lookup; 
    struct rte_ring *mlt_ring, *slt_ring; 
    struct ip_socket dsock, ssock; 
    struct ether_addr *sa, *da; 
    struct mlt_entry *mlt_entry; 
    struct slt_entry *slt_entry; 
    void *data1, *data2; 
    uint8_t port; 
 
    //void *starters[] = { &&f1m1e1s1g1, &&f1m1e1g1 }; 
    void *nextstate[MAX_PORTS]; 
 
    /* 
     * Check that the port is on the same NUMA node as the polling thread 
     * for best performance. 
     */ 
    for (port = 0; port < nb_ports; port++) 
        if (rte_eth_dev_socket_id(port) > 0 && 
                rte_eth_dev_socket_id(port) != 
                        (int)rte_socket_id()) 
            printf("WARNING, port %u is on remote NUMA node to " 
                    "polling thread.\n\tPerformance will " 
                    "not be optimal.\n", port); 
 
    printf("\nCore %u forwarding packets. [Ctrl+C to quit]\n", 
            rte_lcore_id()); 
 
    /* Init nextstate for each port. */ 
    /*for (port = 0; port < nb_ports; port++) 
        nextstate[port] = WALLED(port) ? starters[0] : starters[1];  
    */ 
    /* Create single-producer(SP), single-consumer(SC) mlt and slt rings */ 
        if ((mlt_ring = rte_ring_create("MLT_RING", MAX_MLT_RING_SIZE, rte_socket_id(), 
                    RING_F_SP_ENQ | RING_F_SC_DEQ)) == NULL) 
        rte_exit(EXIT_FAILURE, "Cannot create mlt ring\n"); 
 
        if ((slt_ring = rte_ring_create("SLT_RING", MAX_SLT_RING_SIZE, rte_socket_id(), 
                    RING_F_SP_ENQ | RING_F_SC_DEQ)) == NULL) 
        rte_exit(EXIT_FAILURE, "Cannot create slt ring\n"); 
 
    /* Create hash tables for MAC address and socket learning */ 
    if ((mlt_lookup = rte_hash_create(&mlt_hash_params)) == NULL) 
        rte_exit(EXIT_FAILURE, "Cannot create mlt lookup table\n"); 
 
    if ((slt_lookup = rte_hash_create(&slt_hash_params)) == NULL) 
        rte_exit(EXIT_FAILURE, "Cannot create slt lookup table\n"); 
 
    cur_tsc = rte_rdtsc(); 
 
    /* Fill mlt ring and mlt hash table with expired entries. */ 
    uint16_t i; 
    for (i = 0; i < MAX_MLT_SIZE; i++) { 
        data1 = &mlt_mem[i]; 
        if ((rte_ring_sp_enqueue(mlt_ring, data1)) == -ENOBUFS) 
            rte_exit(EXIT_FAILURE, "Unable to initialize mlt ring\n"); 
 
        /* Set as expired or to the smallest period before expiration. */ 
        mlt_mem[i].tsc = (mlt_timeout > cur_tsc) ? mlt_timeout - cur_tsc : cur_tsc - 
mlt_timeout; 
 
        /* Need unique invalid mac addresses as hash keys to fill mac learning table. 
*/ 
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        mlt_mem[i].mac_addr.addr_bytes[0] = (uint8_t) (i >> 8); 
        mlt_mem[i].mac_addr.addr_bytes[1] = (uint8_t) (i & 0xFF); 
        mlt_mem[i].mac_addr.addr_bytes[2] = 0; 
        mlt_mem[i].mac_addr.addr_bytes[3] = 0; 
        mlt_mem[i].mac_addr.addr_bytes[4] = 0; 
        mlt_mem[i].mac_addr.addr_bytes[5] = 0; 
 
        if ((rte_hash_add_key_data(mlt_lookup, (void *) &mlt_mem[i].mac_addr, data1)) < 
0) 
            rte_exit(EXIT_FAILURE, "Unable to initialize mlt hash table\n"); 
    } 
 
    /* Fill slt ring and slt hash table with expired entries. */ 
    for (i = 0; i < MAX_SLT_SIZE; i++) { 
        data1 = &slt_mem[i]; 
        if ((rte_ring_sp_enqueue(slt_ring, data1)) == -ENOBUFS) 
            rte_exit(EXIT_FAILURE, "Unable to initialize slt ring\n"); 
 
        /* Set as expired or to the smallest period before expiration. */ 
        slt_mem[i].tsc = (slt_timeout > cur_tsc) ? slt_timeout - cur_tsc : cur_tsc - 
slt_timeout; 
 
        /* Need unique invalid IP sockets as hash keys to fill socket learning table. 
*/ 
        memset(slt_mem[i].s_sock.ip_addr, 0, IPv6_ADDR_LEN * 
sizeof(slt_mem[0].s_sock.ip_addr[0])); 
        slt_mem[i].s_sock.l4_port = i; 
 
        if ((rte_hash_add_key_data(slt_lookup, (void *) &slt_mem[i].s_sock, data1)) < 
0) 
            rte_exit(EXIT_FAILURE, "Unable to initialize slt hash table\n"); 
    } 
 
#if MLT_SLT_DUMP 
    uint64_t prev_tsc = rte_rdtsc(); 
    uint64_t mlt_dump_timer_period = get_timeout(5000); 
#endif 
 
    /* Run until the application is quit or killed. */ 
    for (;;) { 
 
        for (port = 0; port < nb_ports; port++) { 
 
            /* Get burst of RX packets from port */ 
             
            struct rte_mbuf *bufs[BURST_SIZE]; 
            const uint16_t nb_rx = rte_eth_rx_burst(port, 0, bufs, BURST_SIZE); 
 
            /* printf("%d packets Rx from port %d\n", nb_rx, port); */ 
            if (unlikely(nb_rx == 0)) 
                continue; 
 
            uint16_t buf; 
 
            for (buf = 0; buf < nb_rx; buf++) { 
                 
                uint32_t port_mask = 0; 
 
                cur_tsc = rte_rdtsc(); 
                printf("\nReceived Packets at Port %d", port); 
 
#if MLT_SLT_DUMP 
                if ((cur_tsc - prev_tsc) > mlt_dump_timer_period) { 
                    printf("MLT Table\n"); 
                    dump_mlt(cur_tsc, mlt_timeout); 
                    printf("\n"); 
                    //dump_slt(cur_tsc, slt_timeout); 
                    prev_tsc = cur_tsc; 




                uint32_t port_mask = 0; 
 
                da = dst_haddr(bufs[buf]); 
                sa = src_haddr(bufs[buf]); 
                 
                has_ip_dst_socket(bufs[buf], &dsock); 
 
                /*Code synthesize for switch sfa*/ 
                //Discharge most common predicate 
                 
                //p5: ucast(f.sa) - 18 counts 
                if(is_unicast_ether_addr(sa)){ 
                    //p6:  f.sa in dom(mlt) - 18 counts 
                    if(check_dom(mlt_lookup, (void *) sa) > 0){ 
                        //p1: walled(self) - 3 counts 
                        if(WALLED(port)){ 
                            //p2: has_ip_src_socket(f) 
                            if(has_ip_src_socket(bufs[buf], &ssock)){ 
                                //Note: &ssock returns socket from has_ip_src_socket? 
                                //p3: f.ssock in dom (slt) 
                                if(check_dom(slt_lookup, (void *) &ssock) > 0){ 
                                    //p5 & p6 & p1 & p2 & p3 & p8 
                                    //Discharge f2e1g1m2s2 
                                    update_mlt(mlt_lookup, sa, cur_tsc, port); 
                                    update_slt(slt_lookup, ssock, cur_tsc, port); 
 
                                    //discharge egress 
                                    port_mask = discharge_e1g1(nb_ports, port, 
                                    da, dsock, mlt_lookup, slt_lookup, 
                                    bufs, buf, cur_tsc, mlt_timeout, slt_timeout); 
                                                                 
                                } 
                                //~p3: f.ssock not in dom(slt) 
                                else{ 
                                    //p4 : check slt not full 
                                    if(check_slt_full(slt_ring, cur_tsc) == 0){ 
                                         
                                        //p5 & p6 & p1 & p2 & ~p3 & p4 & p8 
                                        //Discharge f2e1g1m2s3 
                                        update_mlt(mlt_lookup, sa, cur_tsc, port); 
                                        add_slt_entry(slt_ring, slt_lookup, ssock, 
cur_tsc, port); 
 
                                        //discharge egress 
                                        port_mask = discharge_e1g1(nb_ports, port, 
                                        da, dsock, mlt_lookup, slt_lookup, 
                                        bufs, buf, cur_tsc, mlt_timeout, slt_timeout); 
                                 
                                    } 
                                    //~p4 : slt full 
                                    else{ 
                                        //p5 & p6 & p1 & p2 & ~p3 & ~p4 
                                        //Discharge f2e1g1m2s1 
                                         
                                        update_mlt(mlt_lookup, sa, cur_tsc, port); 
                                         
                                        //discharge egress 
                                        port_mask = discharge_e1g1(nb_ports, port, 
                                        da, dsock, mlt_lookup, slt_lookup, 
                                        bufs, buf, cur_tsc, mlt_timeout, slt_timeout); 
 
                                    } 
                                } 
                            } 
                            //~p2: frame not ip packet 
                            else{ 
                                //p5 & p6 & p1 & ~p2 
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                                //Discharge f2e1g1m2s1 
                                update_mlt(mlt_lookup, sa, cur_tsc, port); 
                                 
                                //discharge egress 
                                port_mask = discharge_e1g1(nb_ports, port, 
                                da, dsock, mlt_lookup, slt_lookup, 
                                bufs, buf, cur_tsc, mlt_timeout, slt_timeout); 
 
                            } 
                        } 
                        //~p1: walled(self) 
                        else{ 
                            //p5 & p6 & ~p1 
                            //Discharge f2e1g1m2s1 
 
                            update_mlt(mlt_lookup, sa, cur_tsc, port); 
 
                            //discharge egress 
                            port_mask = discharge_e1g1(nb_ports, port, 
                                da, dsock, mlt_lookup, slt_lookup, 
                                bufs, buf, cur_tsc, mlt_timeout, slt_timeout); 
 
                        } 
                    } 
                    //~p6: f.sa not in dom(mlt) 
                    else{ 
                        //p7: check mlt not full 
                        if(check_mlt_full(mlt_ring, cur_tsc) == 0){ 
                            //p1: walled(self) - 3 counts 
                            if(WALLED(port)){ 
                                //p2: has_ip_src_socket(f) 
                                if(has_ip_src_socket(bufs[buf], &ssock)){ 
                                    //p3: sock in dom(slt) 
                                    if(check_dom(slt_lookup, (void *) &ssock) > 0){ 
                                                                                     
                                        //p5 & ~p6 & p7 & p1 & p2 & p3 & p8 
                                        //Discharge f2e1g1m3s2 
                                        add_mlt_entry(mlt_ring, mlt_lookup, sa, 
cur_tsc, port); 
                                        update_slt(slt_lookup, ssock, cur_tsc, port); 
                                         
                                        //discharge egress 
                                        port_mask = discharge_e1g1(nb_ports, port, 
                                        da, dsock, mlt_lookup, slt_lookup, 
                                        bufs, buf, cur_tsc, mlt_timeout, slt_timeout);   
                                    } 
                                    //~p3: sock not in dom(mlt) 
                                    else{ 
                                        //p4 : check slt not full 
                                        if(check_slt_full(slt_ring, cur_tsc) == 0){ 
                                             
                                            //Discharge f2e1g1m3s3 
                                            add_mlt_entry(mlt_ring, mlt_lookup, sa, 
cur_tsc, port); 
                                            add_slt_entry(slt_ring, slt_lookup, ssock, 
cur_tsc, port); 
 
                                            //discharge egress 
                                            port_mask = discharge_e1g1(nb_ports, port, 
                                                da, dsock, mlt_lookup, slt_lookup, 
                                                bufs, buf, cur_tsc, mlt_timeout, 
slt_timeout);                                           
                                        } 
                                        //~p4 : slt full 
                                        else{ 
                                            //p5 & ~p6 & p7 & p1 & p2 & ~p3 & ~p4 
                                            //Discharge f2e1g1m3s1                       
                                            add_mlt_entry(mlt_ring, mlt_lookup, sa, 
cur_tsc, port); 
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                                            //discharge egress 
                                            port_mask = discharge_e1g1(nb_ports, port, 
                                            da, dsock, mlt_lookup, slt_lookup, 
                                            bufs, buf, cur_tsc, mlt_timeout, 
slt_timeout); 
                                        } 
                                    } 
                                } 
                                //~p2: frame not ip packet 
                                else{ 
                                    //p5 & ~p6 & p7 & p1 & ~p2 
                                    //Discharge f2e1g1m3s1 
                                    add_mlt_entry(mlt_ring, mlt_lookup, sa, cur_tsc, 
port); 
                     
                                    //discharge egress 
                                    port_mask = discharge_e1g1(nb_ports, port, 
                                    da, dsock, mlt_lookup, slt_lookup, 
                                    bufs, buf, cur_tsc, mlt_timeout, slt_timeout); 
                                } 
                            } 
                            //~p1: walled(self) 
                            else{ 
                                //p5 & ~p6 & p7 & ~p1 
                                //Discharge f2e1g1m3s1 
                                add_mlt_entry(mlt_ring, mlt_lookup, sa, cur_tsc, port); 
 
                                //discharge egress 
                                port_mask = discharge_e1g1(nb_ports, port, 
                                    da, dsock, mlt_lookup, slt_lookup, 
                                    bufs, buf, cur_tsc, mlt_timeout, slt_timeout); 
 
                            } 
                        } 
                        //~p7: mlt full 
                        else{ 
                            //p1: walled(self) - 3 counts 
                            if(WALLED(port)){ 
                                //p2: has_ip_src_socket(f) 
                                if(has_ip_src_socket(bufs[buf], &ssock)){ 
                                    //p3: sock in dom(slt) 
                                    if(check_dom(slt_lookup, (void *) &ssock) > 0){ 
                                                                             
                                        //p5 & ~p6 & ~p7 & p1 & p2 & p3 & p8 
                                        //Discharge f2e1g1m1s2 
                                        update_slt(slt_lookup, ssock, cur_tsc, port); 
 
                                        //discharge egress 
                                        port_mask = discharge_e1g1(nb_ports, port, 
                                            da, dsock, mlt_lookup, slt_lookup, 
                                            bufs, buf, cur_tsc, mlt_timeout, 
slt_timeout); 
                                     
                                    } 
                                    //~p3: sock not in dom(mlt) 
                                    else{ 
                                        //p4 : check slt not full 
                                        if(check_slt_full(slt_ring, cur_tsc) == 0){ 
                                             
                                            //p5 & ~p6 & ~p7 & p1 & p2 & ~p3 & p4 & p8 
                                            //Discharge f2e1g1m1s3 
                                            add_slt_entry(slt_ring, slt_lookup, ssock, 
cur_tsc, port); 
                                                 
                                            //discharge egress 
                                            port_mask = discharge_e1g1(nb_ports, port, 
                                                da, dsock, mlt_lookup, slt_lookup, 
                                                bufs, buf, cur_tsc, mlt_timeout, 
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slt_timeout);                                           
                                        } 
                                        //~p4 : slt full 
                                        else{ 
                                            //p5 & ~p6 & ~p7 & p1 & p2 & ~p3 & ~p4 
                                            //Discharge f2e1g1m1s1 
 
                                            //discharge egress 
                                            port_mask = discharge_e1g1(nb_ports, port, 
                                            da, dsock, mlt_lookup, slt_lookup, 
                                            bufs, buf, cur_tsc, mlt_timeout, 
slt_timeout); 
                                        } 
                                    } 
                                } 
                                //~p2: frame not ip packet 
                                else{ 
                                    //p5 & ~p6 & ~p7 & p1 & ~p2 
                                    //Discharge f2e1g1m1s1 
         
                                    //discharge egress 
                                    port_mask = discharge_e1g1(nb_ports, port, 
                                    da, dsock, mlt_lookup, slt_lookup, 
                                    bufs, buf, cur_tsc, mlt_timeout, slt_timeout); 
                                } 
                            } 
                            //~p1: walled(self) 
                            else{ 
                                //p5 & ~p6 & ~p7 & ~p1 
                                //Discharge f2e1g1m1s1 
                 
                                //discharge egress 
                                port_mask = discharge_e1g1(nb_ports, port, 
                                da, dsock, mlt_lookup, slt_lookup, 
                                bufs, buf, cur_tsc, mlt_timeout, slt_timeout); 
                            } 
                        } 
                    } 
                } 
                //~p5: ~ucast(f.sa) 
                else{ 
                    //Discharge f2e1g1m1s1 
                     
                    //discharge egress 
                    port_mask = discharge_e1g1(nb_ports, port, 
                        da, dsock, mlt_lookup, slt_lookup, 
                        bufs, buf, cur_tsc, mlt_timeout, slt_timeout); 
                } 
 
                 
                printf("\nPortmask = %d", port_mask); 
                 
                send_pkt(bufs[buf], 0, port_mask); 
                rte_pktmbuf_free(bufs[buf]); 
             
            } 
        } 




 * The main function, which does initialization and calls the per-lcore functions. 
 */ 
int 
main(int argc, char *argv[]) 
{ 
    struct rte_mempool *mbuf_pool; 
    unsigned nb_ports; 




    /* Initialize the Environment Abstraction Layer (EAL). */ 
    int ret = rte_eal_init(argc, argv); 
    if (ret < 0) 
        rte_exit(EXIT_FAILURE, "Error with EAL initialization\n"); 
 
    argc -= ret; 
    argv += ret; 
 
    nb_ports = rte_eth_dev_count(); 
 
    if (nb_ports != 4) rte_exit(EXIT_FAILURE, "eth dev count not 4\n"); 
 
    /* Initialize all_ports_mask. */ 
    for (portid = 1, all_ports_mask = 1; portid < nb_ports; portid++) 
        all_ports_mask = (all_ports_mask << 1) | 1; 
 
    /* Check that there is an even number of ports to send/receive on. 
    if (nb_ports < 2 || (nb_ports & 1)) 
        rte_exit(EXIT_FAILURE, "Error: number of ports must be even\n"); 
    */ 
 
    /* Creates a new mempool in memory to hold the mbufs. */ 
    mbuf_pool = rte_pktmbuf_pool_create("MBUF_POOL", NUM_MBUFS * nb_ports, 
        MBUF_CACHE_SIZE, 0, RTE_MBUF_DEFAULT_BUF_SIZE, rte_socket_id()); 
 
    if (mbuf_pool == NULL) 
        rte_exit(EXIT_FAILURE, "Cannot create mbuf pool\n"); 
 
    /* Initialize all ports. */ 
    for (portid = 0; portid < nb_ports; portid++) 
        if (port_init(portid, mbuf_pool) != 0) 
            rte_exit(EXIT_FAILURE, "Cannot init port %"PRIu8 "\n", 
                    portid); 
 
    if (rte_lcore_count() > 1) 
        printf("\nWARNING: Multiple lcores enabled. Only 1 used.\n"); 
 
    /* Call lcore_main on the master core only. */ 
     
    printf("\nRunning Version %s\n", VERSION); 
     
    lcore_main(); 






THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
131 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
[1] P4 Language Consortium, “Programming protocol-independent packet 
processors.” Accessed Jul. 25, 2019. [Online]. Available: https://p4.org/ 
[2] M. Dobrescu and K. Argyraki, “Software dataplane verification,” 
Communications of the ACM, vol. 58, no. 11, pp. 113–121, Oct. 2015. 
[3] M. Neves, L. Freire, A. Schaeffer-Filho, and M. Barcellos, “Verification of P4 
programs in feasible time using assertions,” in Proceedings of the 14th 
International Conference on emerging Networking EXperiments and 
Technologies (CoNEXT ‘18). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 73–85. [Online]. DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.1145/3281411.3281421 
[4] J. Liu, W. Hallahan, C. Schlesinger, M. Sharif, J. Lee, R. Soule, H. Wang, C. 
Cascaval, N. McKeown, and N. Foster. “p4v: practical verification for 
programmable data planes,” in Proceedings of the 2018 Conference of the ACM 
Special Interest Group on data communication, 2018, pp. 490–503. 
[5] D. Volpano, “Modular network function virtualization,” in IEEE Conference on 
Computer Communications Workshops (INFOCOM WKSHPS), 2017. 
[6] A. Panda, O. Lahav, K. Argyraki, M. Sagiv, and S. Shenker, “Verifying Isolation 
Properties in the Presence of Middleboxes,” Computing Research Repository, 
Cornell University, vol. abs/1409.7687, 2014. 
[7] D. Zhou, B. Fan, H. Lim, M. Kaminsky, and D. Andersen, “Scalable, high 
performance ethernet forwarding with CuckooSwitch,” in Proceedings of the 9th 
ACM conference on Emerging Networking Experiments and Technologies, 2013, 
pp. 97–108. 
[8] E. Kohler, R. Morris, B. Chen, J. Jannotti, and M. Kaashoek, “The Click modular 
router,” ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS), vol. 18, no. 3, pp. 263–
297, Aug. 2000D. 
[9] D. Volpano, advisor-student weekly meetings. Jan.–Jul. 2019. 
[10] Data Plane Development Kit, “7. Basic forwarding sample application.” Accessed 
Jul. 25, 2019. [Online]. Available: https://doc.dpdk.org/guides-
18.08/sample_app_ug/skeleton.html 
[11]  Data Plane Development Kit, “API version 17.11.6.” Accessed Aug. 20, 2019. 
[Online]. Available: https://doc.dpdk.org/api-17.11/ 
132 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
  
133 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
